Gladstone & UKCPM county court claim

Umkomaas

The CCBC are running around 6 working days behind schedule.

Coupon-mad

DO NOT go anywhere near the MCOL Defence page/box. Eeeek no!

We've had victims be stupid enough to type 'see email' or 'TBA' in there before and then GUESS what is taken to be their defence, in law?

Yep, those words: 'see email' or TBA...

Lauz44

Sorry for the silence, I have just received a court date for the middle of next month. I'll be leaving for a fortnight holiday in a few days so have been trying to finish my WS so it's submitted before I go. I would appreciate any help with it when it's posted.

Coupon-mad

Yep, certainly.

Lauz44

Here is my WS. I have taken information re: cases from others therefore apologise if there are any errors. It has been a long weekend trying to compile this so I understand this may not be the most concise piece of work. Sorry if it doesn't flow. I've struggled to find anything applicable to my case in terms of similar cases where permits haven't been issued. I very much appreciate any help/guidance with this.

CLAIM No: XXXXX

BETWEEN: UK CAR PARK MANAGEMENT LTD (Claimant)

-and-

XX (Defendant)

Witness Statement

1. Sequence Of Events
1.1 I am XX of X and am the Defendant in this matter, and will say as follows; I am an unrepresented consumer with no experience of Court procedure. Should I not present my case as professionally as the Claimant’s, I trust that the Court excuses my inexperience and reserves any criticism for the extremely sparse particulars filed by the Claimant’s Solicitors.

1.2 The Claimant has been extremely unclear as to what the ‘parking charge’ in question refers to, referring to it on separate occasions as a charge for ‘unauthorised parking’, a ‘consideration for parking’ and a charge for ‘breach of terms’ - all very different things. This makes is very difficult to focus my defence and I apologise if, as a result, this statement seems rather long-winded. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, and non-compliance of the Claimant with the Pre-Action Protocols, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any of the Claimant's purported contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

1.3. Whilst residing at the student accommodation on XX in X, I was informed by a friend that there was a reduced fee for a month’s parking permit available to students residing at the accommodation. I received the email application from a friend and submitted the required personal information and a payment to the requested account of XX for a one month permit for £45.00. The payment debited my account at on the 12th X 2018 (exhibit 1) and I then moved my car to the car park in question. A hand written note was left inside the car on the dashboard explaining that a permit had been paid for and all details were available to the land owner (exhibit 2).

1.4 I returned to my car on the 14th X 2018 to a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) on the windscreen, the subject of this claim (exhibit 3). The reason for issue being ‘not displaying a valid permit’

1.5. As I applied for and paid the landowner directly for a month long parking permit on the 12th XXX 2018 prior to the PCN being issued on the 13th (same month) 2018. Instructions for the purchase and issue of the permit from the landowner stated “upon receipt of a completed parking agreement (exhibit 4) and your fee, your parking permit will be issued to you immediately”. With no further instruction regarding displaying or issuing of the permit, and due to the lack of clarity regarding the timeframe of receiving the permit, as explained, a note was displayed on the car dashboard. The Defendant knew nothing about any risk of a further charge, having paid for ''immediate'' permission and parked in good faith, relying upon the prior agreement made with the landowner, concluded by the application and payment of the sum agreed as a licence to park for the dates stated. Therefore, as a valid parking permit was applied and paid for pertaining to the vehicle in question prior to the PCN being issued it is argued that the PCN was issued incorrectly.

1.6. The PCN states that the charge is for ‘unauthorised parking’ and I ‘parked on private property in a manner where the driver agreed to pay a parking charge as displayed on the signage at the site’. This in itself is contradictory as I cannot have entered into an agreement to do something that I was not ‘authorised’ to do, parking is either ‘authorised’ or it isn’t.

1.7. On the 14th X 2018 I emailed the land owners representative directly questioning why I’d received a PCN when I’d applied and paid for a permit. A reply was received on the 15th X 2019 from the land owner’s representative with an emailed permit attached though no reply to my queries about the PCN. A further reply was sent to the representative who instructed me to contact ‘the parking company directly to dispute the fine’.

