Robin hood airport Doncaster

BON_EON · 26 June 2019 at 8:25PM

Umkomaas · 26 June 2019 at 9:17PM

You seem to have set this up so that Dropbox requires registration to view. You need to make access much easier.

BON_EON · 26 June 2019 at 9:38PM

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/cgt0lr3z0irubcr/AACuVe8t8zljpWpIAlJagmd4a?dl=0

BON_EON · 26 June 2019 at 9:39PM

Think this is it.....

Coupon-mad · 26 June 2019 at 9:40PM

I have just received the witness statement from VCS.

Is there a way of uploading it so i can get some advice on counter arguments that they are posing?

We may not have time to help in this depth and there is no need.

None of us can see those links but surely this is the same tediously well known template WS that VCS always use in no-stopping cases, relying on VCS v Crutchley, and VCS v Ward, and then going on about the words of Roch LJ where they misquote him in Vine v Waltham Forest, and then they no doubt talk about the law of agency and CPS v AJH Films, yawny yawny yawn?

If I am right, just search the forum for any of those surnames...read what's been said before. Saves us soooo much time and informs you better than on this thread.

BON_EON · 29 June 2019 at 4:14PM

Simple question for most of you to answer, but when or how do i claim back any loss of earnings etc

What do i need to produce in order to fully show the loss of earnings

Redx · 29 June 2019 at 4:22PM

all explained in the NEWBIES thread post #2

see the advice by LOC123 and the example of the costs schedule etc

this is submitted before the hearing date, plus take a copy with you and proof of earnings etc, like wage slips, ask at the end before leaving the room

most of the questions you may have are already answered in that thread and post , you arent the first person to ask and LOC123 is a qualified solicitor, so follow her advice

the Newbies thread includes a link to one written by coupon-mad too

BON_EON · 30 June 2019 at 10:22AM

This is VCS's witness statement - It may be useful to people not as far down the line as myself, to see what is in store for them if they go to court.

If anyone could comment on anything or offer advice on any particulars that would be great. Or if they have used something not seen before, advice on that would be good.

VCS witness statement
Authorities

23. It is settled that individuals may enter into a contract with a sign and reference is made to Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking 1971 2 QB 163. The Defendant ought to have been made aware of the Terms and Conditions of entering private land.

24. ne Claimant is entitled to charge for each instance in which the Defendant has been identified in breach of the advertised Terms and Conditions at the development. In this case, the charge for breaching the Terms and Conditions is flOO.OO discounted to f60.OO if paid within 14 days.

25. This is a contractual clause which specifies the amount owed. The Claimant wishes to rely on the precedent set under Vine v Waltham Forest LBC [20021 1 WLR 2383, 2390, where Roch L.J. stated:

"the question whether a person voluntarily assumes a risk or consents to trespass to his or her property is to be judged objectively and not subjectively. Once it is established that sufficient and adequate warning notices were in place, a car driver cannot be heard to say that he or she did not see the notice. Were that to be the law, it would be too easy for car drivers who trespass with their cars to evade the only method land owners have of stopping the unauthorised parking spaces or parking areas on theirproperty "

26. The Claimant also relies upon the authority of Vehicle Control Services

Limited v Crutchley in whereby HHJ Wood concluded that the warning notices this is an acceptable and enforceable contractual arrangement. Whilst the smaller notices give cause for concern that their content is not easily identifiable for a driver, nevertheless it is difficult to see how the Terms and Conditions could otherwise be communicated. It is incumbent on a person entering private property, when it is clear that a contractual licence is being provided, to understand the terms of such n licence.

27. ne signage is prominently displayed and visible on entry to the site. It is submitted that the Claimant has done what is reasonable to draw attention to the existence of the contractual terms and therefore has given sufficient notice of them.

28. ne Supreme Court in ParkingEye v Beavis 120151 UKSC 67 has established that in cases as this, a contract exists between the Motorist and the Operator, whereby the Motorist is granted a contractual licence to park their car in the Car Park on the terms of the notice posted at the site, which are accepted by entering and leaving the vehicle at the site.

