BW Legal Letter of Claim (Britannia)

Coupon-mad

my other claim is a little more progressed at the N180 stage, and is being managed in the same way using the advice on these threads!

Was the different VRN the only difference? Same location and contravention alleged exactly, same sort of facts?

If so, with your other claim, send the local court a note as soon as you hear that it's been allocated to your local court, citing BOTH claim numbers and using the words you find on several results when you search:

two claims? abuse of process

But only if the facts/site are the same, otherwise they shouldn't be consolidated into one hearing.

Lunar2019

Almost had it, thanks Keith P. I'll aim to post up my defence today for comments, which will be gratefully received!

Lunar2019

Coupon-mad wrote: »

Was the different VRN the only difference? Same location and contravention alleged exactly, same sort of facts?

If so, with your other claim, send the local court a note as soon as you hear that it's been allocated to your local court, citing BOTH claim numbers and using the words you find on several results when you search:

two claims? abuse of process

But only if the facts/site are the same, otherwise they shouldn't be consolidated into one hearing.

Ah I see - they were two separate locations so I understand now that they'll have to be treated separately, thanks for clarifying. Is there any value in mentioning the strong suspicion/highly convenient point that receiving this PCN in Nov 2018 "re-activated" an older PCN that I had heard nothing about for aorund 19 months? Different reg numbers so a search of my name is the trigger... A SAR submitted at a time when I had 2 PCNs in my pocket came back stating I only had 1...twice.

Lunar2019

Afternoon all, First draft of my defence is copied below, I fear it is a little too long.. comments on where/how I can shorten and condense are appreciated - I wanted the first draft to include all points I think are relevant to then whittle down a little.

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: XXX

BETWEEN:

BRITANNIA PARKING LTD (Claimant)

-and-

XXX (Defendant)

The Defendant is the Registered Keeper of vehicle registration number XXX. The Claim relates to an alleged debt arising from the driver's alleged breach of contract, when visiting the XXX car park, on XXX between XX and XX, while awaiting the collection of a resident of XXX. The car park in question is the registered car park for residents of these adjacent apartments. The Defendant appealed the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) on a number of counts.

It is denied that there was any agreement to pay the Claimant’s £100 PCN, by means of a ‘contract’ between the Defendant and the Claimant, for the reasons set out below.

Firstly, there is no safe or legal alternative to wait in the proximity of the apartments. XX Road is marked with double yellow lines and 24-hour bus lanes on both sides of the road, a point which was highlighted to the Claimant. As dictated by the Road Traffic Regulations Act (1984, 27 (5)) and the Highway Code Waiting Restrictions, to wait on the roadside at the location of XXX would have been a contravention of a traffic regulation order. Given the lack of alternatives, and applying some common sense, there was no option but to await a passenger within the car park.

Secondly, it is denied that the car in question was parked; at no point was the car left unattended, and therefore the Claimant’s allegations that this car was parked, and a parking contract entered into, for 13.5 minutes is denied. The Defendant adds that the Oxford English Dictionary definition of the term ‘park’ is to bring (a vehicle that one is driving) to a halt and leave it temporarily, typically in a car park or by the side of the road.

The Defendant would like to draw attention to Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016] whereby:
“The purported prohibition was upon “parking”, and it is possible to draw a real and sensible distinction between pausing for a few moments or minutes to enable passengers to alight or for awkward or heavy items to be unloaded, and parking in the sense of leaving a car for some significant duration of time…”

“The concept of parking, as opposed to stopping, is that of leaving a car for some duration of time beyond that needed for getting in or out of it, loading or unloading it, and perhaps coping with some vicissitude of short duration, such as changing a wheel in the event of a puncture. Merely to stop a vehicle cannot be to park it; otherwise traffic jams would consist of lines of parked cars. Delivery vans, whether for post, newspapers, groceries, or anything else, would not be accommodated on an interpretation which included vehicles stopping for a few moments for these purposes.”

Further, the signage does not state that waiting is not permitted when engaging in the collection or alighting of residents of XXX. A driver engaged in this activity has no reason to alight their vehicle and therefore cannot be held accountable for ‘leaving the car unattended’ as the correspondence in this case state.

Kelvin Reynolds, BPA Director of Corporate Affairs says there is a difference between ‘grace’ periods and ‘observation’ periods in parking and that good practice allows for this. It could be argued that grace periods apply to those who have agreed to the terms and conditions of the car park, but time is allowed for the driver to return and leave should there be a delay. An observation period on the other hand is the time when an enforcement officer would be able to determine the motorists intentions once in the car park. In this case, the use of an ANPR system did not allow for such observation period to occur. No time limit is specified for observation periods, as this is dependent on various factors, not limited to disability.