1.8. On 25th X 2018 I submitted an appeal letter to the Claimant against the parking charge on the grounds that paid the land owner directly, adhering to the guidance sent to me by the land owner themselves. As my contract was with the land owner, I believe I have upheld and complied with their requests. I asked for a breakdown of the costs however this was not addressed in the reply I received on the 22nd X 2018 and did not received a response to this appeal (exhibit 5). The claimant refused to provide any evidence of landowner authority for issuing parking charges.

1.9. On the 27th X 2018 I submitted a formal complaint however did not receive a reply to my queries from UK Car Park Management. On the 8th X 2018 a formal demand letter for payment from UKCPM was sent for a ‘parking charge notice’ for the charge of £100.00 with no breakdown of the costs, with a threat that an overdue charge would ‘increase to £149.00 in the first instance of further action’.

1.10. I heard nothing further from the Claimant until 15th X 2018 when I received a letter from Debt Recovery Plus Ltd acting on behalf of UKCPM demanding £160.00 payment. A further letter was received with the threat of court action for unpaid parking charge for £160.00 on the 30th X 2018 (exhibit 6).

1.11. No correspondence was received until their agents, Gladstones Solicitors (a well-known serial litigant and ‘roboclaimer’), sent a letter before claim on the 12th X 2018 demanding money and threatening court action (exhibit 7). I began researching my case and was advised not to correspond with Gladstones Solicitors.

1.12. On the 25th X 2018 I received a Claim Form from the County Court Business Centre instructing me that Gladstones Solictors were issuing proceedings against me on behalf of the Claimant for parking ‘in breach of the terms of parking stipulated on the signage at XX, X’ with an outline of alleged costs.

1.14. On the 31st X 2019 I submitted my defence and later declined mediation as I didn’t feel the IAS could be considered ‘independent’ as it is owned and operated by William Hurley and John Davies, also the owners of Gladstones Solictors who had already been instructed by the Claimant to issue court proceedings against me. This represents a clear conflict of interest.

2. No Contract Exists
2.1 I understand from correspondence with the Claimant that the Claimant’s case relies upon the signage at the site (exhibit 8) constituting a ‘contract’ between myself and the Claimant as per ParkingEye vs Beavis. The ‘breach of terms’ on the Particulars Of Claim presumably refers to the supposed ‘contract’ formed by this signage.

2.2. Even if the Claimant is relying on a purported contract flowing from signs at the location, such terms were not prominent and were never seen by the Defendant, failing Lord Denning's 'red hand rule'. Any signs were not 'adequate notice' of the claimed parking charge and nor did the Defendant know about, or agree to by conduct or otherwise, any 'relevant obligation' or 'relevant contract' (ref: the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4).

2.3. This Claimant offered no consideration to the Defendant, since there was nothing of value that the Defendant did not already possess from the promise made by the landowner of permission and a licence to park 'immediately'. Nothing was mentioned about a paper permit being required, nor about any penalty risk, nor even that signage on site formed part of that contract and must be read/complied with before parking. This Claimant was not even a party to the parking licence, thus they are a stranger to the contractual permission the Defendant relied upon and they could not, as a third party, bolt on new terms to the promise of the 'immediate' parking licence agreement.

2.4. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient interest in the land or that there are specific terms in its contract to bring an action on its own behalf. As a third party agent, the Claimant may not pursue any charge, unless specifically authorised by the principal. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant does not have the authority to issue charges on this land in their own name, and that they have no right to bring any action regarding this claim.

2.5. In ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’, on which the Claimant relies to justify this charge, it was found that a contract could exist because there was a meaningful ‘offer’ made to the Defendant (that of a licence allowing free parking for a set period of time) and that the Defendant’s agreeing not to overstay this period could constitute a ‘consideration’ in respect of this. The ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ judgement is littered with references to the disputed charge being justifiable only in the context of the ‘contractual licence to park’ being given to the Defendant, e.g. ‘They must regard the risk of having to pay £85 for overstaying as an acceptable price for the convenience of parking there’.