The Defendant's Defence

The Claimant denies all of the allegations contained within the Defendant's Defence in their entirety. The Claimant will address the Defendant's Defence by way of Paragraphs.

29. In response to Paragraph 1, the Claimant maintains that they are entitled to relief in the sum claimed. The Claimant relies on ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis

[2016J AC 1172 and submits that they do not need to suffer a financial loss. Lord Neuberger at paragraph 99 it was stated that:

"The reason is that although ParkingEye was not liable to suffer loss as a result of overstaying motorists, it had a legitimate interest in charging them which extended beyond the recovery ofany loss. The scheme in operation here (and in many similar car parks) is that the landowner authorises ParkingEye to control access to the car park and to impose the agreed charges, with a view to
scheme as a private land owner. As such, they have an unqualified private right to determine that vehicles are not permitted to stop onsite. managing the car park in the interests of the retail outlets, their customers and the public at large i'.

30. In response to Paragraph 2, the Claimant relies on Paragraph 5.2A PD 7E which states: 'The requirement in paragraph 7.3 of Practice Direction 16 for documents to be attached to the particulars of contract Claims does not apply to Claims started using an online Claim Form, unless the Particulars of Claim are served separately in accordance with Paragraph 5.2 of this Practice Direction'.

31. Notwithstanding the above, the Claimant submits that the Defendant could have made a Part 1 8 request for Further Information if he considered the Particulars to be insuffcient. However, this was not utilised by the Defendant.

32. In response to Paragraph 3, the Claimant submits that they have no record of having received a SAR request from the Defendant to be able to respond to the same.

33. In response to Paragraph 4, the Claimant submits that they have acted in accordance with IPC Code of Practice, Part B, Paragraph 3.3 — 'Automatic Number Plate Recognition and use of surveillance cameras'. In this case, the manual check was carried out by the CCTV Processing Department in the Claimant Company who reviewed the contravention images taken by the CCTV camera and then from the images captured of the vehicle, they identified the registration number of the contravening vehicle and passed this onto the relevant Department for them to request the Registered Keeper details from the DVLA.

34. In response to Paragraph 5, the Claimant submits that the Site is private property. The Court is referred to the Contract Witness Statement enclosed in exhibit AAI which specifically states that the owner of the land is Peel Investments (North) Ltd and has no mention of a Local Authority having control over the land. Thus, Peel Investments (North) Ltd are entitled to introduce a

35.Even where byelaws are present and an Operator is appointed to provide a parking control service on a site, the case of Jones & Tighilt (on behalf of National Taxi Association) v First Greater Western Ltd [20131 EWHC 1485 is authority that the scheme is justified and lawful. HHJ McCahi11 cited at Paragraph 90:

Even if the byelaws did not permit its introduction, and even if FGW had wrongly invoked byelaws powers, its position as a private landowner, with power to control those who come on to its land, justified and rendered lawful the scheme '.

36.The Claimant submits that how Peel Investments (North) Ltd control access to their land is a private matter for them. The scheme introduced is necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued. The Driver is being asked to sign up to the Terns and Conditions and if in breach, is required to pay a fee of EIOO.OO, discounted to E60.00 if payment is made within 14 days. This Charge levied is used to police the Site and is heavily reinvested to improve the layout, the facilities and to alleviate congestion to the benefit of the users.

37.The Terms and Conditions are in place by the Client to control their land. In order to enforce the Terns and Conditions would be by way of a breach of Contract. Thus, the Claimant denies that they are in breach of the Code of Practice.

38.In response to Paragraph 6, the Claimant submits that they are pursuing the Defendant as the Registered Keeper for recovery of the unpaid Parking Charge and the Notice to Keeper is compliant with the relevant provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 for there to be Keeper liability. The Claimant submits that the onus was on the Defendant to come forward and furnish the

Claimant with Driver details, however, he had failed to do so. Thus, in the absence of Driver details, the Claimant was entitled, by law, to pursue the Defendant.

39. Claimant relies upon Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and contends that they can hold the Defendant liable for the Parking Charge Notice under the said enactment. The relevant clause is;

"4 (1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper ofthe vehicle...