As evidence is reliant on ANPR, the Defendant would like to raise that the signage at the car park in question bears no mention of a grace period. A failure to clearly present such evidence should be regarded as an attempt to mislead. It is only upon receipt of a PCN from the Claimant that the grace period is identified as 10 minutes, with no allowance for an observation period.
Regardless of whether grace and/or observation periods were clearly outlined or not, as this case does not relate to a parked car, and in the absence of clear signage to state that waiting and/or collection of residents is not permitted, there is significant grounds for confusion and uncertainty in this scenario.

The length of time given by the Claimant for a resident to vacate their property, and journey down to the adjacent car park is discriminatory towards those of limited mobility and disability; 13.5 minutes is not an unreasonable amount of time to wait, and this time should not have to be justified in order to satisfy arbitrary criteria. Using this logic, and as alluded to in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016], an ambulance in the act of resuscitating a resident, or a broken down vehicle would receive a parking ticket for an overstay, despite having good and honest reasons for being there. The Defendant trusts that the Court will take judicial notice of this wholly unreasonable conduct, and agree with the logic set out above.

The Defendant has repeatedly drawn these matters to the Claimant’s attention, who have refused to see reason.

The fact of the presence of the terms and conditions of the signage ‘contract’ should not be used to be a legally binding agreement, as the font on the signage is too small to be read by a passing car.

In any case, the Claimant is put to strict proof that it had sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it had the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation in its own name on the material date.

The Claimant may try to rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. However, with no 'legitimate interest' excuse for charging this unconscionable sum given the above facts, this Claimant is fully aware that their claim is reduced to an unrecoverable penalty and must fail.

The Beavis case confirmed that the penalty rule is certainly engaged in any case of a private parking charge and was only disengaged due to the unique circumstances of that case, which do not resemble this claim, where there was no breach, no right to issue a PCN within 13.5 minutes and nothing to deter.

Differences in facts include but are not limited to:
the signs/terms were not prominent (grace periods being a 'misleading omission' on the signage, contrary to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (2008);
the Defendant did not ignore the PCN;
this was not a free car park which complicated the decision in Beavis; and
the PCN bore no resemblance to the advertised tariff.
As such, this case is fully distinguished from Beavis, where the decision turned on a legitimate interest in charging more as a deterrent, and clear notices proclaiming brief terms and an agreed contractual sum that did not impact on the rights and interests of drivers.

Instead, the Defendant received a PCN demanding an extortionate £100, a 4900% increase, (also described as the 'parking charge' but clearly an unrecoverable penalty) suggesting that the Claimant is operating a punitive unjustified and excessively data-intrusive ANPR system to their own ends, which is not transparent to consumers. A 'parking charge' of £2 unexpectedly becomes an extortionate £100 bill several weeks later (described also as the 'parking charge'). This is not the sort of 'complex' issue with a 'compelling' commercial justification that saved the charge in Beavis from the penalty rule.

To quote from the Supreme Court:
i) Para 108: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''.

ii) Para 199: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests. Customers using the car park agree to the scheme by doing so.''

iii) Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

Taking the comments of the Supreme Court (and the Court of Appeal in the earlier hearing in Beavis) into account, the Defendant avers that the factually-different Beavis decision confirms the assertion that the £100 PCN is unconscionable, given the facts of this case. If the 'parking charge' (the first interpretation meaning the car park tariff payable for 13.5 minutes) was unpaid, then the sum 'owed' is a quantifiable figure of £2.00.

In addition to the original PCN penalty, for which liability is denied, the Claimants have artificially inflated the value of the Claim by adding purported added 'costs' of £60, which the Defendant submits have not actually been incurred by the Claimant.

The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (the POFA) Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper (NTK) in this case £100. In the Beavis case, ParkingEye were only able to seek the only stated 'parking charge' sum on their NTK, since there was no quantifiable tariff. It is not accepted that £100 can be claimed instead of £2 in this case, but either way, the additional sum of £60 on top, appears to be a disingenuous attempt at double recovery.

These have been variously described as a 'BW Legal instructions fee' (in the pre-action exchange of letters) and/or a 'debt collection charge' (not part of any terms on signage and cannot be added, not least because it was never expended). Suddenly in the Particulars there is also a second add-on for purported 'legal representative costs’ of £50 on top of the vague £60, artificially hiking the sum to £XXX. This would be more than double recovery, being vague and disingenuous and the Defendant is alarmed by this gross abuse of process.