2.6. There is no such ‘offer’ made by the signage in this case, no ‘contractual licence’, no ‘benefit of free parking‘ and no conceivable way I could have benefitted from this alleged ‘contract’ without breaching its terms.

2.7. The parking contract in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ case was judged to be ‘objectively reasonable’ partly because ‘motorists generally’ did accept it (108). The landowner wanted as many people as possible to use the car park in question so the contractual arrangements were designed to be attractive to the average motorist. This is the complete antithesis of the supposed ‘contract’ in this case which is designed to actively discourage motorists from parking at the site. The terms of this ‘contract‘ are not ‘objectively reasonable’, but deliberately designed to be so heinous that no one in their right mind would agree to them. It follows that this is not a ‘contract’ but a prohibitory notice masquerading as such.

2.8. In J Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw in the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning states that ‘the more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be given of it’. This is commonly referred to the ‘Red Hand Rule’. As the terms of this ‘contract’ (specifically the clause relating to a £100 parking charge) are designed to discourage motorists from accepting them it follows that they must be ‘unreasonable’ and that therefore Lord Denning’s rule should apply.

2.9. The Claimant has not applied Lord Denning’s ‘Red Hand Rule’ to the terms and conditions in this case. The sentence that refers to a ‘parking charge’ is in an extremely small font (one of the smallest on the sign) which, given that this sign is supposed to be read from a vehicle, is woefully inadequate - particularly when compared to the signage in the ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ case.

2.10. The very act of entering into this alleged ‘contract’ (parking) constitutes a breach of its terms, therefore making it impossible to perform.

2.11. Both the PCN and Notice to Keeper I was issued by the Claimant state the reason for the disputed charge as being ‘breaching the terms of the contract’. I cannot be seen to have entered into a contract for something I was not ‘authorised’ to do.

2.12. In the case of ‘Parking Control Management v Bull’ the Judge found that it was ‘impossible to construct out of this in any way, either actually or contingently or conditionally, any permission for anyone to park on the roadway.’ and that therefore any charges made on the basis of said signage would be damages for trespass and must constitute reparations for actual loss.

3. Inadequate Signage
3.1 A key factor in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ was that the relevant signs were ‘large, prominent and legible, so that any reasonable user of the car park would be aware of their existence and nature’ and ‘The charge is prominently displayed in large letters at the entrance to the car park and at frequent intervals within it’. That is not the case here.

3.2 In‘Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest’ the Court of Appeal ruled that a person cannot be presumed bound by terms and conditions on signage that they haven’t seen. In this case, which was found in favour of the motorist, the signage was deemed insufficient because there was no sign directly adjacent to the Appellant’s parking bay and the only signage that was displayed could not have been seen from within the vehicle whilst parking.

3.3 A key factor in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ was that ParkingEye were found to have operated in line with the relevant parking operator’s code of practice.

3.4 In this case the signage and operating practice of the Claimant fails, on numerous counts, to adhere to the standards laid out by the relevant accredited parking operator - The International Parking Community (IPC).

3.4.1 The IPC guidelines state that signage at the entrance to the site should ‘Make it clear that the motorist is entering onto private land’. There is no signage at the entrance to the site in question and one can see from the photographs that I would not have passed any signage indicating I was entering private land.

3.4.2 The IPC guidelines state that signage should include a very large ‘P’ to alert the motorist to the fact that said signage relates to parking restrictions. There is no large ‘P’, or even a small ‘P’ on the signage in this case.

3.4.3 The IPC guidelines state that text on signage ‘should be of such a size and in a font that can be easily read by a motorist having regard to the likely position of the motorist in relation to the sign.’ The text on the signage, particularly that which refers to ‘contractual terms’ and a ‘parking charge’ is very small. This, coupled with the fact that the sign is mounted at least 7ft off the ground, makes it very hard to read and impossible to read from a vehicle.