...5 1 (b)...ifthey are unable to take steps to enforce that requirement against the driver because the creditor does not know both the name ofthe driver and a current addressfor servicefor the driver... "

40. In the Defendant's failure to act upon the Parking Charge Notice addressed to him by transferring liability or putting forward his position, the Claimant is able to pursue the Registered Keeper of the vehicle, to which is the Defendant, as confirmed by the DVLA.

41. The Claimant submits that the Notice to Keeper includes all the mandatory information for it to be rendered valid.

42. Pursuant to Paragraph 9(2)(a) the requirement is that the Notice must specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking for which it was parked and the period of parking to which the Notice relates to. The Notice clearly states that the Defendant's vehicle was parked on the Site in question (Robin Hood Airport Doncaster in Doncaster), including the date it relates to.

43. The second requirement is that the Notice must inform the Keeper that the Drive is required to pay the Parking Charge in respect of a specified period of parkini and that the Parking Charge remains unpaid. The Notice states the date of th contravention as well as the outstanding balance that has not been paid

44. lhe third requirement is that the Notice must describe the Parking Charge due from the Driver, the circumstances in which the requirement to pay it arose and other facts that made it payable, The Notice clearly sets outs the breach in which the Notice occurred and states that the Terms and Conditions of parking are clearly displayed in the signage within the Development.

45. ne fourth requirement is to specify the total amount of the Parking Charge that is unpaid as specified in the Notice. The Notice sent to the Defendant specifies that the outstanding balance is EIOO.OO discounted to E60.00 if paid within 14 days.

46. The fifth requirement is that the Notice must state that the creditor does not know the name and address of the Driver and must invite the Keeper to either (a) pay the Parking Charge or (b) notify the creditor of the name and address of the Driver and to pass the notice to the Driver. The Notice that was issued to the Defendant gave the Defendant the opportunity to pay the Parking Charge, appeal the Parking Charge or transfer liability of the Parking Charge.

47. The sixth requirement is that the Notice to the Registered Keeper must warn the Registered Keeper that if, after a period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the Notice is given the amount of unpaid Parking Charge has not been paid in full and the creditor does not know both the name and address of the current driver, the creditor will have the right to recover from the Registered Keeper the parking charge. The Claimant submits that it has complied with this point.

48. The seventh requirement is that the Notice must inform the Keeper if any discount is offered for prompt payment and the arrangement for resolution of disputes or complaints that are available. The Claimant submits that they have complied with this requirement as the Notice issued gives the Registered Keeper the opportunity to pay the reduced Charge of E60.00 in addition to the opportunity to appeal the Charge and/or lodge a complaint regarding the Parking Charge if they wish to do so.

49. The eighth requirement is that the Notice must identify the creditor and specify how and to whom payment or notification to the creditor may be made. The Notice clearly states how to make payment, the deadline for the payment to be made and who the payment is to be made to.

50. The final requirement is that the Notice must specify the date on which the Notice is sent. In this case the Notice clearly states in the top right corner the date on which the Notice was sent.

51. Paragraph 9(3) states that the Notice must only relate to a single period of parking. The Notice issued by the Claimant was for an individual parking event.

52. Paragaph 9(4) states that the Notice must be given by either (a) handing it to the registered keeper, or leaving it at a current address for service for the Registered Keeper, within the relevant period or (b) sending it by post to a current address for service for the Registered Keeper so that it is delivered to that address within the relevant period. The Notice was sent to the Defendant by post to the address provided by the DVLA.

53. Paragraph 9(5) states that the Notice must be sent within 14 days beginning with the day after the contravention. The Claimant can confinn that the Notice issued to the Defendant was sent within 14 days of the contravention taking place.

54. Paragraph 9(6) states that a Notice sent by post is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have been delivered on the second working day after the day on which it is posted. The Claimant submits that their Notice was issued by post to the Defendant. It is therefore deemed served as per the above as to date no evidence has been received to prove otherwise.