Not only are such costs not permitted (CPR 27.14) but the Defendant believes that the Claimant has not incurred legal costs. Given the fact that BW Legal boasted in Bagri v BW Legal Ltd of processing 'millions' of claims with an admin team (and only a handful of solicitors), the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste PPS robo-claims at all, on the balance of probabilities.

According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA the Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent on preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration cost.

The Defendant undertook a Subject Access Request to obtain all data held under that name, this request included a list of all PCNs the Claimant considered outstanding against the Defendant. The resulting information received did not reveal that they had two PCNs on record, despite active communication for both at the time of SAR submission. I think this part may be a little irrelevant at this stage? Thoughts?

To summarise, it is denied that a contractual agreement with the Claimant was entered into, whether express, implied, or by conduct. The signage at the car park in question was not sufficient in demonstrating the terms and conditions. It is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Lunar2019

The paragraphs are numbered in the original document FYI.

Lunar2019 wrote: »

Afternoon all, First draft of my defence is copied below, I fear it is a little too long.. comments on where/how I can shorten and condense are appreciated - I wanted the first draft to include all points I think are relevant to then whittle down a little.

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: XXX

BETWEEN:

BRITANNIA PARKING LTD (Claimant)

-and-

XXX (Defendant)

The Defendant is the Registered Keeper of vehicle registration number XXX. The Claim relates to an alleged debt arising from the driver's alleged breach of contract, when visiting the XXX car park, on XXX between XX and XX, while awaiting the collection of a resident of XXX. The car park in question is the registered car park for residents of these adjacent apartments. The Defendant appealed the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) on a number of counts.

It is denied that there was any agreement to pay the Claimant’s £100 PCN, by means of a ‘contract’ between the Defendant and the Claimant, for the reasons set out below.

Firstly, there is no safe or legal alternative to wait in the proximity of the apartments. XX Road is marked with double yellow lines and 24-hour bus lanes on both sides of the road, a point which was highlighted to the Claimant. As dictated by the Road Traffic Regulations Act (1984, 27 (5)) and the Highway Code Waiting Restrictions, to wait on the roadside at the location of XXX would have been a contravention of a traffic regulation order. Given the lack of alternatives, and applying some common sense, there was no option but to await a passenger within the car park.

Secondly, it is denied that the car in question was parked; at no point was the car left unattended, and therefore the Claimant’s allegations that this car was parked, and a parking contract entered into, for 13.5 minutes is denied. The Defendant adds that the Oxford English Dictionary definition of the term ‘park’ is to bring (a vehicle that one is driving) to a halt and leave it temporarily, typically in a car park or by the side of the road.

The Defendant would like to draw attention to Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016] whereby:
“The purported prohibition was upon “parking”, and it is possible to draw a real and sensible distinction between pausing for a few moments or minutes to enable passengers to alight or for awkward or heavy items to be unloaded, and parking in the sense of leaving a car for some significant duration of time…”

“The concept of parking, as opposed to stopping, is that of leaving a car for some duration of time beyond that needed for getting in or out of it, loading or unloading it, and perhaps coping with some vicissitude of short duration, such as changing a wheel in the event of a puncture. Merely to stop a vehicle cannot be to park it; otherwise traffic jams would consist of lines of parked cars. Delivery vans, whether for post, newspapers, groceries, or anything else, would not be accommodated on an interpretation which included vehicles stopping for a few moments for these purposes.”

Further, the signage does not state that waiting is not permitted when engaging in the collection or alighting of residents of XXX. A driver engaged in this activity has no reason to alight their vehicle and therefore cannot be held accountable for ‘leaving the car unattended’ as the correspondence in this case state.

Kelvin Reynolds, BPA Director of Corporate Affairs says there is a difference between ‘grace’ periods and ‘observation’ periods in parking and that good practice allows for this. It could be argued that grace periods apply to those who have agreed to the terms and conditions of the car park, but time is allowed for the driver to return and leave should there be a delay. An observation period on the other hand is the time when an enforcement officer would be able to determine the motorists intentions once in the car park. In this case, the use of an ANPR system did not allow for such observation period to occur. No time limit is specified for observation periods, as this is dependent on various factors, not limited to disability.

As evidence is reliant on ANPR, the Defendant would like to raise that the signage at the car park in question bears no mention of a grace period. A failure to clearly present such evidence should be regarded as an attempt to mislead. It is only upon receipt of a PCN from the Claimant that the grace period is identified as 10 minutes, with no allowance for an observation period.
Regardless of whether grace and/or observation periods were clearly outlined or not, as this case does not relate to a parked car, and in the absence of clear signage to state that waiting and/or collection of residents is not permitted, there is significant grounds for confusion and uncertainty in this scenario.