3.4.4 The IPC guidelines state that signage that is intended to form a contract should ‘Be clearly legible and placed in such a position (or positions) such that a driver of a vehicle is able to see them clearly upon entering the site or parking a vehicle within the site’. It is more-or-less impossible to read this signage whilst driving as it is mounted on a pole at least 7ft high. When another vehicle is already parked in front of the signage (as was the case here), it is literally impossible to read whilst parking.

3.4.5 The IPC guidelines state that ‘Where there is any change to any pre-existing terms and conditions that would not be immediately apparent to a person visiting the site and which materially affects the motorist you should place additional (temporary) signage at the entrance making it clear that new terms and conditions/charges apply, such that regular visitors who may be familiar with the old terms do not inadvertently incur parking charges. This signage should be in addition to the signage ordinarily required and left in place for an appropriate period.’ The parking terms had recently changed here and yet there was not, nor had there ever been, additional signage informing visitors that a change of restrictions was in place.

3.4.6 The IPC guidelines (14) state ‘You must not use predatory or misleading tactics to lure drivers into incurring parking charges. Such instances will be viewed as a serious instance of non-compliance’. Given the timings involved, the balance of probability strongly suggests that the Claimant’s representative watched me park and leave my vehicle. There is anecdotal evidence of them doing exactly this. Not to warn me that leaving my vehicle would potentially incur a parking charge, particularly when the parking restrictions had recently changed, in my opinion constitutes ‘predatory tactics’.

3.4.7 The Claimant and their representative also have a duty to mitigate loss. In the case of ‘Vehicle Control Services vs Ibbotson’ (which was won by the motorist) the judge severely castigates the Claimant for not making the Defendant aware of the terms of parking at the site when they could have easily done so. The Claimant’s representative could simply have made me aware of the terms of parking and, in the unlikely event that I agreed to them, collected payment from me directly. This would have saved all the costs involved with DVLA lookup, solicitor’s letters and court fees and better fulfilled their (presumed) obligation to keep the area free from parked vehicles.

4. Consumer Rights
4.1 If a contract were deemed to exist between myself and the Claimant it would, under the terms of The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (exhibit 13), be defined as a ‘distance contract’. As ‘distance contract’ is defined as ‘a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded’.

4.2 As a ‘distance contract’, the signage at the site does not carry the information required by the The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, specifically on the right to cancel required by paragraph (l) of Schedule 2.

4.3 As the signage does not carry the information required as specified in 4.2 (above) I have the right to cancel the contract as specified by The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (exhibit 13) clause 31 ‘Cancellation period extended for breach of information requirement’.

4.4 Whilst it might, at a stretch, be reasonable to expect me to pay for any parking services utilised up to the point of cancellation, this respresents five minutes of a 24 hour period and would therefore amount to approximately 20p.

5. Landowner Authority
5.1 Despite being asked, the Claimant has not provided any indication that they are authorised by the landowner to issue parking charges and carry out court proceedings on their behalf. The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have they authority to do this, and that the terms and conditions of parking they impose at the site are in line with what they have been authorised to do.

6. Additional Costs
6.1. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred £60 costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, in Schedule 4, Para 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100.

6.2 The Particulars of Claim include £50 for ‘legal representatives costs’ yet all I have received from the Claimant’s solicitors are automated letters. The Claimant is put to strict proof that these ‘solicitors costs’ are justified.

7. In summary, it is my position that, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the Claimant has no standing, or cause of action, to litigate in this matter. The Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and the Court is invited to dismiss the claim in its entirety

I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

KeithP

You mention IPC guidelines several times.

I would strongly suggest that you use a different word to 'guidelines'.

The word 'guidelines' suggests that they can be ignored - they are only guidelines.

They are effectively law. I believe this has been established - was it Beavis?