55. Paragraph 9(7) states that when the Notice is given it must be accompanied by any evidence prescribed by a national authority. This is not applicable to this

56. In response to Paragraph 7, the Claimant reiterates Paragraphs 34-37 above and submits that the Act is applicable to this case because the Site is private property.

57. In response to Paragraph 8, the Claimant submits that all of the information and evidence requested by the Defendant (in his Appeal) was provided to him, save for the commercially sensitive documentation which the Claimant was unable to provide at an earlier stage. The Claimant maintains that there has been no breach of the Code of Practice.

58. In response to Paragraph 9, the Claimant refers to the time and date stamped contravention photographs which demonstrate that the Defendant's vehicle was observed stopped on the Access Road for 33 seconds. The first image was captured at 13: 10:54pm and the last image was captured at 13:11 :27pm, a careful inspection of which shows that, during this period of time, the vehicle was stationary and had not moved at all. As such, the CCTV camera had detected the Defendant's vehicle to be stopped and a Parking Charge was automatically levied, as per the Terms and Conditions on the signage.

59. The Terms and Conditions (copy enclosed in exhibit AAI) specifically state, amongst other things, the following:

'RESTRICTED ZONE

No Stopping At Any Time

EIOO Automatic Charge plus additional chargesfor debt recovery and/or court action. Vehicle keeper details may be requestedfrom the D VLA

60. ne Terns and Conditions are neither unusual nor unreasonable. They are set in stone by the Client, that is 'Restricted Zone: No Stopping At Any othetwis!¯R+Gking Charge of El 00.00 will be levied, as per e Client's instructions. There were several advantages to this, but mainly the sch pr mc congestion and to prevent any vehicles obstructing the route.

61. The predominant purpose of the parking charge was to deter motorists, such as the Defendant, from stopping on a private road where stopping is prohibited and that the occupier's objective include the following:

1 The need to prevent traffic congestion;

2 The related need to prevent any vehicles obstructing this route; and

3 The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable the Claimant to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services, without which those services would not be available.

62. In response to Paragraphs 10 and 11, the Claimant submits that there are 62 waming signs prominently displayed within the Development, including 4 entrance signs erected on the Access Road to alert motorists that they are entering private land and stopping is strictly prohibited. Furthermore, the Terms and Conditions on the signage are printed in a large font size, in bold and are legible. Thus, it cannot be a valid defence for any motorist to say "I did not see and read the signage" in an attempt to absolve liability and expect the Court to uphold this, especially where the contravention takes place in broad daylight as in this case.

63. The Claimant submits that to reach the location where the Defendant's vehicle was stationary, the Defendant would have driven past an absolute minimum of 3 waming signs, including I entrance sign. The exact location of where the vehicle was stopped is identified on the Site Overhead enclosed in exhibit AAI. This Overhead together with the contravention photographs show that the Defendant's vehicle was stopped in very close proximity to and by 1 warning sign. ne entrance sign is 2000mm x 1000mm, to put the size of this sign into perspective; it is larger than a house door. Therefore, the Defendant had sumcient notice of the advertised requirement that vehicles must not stop on any roadways past this point.

64. Furthermore, the signage on the approach road is reflective and positioned to face oncoming motorists and the text size is relative to the average approach speed of vehicles, which is 30 mph. Therefore, the Claimant submits that this does not require motorists to stop and read the signage, as the text 'No Stopping at Any Time' is printed the largest font size and in bold.

65. Due to the size of the entrance sign, it cannot be disputed that the Defendant did not see and read this warning sign at the absolute minimum. The entrance sign makes it clear that stopping on roadways is prohibited past this point. The Claimant submits that the reasonable driver would continue driving or make a U tum without stopping where they have driven past the entrance sign. However, the Defendant did not do this. Instead, the Defendant decided to stop the vehicle on the roadway for 33 seconds at the minimum, in breach of the Terms and Conditions.

66. In any event, the Claimant submits that their signage is compliant with the IPC

Code of Practice. The Claimant's signage is also audited and approved by the

Intemational Parking Community, and is therefore fully capable of forming a legally binding contract with motorists entering the Site.

