online cooker scam

gascookie

ah yes KeithP I'm with you now, didnt see post #5, the others that were scammed by them I found on computerperson, dont know them personally but it says how many caught by Cambridge cookers.

gascookie

just been back on computerperson site and found this interesting reply( not to me)..
the computer person says
Hi xxxxxx,
Thanks for calling the bank to report the account. I find it difficult having enough spare time to phone sometimes.
The only thing I can suggest about your loss of money is to find out from the _destination_ bank at what time they first had a report that the account was being used for fraudulent activity. If you sent payment after this date and time then the _destination_ bank is likely liable to refund you.
Trying to get this information from the destination bank is likely to be difficult. I do wish you luck.


dont know if the halifax will offer the info as to when they were first aware of the fraud,
only know that their account was still up and running when I reported it, it should have been easy enough to sort out as it was the same bank..

gascookie

found this interesting article on the due diligence section of the Basel comittee on banking supervision, its a bit long winded but worth a read,

Operational risk
can be defined as the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. Most
operational risk in the KYC context relates to weaknesses in the implementation of banks’
programmes, ineffective control procedures and failure to practise due diligence. A public
perception that a bank is not able to manage its operational risk effectively can disrupt or
adversely affect the business of the bank.
13.
Legal risk
is the possibility that lawsuits, adverse judgements or contracts that turn
out to be unenforceable can disrupt or adversely affect the operations or condition of a bank.
Banks may become subject to lawsuits resulting from the failure to observe mandatory KYC
standards or from the failure to practise due diligence. Consequently, banks can, for
example, suffer fines, criminal liabilities and special penalties imposed by supervisors.
Indeed, a court case involving a bank may have far greater cost implications for its business
than just the legal costs. Banks will be unable to protect themselves effectively from such
legal risks if they do not engage in due diligence in identifying their customers and
understanding their business.
14.
Supervisory concern about
concentration risk
mostly applies on the assets side of
the balance sheet. As a common practice, supervisors not only require banks to have
information systems to identify credit concentrations but most also set prudential limits to
restrict banks’ exposures to single borrowers or groups of related borrowers. Without
knowing precisely who the customers are, and their relationship with other customers, it will
not be possible for a bank to measure its concentration risk. This is particularly relevant in
the context of related counterparties and connected lending.
15.
On the liabilities side, concentration risk is closely associated with funding risk,
particularly the risk of early and sudden withdrawal of funds by large depositors, with
potentially damaging consequences for the bank’s liquidity. Funding risk is more likely to be
higher in the case of small banks and those that are less active in the wholesale markets
than large banks. Analysing deposit concentrations requires banks to understand the
characteristics of their depositors, including not only their identities but also the extent to
which their actions may be linked with those of other depositors. It is essential that liabilities
managers in small banks not only know but maintain a close relationship with large
depositors, or they will run the risk of losing their funds at critical times.
16.
Customers frequently have multiple accounts with the same bank, but in offices
located in different countries. To effectively manage the reputational, compliance and legal
risk arising from such accounts, banks should be able to aggregate and monitor significant
balances and activity in these accounts on a fully consolidated worldwide basis, regardless of
5
whether the accounts are held on balance sheet, off balance sheet, as assets under
management, or on a fiduciary basis.
17.
Both the Basel Committee and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors are fully
convinced that effective KYC practices should be part of the risk management and internal
control systems in all banks worldwide. National supervisors are responsible for ensuring that
banks have minimum standards and internal controls that allow them to adequately know
their customers.

Voluntary codes of conduct
4
issued by industry organisations or
associations can be of considerable value in underpinning regulatory guidance, by giving
practical advice to banks on operational matters. However, such codes cannot be regarded
as a substitute for formal regulatory guidance

KeithP

gascookie wrote: »

found this interesting article on the due diligence section of the Basel comittee on banking supervision...

I question your choice of the word 'interesting' there.

But what conclusion did you draw from that?

gascookie

'interesting' used in this context to avoid offence, unwarranted praise etc., it was much much longer than the section I've posted, which is just the juicy bits, still comatose, trying to come to a conclusion on it, think it suggests the bank is responsible so should re-imburse, hmm, sounds erm interesting.