Lauz44

I’ve received Gladstone’s WS but can’t figure out how to upload the photos for people to view. Sorry if it’s glaringly obvious.

Coupon-mad

Host them in Dropbox then click to get a 'share link' then post the URL here (not upload) and if the forum disallows a live link as you are new, change the http to hxxp.

Lauz44

Above is the Drop Box link for the WS for Gladstones. Hope it works.
Having read over my WS, there were a number of errors as I sent the wrong draft (apologies). This is the most current WS:

1. Sequence Of Events
1.1 I am XX and am the Defendant in this matter, and will say as follows; I am an unrepresented consumer with no experience of Court procedure. Should I not present my case as professionally as the Claimant’s, I trust that the Court excuses my inexperience and reserves any criticism for the extremely sparse particulars filed by the Claimant’s Solicitors.

1.2 The Claimant has been extremely unclear as to what the ‘parking charge’ in question refers to, referring to it on separate occasions as a charge for ‘unauthorised parking’, a ‘consideration for parking’ and a charge for ‘breach of terms’ - all very different things. This makes is very difficult to focus my defence and I apologise if, as a result, this statement seems rather long-winded. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, and non-compliance of the Claimant with the Pre-Action Protocols, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any of the Claimant's purported contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

1.3. Whilst residing at XX, I was informed by a friend that there was a reduced fee for a month’s parking permit available to students residing at the accommodation. I received the email application from a friend and submitted the required personal information and a payment to the requested account of XX for a one month permit at the cost of £45.00. The payment debited my account at on the 12th X 2018 (exhibit 1) and I then moved my car to the car park in question. A hand written note was left inside the car on the dashboard stating “parking permit applied for and paid on XXXXXX” (exhibit 2).

1.4 I returned to my car on the 14th X 2018 to a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) on the windscreen, the subject of this claim (exhibit 3). The reason for issue being ‘not displaying a valid permit’

1.5. As I applied for and paid the landowner directly for a month long parking permit on the 12th X 2018 prior to the PCN being issued on the 13th X 2018. Instructions for the purchase and issue of the permit from the landowner stated “upon receipt of a completed parking agreement (exhibit 4) and your fee, your parking permit will be issued to you immediately”. With no further instruction regarding displaying or issuing of the permit, and due to the lack of clarity regarding the timeframe of receiving the permit, as explained, a note was displayed on the car dashboard. The Defendant knew nothing about any risk of a further charge, having paid for ''immediate'' permission and parked in good faith, relying upon the prior agreement made with the landowner, concluded by the application and payment of the sum agreed as a licence to park for the dates stated. Therefore, as a valid parking permit was applied and paid for pertaining to the vehicle in question prior to the PCN being issued it is argued that the PCN was issued incorrectly.


1.6. The PCN states that the charge is for ‘unauthorised parking’ and I ‘parked on private property in a manner where the driver agreed to pay a parking charge as displayed on the signage at the site’. This in itself is contradictory as I cannot have entered into an agreement to do something that I was not ‘authorised’ to do, parking is either ‘authorised’ or it isn’t.

1.7. On the 14th X 2018 I emailed the land owners representative directly questioning why I had received a PCN when I had applied and paid for a permit. A reply was received on the 15th X 2019 from the land owner’s representative with an emailed permit attached, though no reply to my queries about the PCN. A further reply was sent to the representative who instructed me to contact ‘the parking company directly to dispute the fine’.

1.8. On 25th X 2018 I submitted an appeal letter to the Claimant against the parking charge on the grounds that paid the land owner directly, adhering to the guidance sent to me by the land owner themselves. As my contract was with the land owner, I believe I have upheld and complied with their requests. I asked for a breakdown of the costs however this was not addressed in the reply I received on the 22nd X 2018 and did not received a response to this appeal (exhibit 5). The claimant did not provide any evidence of landowner authority for issuing parking charges.