67. Court should construe the Claimant as having given the Driver a contractual licence to enter its private property. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis (20161 AC 1172 and paragraph 94 of the judgment of Lord Neuberger:

"94. It was common ground before the Court ofAppeal, and is common ground in this court, that on the facts which we have just summarised there was a contract between Mr Beavis and ParkingEye. Mr Beavis had a contractual licence to park his car in the retail park on the terms of the notice posted at the entrance, which he accepted by entering the site. Those terms were that he would stay for not more than two hours, that he would park only within the marked bays, that he would not park in bays reservedfor blue badge holders, and that on breach of any of those terms he would pay E85. Moore-Bick LJ in the Court ofAppeal was inclined to doubt this analysis, and at one stage so were we. But, on reflection, we think that it is correct. The E85 is described in the notice as a

"parking charge ", but no one suggests that that label is conclusive. In our view it was not, as a matter ofcontractual analysis, a chargefor the right to park, nor was it a chargefor the right to overstay the two-hour limit. Not only is the {85 payable upon certain breaches which may occur within the two-hour free parking period, but there is no fixed period of time for which the motorist is permitted to stay after the two hours have expired, for which the {85 could be regarded as consideration. The licence having been terminated under its terms after two hours, the presence of the car would have constituted a trespass from thatpoint on. In the circumstances, the E85 can only be regarded as a chargefor

68. A similar process of reasoning should apply here. The only right the Driver had was to enter the land on the Terms and Conditions which applied. It was unnecessary to apply an analysis of offer/acceptance/consideration, quite simply because the Contract was formed by the mutual promises. The Driver had permission on the understanding that if they stopped the vehicle there was a breach of the contractual licence, for which provision was made that they should pay the sum of E 100.00.

69. In response to Paragraph 12, the Claimant submits that it was the Driver's responsibility to adhere to the Terms and Conditions. The Claimant had done all they could have reasonably done to bring the Terms and Conditions to the Driver's attention. The Claimant had erected more than enough warning signs within the Development. The Terms and Conditions were transparent with the words 'No Stopping at Any Time' printed in the largest font size and in bold. The Claimant should not be held responsible for the Defendant's ignorance in this matter.

70. The Claimant maintains that the Defendant's vehicle was stationary, as is evident from a careful inspection ofthe contravention images.

71. In response to Paragraph 13, the Claimant refers to the Contract Witness Statement enclosed in exhibit AAI which demonstrates that the Claimant is authorised by the landowner to issue Parking Charges to vehicles found/seen in breach of the Terms and Conditions and then enforce the Charges through debt recovery action/Court proceedings in their own name.

72. In response to Paragraphs 14 and 15, the additional E60.00 is the debt recovery charge as debt recovery proceedings had been initiated. The total amount claimed is El 60.00 as specified on the Claim Form. The Defendant was made aware by the Notice to Keeper that an additional E60.00 may be incurred where debt recovery action is taken. This was confirmed in the Demand for Payment and subsequent correspondence.

73. In this case, the file was transferred to the Claimant's Debt Recovery Department on 5 October 2018 and it remained with them until 4 December 2018, during which period the Debt Recovery Department took over the account and had served numerous correspondence on the Defendant (see correspondence

enclosed in exhibit AA2). By doing so, the Claimant had incurred additional costs as a result of having to take necessary action in an attempt to recover the unpaid Charge outside of Court. Thus, the Claimant should also be able to recover the $60.00 debt recovery charge.

74. The Claimant submits that as at 29 September 2014, it was a member of the accredited trade association of the Independent Parking Committee (IPC) to which reference was made on the Notices and to which the Claimant still belongs. The IPC code of practice is a detailed code of regulation governing signs, charges and enforcement. Schedule 5 deals with Parking Charges and provides that "it is suggested the maximum parking charge should be El 00.00".

75. The Claimant submits that EIOO.OO for a Parking Charge is not an extortionate sum at all, but in line with the recommendation provided by the IPC.