The length of time given by the Claimant for a resident to vacate their property, and journey down to the adjacent car park is discriminatory towards those of limited mobility and disability; 13.5 minutes is not an unreasonable amount of time to wait, and this time should not have to be justified in order to satisfy arbitrary criteria. Using this logic, and as alluded to in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016], an ambulance in the act of resuscitating a resident, or a broken down vehicle would receive a parking ticket for an overstay, despite having good and honest reasons for being there. The Defendant trusts that the Court will take judicial notice of this wholly unreasonable conduct, and agree with the logic set out above.

The Defendant has repeatedly drawn these matters to the Claimant’s attention, who have refused to see reason.

The fact of the presence of the terms and conditions of the signage ‘contract’ should not be used to be a legally binding agreement, as the font on the signage is too small to be read by a passing car.

In any case, the Claimant is put to strict proof that it had sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it had the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation in its own name on the material date.

The Claimant may try to rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. However, with no 'legitimate interest' excuse for charging this unconscionable sum given the above facts, this Claimant is fully aware that their claim is reduced to an unrecoverable penalty and must fail.

The Beavis case confirmed that the penalty rule is certainly engaged in any case of a private parking charge and was only disengaged due to the unique circumstances of that case, which do not resemble this claim, where there was no breach, no right to issue a PCN within 13.5 minutes and nothing to deter.

Differences in facts include but are not limited to:
the signs/terms were not prominent (grace periods being a 'misleading omission' on the signage, contrary to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (2008);
the Defendant did not ignore the PCN;
this was not a free car park which complicated the decision in Beavis; and
the PCN bore no resemblance to the advertised tariff.
As such, this case is fully distinguished from Beavis, where the decision turned on a legitimate interest in charging more as a deterrent, and clear notices proclaiming brief terms and an agreed contractual sum that did not impact on the rights and interests of drivers.

Instead, the Defendant received a PCN demanding an extortionate £100, a 4900% increase, (also described as the 'parking charge' but clearly an unrecoverable penalty) suggesting that the Claimant is operating a punitive unjustified and excessively data-intrusive ANPR system to their own ends, which is not transparent to consumers. A 'parking charge' of £2 unexpectedly becomes an extortionate £100 bill several weeks later (described also as the 'parking charge'). This is not the sort of 'complex' issue with a 'compelling' commercial justification that saved the charge in Beavis from the penalty rule.

To quote from the Supreme Court:
i) Para 108: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''.

ii) Para 199: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests. Customers using the car park agree to the scheme by doing so.''

iii) Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

Taking the comments of the Supreme Court (and the Court of Appeal in the earlier hearing in Beavis) into account, the Defendant avers that the factually-different Beavis decision confirms the assertion that the £100 PCN is unconscionable, given the facts of this case. If the 'parking charge' (the first interpretation meaning the car park tariff payable for 13.5 minutes) was unpaid, then the sum 'owed' is a quantifiable figure of £2.00.

In addition to the original PCN penalty, for which liability is denied, the Claimants have artificially inflated the value of the Claim by adding purported added 'costs' of £60, which the Defendant submits have not actually been incurred by the Claimant.

The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (the POFA) Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper (NTK) in this case £100. In the Beavis case, ParkingEye were only able to seek the only stated 'parking charge' sum on their NTK, since there was no quantifiable tariff. It is not accepted that £100 can be claimed instead of £2 in this case, but either way, the additional sum of £60 on top, appears to be a disingenuous attempt at double recovery.

These have been variously described as a 'BW Legal instructions fee' (in the pre-action exchange of letters) and/or a 'debt collection charge' (not part of any terms on signage and cannot be added, not least because it was never expended). Suddenly in the Particulars there is also a second add-on for purported 'legal representative costs’ of £50 on top of the vague £60, artificially hiking the sum to £XXX. This would be more than double recovery, being vague and disingenuous and the Defendant is alarmed by this gross abuse of process.

Not only are such costs not permitted (CPR 27.14) but the Defendant believes that the Claimant has not incurred legal costs. Given the fact that BW Legal boasted in Bagri v BW Legal Ltd of processing 'millions' of claims with an admin team (and only a handful of solicitors), the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste PPS robo-claims at all, on the balance of probabilities.

According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA the Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent on preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration cost.

The Defendant undertook a Subject Access Request to obtain all data held under that name, this request included a list of all PCNs the Claimant considered outstanding against the Defendant. The resulting information received did not reveal that they had two PCNs on record, despite active communication for both at the time of SAR submission. I think this part may be a little irrelevant at this stage? Thoughts?