1.9. On the 27th X 2018 I submitted a formal complaint however did not receive a reply to my specific queries from UK Car Park Management. On the 8th X 2018 a formal demand letter for payment from UKCPM was sent for a ‘parking charge notice’ for the charge of £100.00 with no breakdown of the costs, with a threat that an overdue charge would ‘increase to £149.00 in the first instance of further action’.

1.10. I heard nothing further from the Claimant until 15th X 2018 when I received a letter from Debt Recovery Plus Ltd acting on behalf of the Claimant demanding £160.00 payment. A further letter was received with the threat of court action for unpaid parking charge for £160.00 on the 30th X 2018 (exhibit 6).

1.11. No correspondence was received until their agents, Gladstones Solicitors (a well-known serial litigant and ‘roboclaimer’), sent a letter before claim on the 12th X 2018 demanding money and threatening court action (exhibit 7). I began researching my case and was advised not to correspond with Gladstones Solicitors at this point.

1.12. On the 25th X 2019 I received a Claim Form from the County Court Business Centre instructing me that Gladstones Solictors were issuing proceedings against me on behalf of the Claimant for parking ‘in breach of the terms of parking stipulated on the signage at X' with an outline of alleged costs.

1.14. On the 31st X 2019 I submitted my defence and later declined mediation as I didn’t feel the IAS could be considered ‘independent’ as it is owned and operated by William Hurley and John Davies, also the owners of Gladstones Solictors who had already been instructed by the Claimant to issue court proceedings against me. This represents a clear conflict of interest.

2. No Contract Exists
2.1. I understand from correspondence with the Claimant that the Claimant’s case relies upon the signage at the site (exhibit 8) constituting a ‘contract’ between myself and the Claimant as per ParkingEye vs Beavis. The ‘breach of terms’ on the Particulars Of Claim presumably refers to the supposed ‘contract’ formed by this signage.

2.2. This Claimant offered no consideration to the Defendant, since there was nothing of value that the Defendant did not already possess from the promise made by the landowner of permission and a licence to park 'immediately'. Nothing was mentioned about a paper permit being required, nor about any penalty risk, nor even that signage on site formed part of that contract and must be read/complied with before parking. This Claimant was not even a party to the parking licence, thus they are a stranger to the contractual permission the Defendant relied upon and they could not, as a third party, bolt on new terms to the promise of the 'immediate' parking licence agreement.

2.3. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient interest in the land or that there are specific terms in its contract to bring an action on its own behalf. As a third party agent, the Claimant may not pursue any charge, unless specifically authorised by the principal. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant does not have the authority to issue charges on this land in their own name, and that they have no right to bring any action regarding this claim.

2.4. The parking contract in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ case was judged to be ‘objectively reasonable’ partly because ‘motorists generally’ did accept it (108). The landowner wanted as many people as possible to use the car park in question so the contractual arrangements were designed to be attractive to the average motorist. This is the complete antithesis of the supposed ‘contract’ in this case which is designed to actively discourage motorists from parking at the site. The terms of this ‘contract‘ are not ‘objectively reasonable’, but deliberately designed to be so heinous that no one in their right mind would agree to them. It follows that this is not a ‘contract’ but a prohibitory notice masquerading as such.

2.5. Even if the Claimant is relying on a purported contract flowing from signs at the location, such terms were not prominent and were never seen by the Defendant, failing Lord Denning's 'red hand rule'. Any signs were not 'adequate notice' of the claimed parking charge and nor did the Defendant know about, or agree to by conduct or otherwise, any 'relevant obligation' or 'relevant contract' (ref: the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4).

2.6. The very act of entering into this alleged ‘contract’ (parking) constitutes a breach of its terms, therefore making it impossible to perform.

2.7. Both the PCN and Notice to Keeper I was issued by the Claimant state the reason for the disputed charge as being ‘breaching the terms of the contract’. I cannot be seen to have entered into a contract for something I was not ‘authorised’ to do.

2.8. In the case of ‘Parking Control Management v Bull’ the Judge found that it was ‘impossible to construct out of this in any way, either actually or contingently or conditionally, any permission for anyone to park on the roadway.’ and that therefore any charges made on the basis of said signage would be damages for trespass and must constitute reparations for actual loss.