76. To reiterate, the E60.00 is for the debt recovery charge. The Claimant refers to the IPC Code of Practice Part E Schedule 5- Parking Charges which states the following:

'Where a Parking Charge becomes overdue a reasonable sum may be added. This sum must not exceed E60 (inclusive of VAT where applicable) unless Court Proceedings have been initiated. '

77. The Claimant submits that the debt recovery charge included within the Claim does not exceed E60.00 and therefore is in accordance with the IPC Code of Practice. The additional E25.00 is the Court fee.

78. In response to Paragraphs 16 and 17, the Defendant is liable for the Parking Charge as the Registered Keeper and the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, as a result of the Driver breaching the Contract.

BON_EON · 30 June 2019 at 10:24AM

Summary

79. Claimant was entitled to erect signs with the development in accordance with their appointment by the freeholder. The signs were duly erected at the development. Defendant ought to have been made aware of the Terms and Conditions of parking. Defendant could not have been in doubt, at worst, after the issue of the first PCN.

80. ne Claimant wishes to rely on ParkingEye v Beavis 120151 UKSC 67 and submits that it has a legitimate interest in enforcing the Parking Charges as stated. This is how the Claimant can support the services they provide to their client. The Claimant avers that its charges are "neither extravagant nor unconscionable".

81. Accordingly the Claimant is entitled to a Judgment. It is a matter of agreement that the instance of parking in contravention of the Terms and Conditions of the signs. Liability is agreed to be EIOO.OO in accordance with the amount stated on the signs. The Claimant submits that they are therefore entitled to a Judgnent for the amount claimed together with expenses of the cause.

82. In view of the Defendant not paying the charge within 28 days the breach of the contract entitles the Claimant to damages as of right in addition to the CN incurred. The warning notices make it clear that damages will be sought and added to the value of the charge levied. The maximum amount awarded is E60.00 which is identified as a debt recovery charge. The Claimant would place reliance upon the Court of Appeal ruling in Chaplair Limited v Kumari [20151 EWCA 798:

"that does not alter the fact that it remains a contractual entitlement which the Court will enforce subject to it equitable power to disallow unreasonable expenses. There is nothing in the rule making powers in respect of the CPR which enable the rules to exclude or override that contractual entitlement and I therefore agree with Arden LJ that the Judge had jurisdiction to assess the costs free from any restraints imposed by CPR 27.14".

Coupon-mad · 1 July 2019 at 1:25AM

The only new case law we've not seen before is this one:

http://www.national-taxi-association.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Jones-Anor-v-First-Greater-Western-Ltd-2013-EWHC-1485-Ch-25-April-2013.pdf

Which doesn't actually support the view that a private company can issue PCNs on byelaws land. The findings of that case appear to be that a LANDOWNER can exercise rights and have a 'permit scheme' for taxis. Nothing to do with a PPC trying to ignore what the byelaws say.

You know about how to rebut the other cases as I told you earlier to search the forum for those predictable case law names. Please read the threads results when you search for the case law name I yawned about - this has been done already and you can copy from other threads to rebut those cases.

You need to rebut #38 - #56 where they have thrown the irrelevant POFA into the mix, and are clearly hoping to hoodwink a Judge into not realising that Airport land is NOT the 'relevant land' of which they speak!

As well as using the POFA Schedule 4 to show the Judge the definition of 'relevant land' and how it expressly and unequivocally EXCLUDES land covered by byelaws, also use the DFT Guidance mentioned & quoted here:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?p=75927119#post75927119

Put that DFT Guidance into the case as an exhibit with your own WS.

And point out here that they are lying, they KNOW the keeper can't be liable:

78. In response to Paragraphs 16 and 17, the Defendant is liable for the Parking Charge as the Registered Keeper

Absolutely shocking. People who had not researched the POFA would be like lambs to the slaughter with this mendacious WS.

And of course you know how to rebut the added FAKE £60 costs as we've covered that till we are blue in the face recently. The Beavis case confirms that only the parking charge itself is recoverable and the cost of the letters (including debt chasers) are the low level business costs ALREADY more than covered by the parking charge. They can't count the letters twice!

Search the forum for disproportionate costs DJ Grand and read the words I wrote for defences, and use those words in your WS to attack the fake added costs and peg the sum in dispute back to £100, not £160.

Robin hood airport Doncaster

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