To summarise, it is denied that a contractual agreement with the Claimant was entered into, whether express, implied, or by conduct. The signage at the car park in question was not sufficient in demonstrating the terms and conditions. It is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Le_Kirk

You are not going to get away with "I wasn't parked guv" so all that stuff about the dictionary can go. If you stopped, you parked. The only time I've seen anybody "get away" with something similar is if a car is constantly circling a car park looking for a space. You are right that the defence is a little long. Did you look at the NEWBIE section post # 2 where you will find some concise defences written by Bargepole and others and there is one about "own space ticketing" which you might be able to adapt. I know it is not "your space" but you were waiting for a resident and might be able to use "visitor" arguments.

Lunar2019

Afternoon all,
Updated and condensed Defence here for you, some afternoon reading if anyone finds themselves with some free time...! Thanks for the comments/support to date.

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: XXX

BETWEEN:

BRITANNIA PARKING LTD (Claimant)

-and-

XXX (Defendant)

DEFENCE


The Defendant is the Registered Keeper of vehicle registration number XXX. The Claim relates to an alleged debt arising from the driver's alleged breach of contract, when visiting the XXX car park, on XXX between XXX and XXX, while awaiting the collection of a resident of XXX. The car park in question is the registered car park for residents of the adjacent apartments. The Defendant appealed the PCN on a number of counts.

It is denied that a contractual agreement with the Claimant was entered into, whether express, implied or by conduct. The terms on the Claimant's signage are also displayed in a font which is too small to be read from a waiting vehicle. It is therefore denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding contract. The fact of the presence the signage ‘contract’ should not be used to be a legally binding agreement.

The Defendant would like to raise that the signage at the car park in question bears no mention of a grace period or waiting periods when in the act of collecting a resident of XXX, a misleading omission. It is only upon receipt of a PCN from the Claimant that the grace period is identified as 10 minutes. A driver engaged in the collection of residents has a legitimate and authorised reason to visit the car park, and no reason to alight their vehicle. The presumption that the vehicle in question was left unattended within the carpark is factually incorrect.

Further, there is no safe or legal alternative to wait in the proximity of the apartments. XXX Road is marked with double yellow lines and 24-hour bus lanes on both sides of the road. As dictated by the Road Traffic Regulations Act (1984, 27 (5)) and the Highway Code Waiting Restrictions, to wait on the roadside at the location of XXX would have been a contravention of a traffic regulation order. Given the lack of alternatives, and applying some common sense, there was no option but to await a passenger within the car park. The Defendant has repeatedly drawn these matters to the Claimant’s attention, who have refused to see reason.

The length of time given by the Claimant for a resident to vacate their property, and journey down to the adjacent car park is discriminatory towards those of limited mobility and disability; 13.5 minutes is not an unreasonable amount of time, and this time should not have to be justified in order to satisfy arbitrary criteria.

In any case, the Claimant is put to strict proof that it had sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it had the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation in its own name on the material date.

The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, in Schedule 4, Para 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100.


The Claimant may try to rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. However, with no 'legitimate interest' excuse for charging this unconscionable sum given the above facts, this Claimant is fully aware that their claim is reduced to an unrecoverable penalty and must fail.

Differences in facts include but are not limited to:
the signs/terms were not prominent (grace periods being a 'misleading omission' on the signage, contrary to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (2008);
the Defendant did not ignore the PCN;
this was not a free car park which complicated the decision in Beavis; and
the PCN bore no resemblance to the advertised tariff.

If the 'parking charge' (the first interpretation meaning the car park tariff payable for 13.5 minutes) was unpaid, then the sum 'owed' is a quantifiable figure of £2.00.

Instead, the Defendant received a PCN demanding an extortionate £100, later increasing to £160 following a ‘BW Legal Instructions Fee’, and a further add-on of £50 for ‘legal representative costs’. A final claim of £XXX is more than double recovery, being vague and disingenuous and the Defendant is alarmed by this gross abuse of process.

To summarise, it is denied that a contractual agreement with the Claimant was entered into, whether express, implied, or by conduct. The signage at the car park in question was not sufficient in demonstrating the terms and conditions. It is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

beamerguy

You may wish to expand on the £60 fake claim to the judge

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6014081/abuse-of-process-district-judge-tells-bwlegal

Coupon-mad

Yep, by ending a defence like this, especially as this is Britannia (Named & shamed):

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/75922229#Comment_75922229

HTH

Lunar2019

Coupon-mad wrote: »

Yep, by ending a defence like this, especially as this is Britannia (Named & shamed):

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/75922229#Comment_75922229

HTH

My case will also be Southampton so this is promising!! Thanks Coupon Mad!