3. Inadequate Signage
3.1 A key factor in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ was that the relevant signs were ‘large, prominent and legible, so that any reasonable user of the car park would be aware of their existence and nature’ and ‘The charge is prominently displayed in large letters at the entrance to the car park and at frequent intervals within it’. That is not the case here.

3.2 In‘Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest’ the Court of Appeal ruled that a person cannot be presumed bound by terms and conditions on signage that they haven’t seen. In this case, which was found in favour of the motorist, the signage was deemed insufficient because there was no sign directly adjacent to the Appellant’s parking bay and the only signage that was displayed could not have been seen from within the vehicle whilst parking.

3.3 A key factor in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ was that ParkingEye were found to have operated in line with the relevant parking operator’s code of practice.

3.4 In this case the signage and operating practice of the Claimant fails, on numerous counts, to adhere to the standards laid out by the relevant accredited parking operator - The International Parking Community (IPC).

3.4.1 The IPC state that signage at the entrance to the site should ‘Make it clear that the motorist is entering onto private land’. There is no signage at the entrance to the site in question and one can see from the photographs that I would not have passed any signage indicating I was entering private land.

3.4.3 The IPC state that text on signage ‘should be of such a size and in a font that can be easily read by a motorist having regard to the likely position of the motorist in relation to the sign.’ The text on the signage, particularly that which refers to ‘contractual terms’ and a ‘parking charge’ is very small. This, coupled with the fact that the sign is mounted at least 7ft off the ground, makes it very hard to read and impossible to read from a vehicle.

3.4.4 The IPC state that signage that is intended to form a contract should ‘Be clearly legible and placed in such a position (or positions) such that a driver of a vehicle is able to see them clearly upon entering the site or parking a vehicle within the site’. It is more-or-less impossible to read this signage whilst driving as it is mounted on a pole at least 7ft high..

3.4.5 The IPC guidelines state that ‘Where there is any change to any pre-existing terms and conditions that would not be immediately apparent to a person visiting the site and which materially affects the motorist you should place additional (temporary) signage at the entrance making it clear that new terms and conditions/charges apply, such that regular visitors who may be familiar with the old terms do not inadvertently incur parking charges. This signage should be in addition to the signage ordinarily required and left in place for an appropriate period.’ The parking terms had recently changed here and yet there was not, nor had there ever been, additional signage informing visitors that a change of restrictions was in place.

4. Consumer Rights
4.1 If a contract were deemed to exist between myself and the Claimant it would, under the terms of The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (exhibit 13), be defined as a ‘distance contract’. As ‘distance contract’ is defined as ‘a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded’.

4.2 As a ‘distance contract’, the signage at the site does not carry the information required by the The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, specifically on the right to cancel required by paragraph (l) of Schedule 2.

4.3 As the signage does not carry the information required as specified in 4.2 (above) I have the right to cancel the contract as specified by The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (exhibit 13) clause 31 ‘Cancellation period extended for breach of information requirement’.

5. Landowner Authority
5.1 Despite being asked, the Claimant has not provided any indication that they are authorised by the landowner to issue parking charges and carry out court proceedings on their behalf. The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have they authority to do this, and that the terms and conditions of parking they impose at the site are in line with what they have been authorised to do.

6. Additional Costs
6.1. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred £60 costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, in Schedule 4, Para 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100.

6.2 The Particulars of Claim include £50 for ‘legal representatives costs’ yet all I have received from the Claimant’s solicitors are automated letters. The Claimant is put to strict proof that these ‘solicitors costs’ are justified.

7. In summary, it is my position that, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the Claimant has no standing, or cause of action, to litigate in this matter. The Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and the Court is invited to dismiss the claim in its entirety

I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Quentin

Are your initials **??

If so you need to take down the link in #30

The ppcs monitor this forum and can use posts in your thread against you