Help! PCN received for wrong vehicle number plate

Coupon-mad

Yes - plenty of others have done so before you in POPLA Indigo appeals after blabbing earlier about who was driving - because in your case, due to the byelaws, you are talking about the appellant not being shown to be the individual liable for the charge (= owner, under railway byelaws).

wkm86

Coupon-mad wrote: »

Yes - plenty of others have done so before you in POPLA Indigo appeals after blabbing earlier about who was driving - because in your case, due to the byelaws, you are talking about the appellant not being shown to be the individual liable for the charge (= owner, under railway byelaws).

Thanks again. Ok, so I think I understand it now. In short, I will be appealing on a number of points - is the below right?

1. Due to the Byelaws, no person other than the land owner (in this case TOC) can apply to the magistrates to impose a penalty - Indigo have no authority to do so.

2. Even with the above, the specific Byelaw (14) is regarding paying the appropriate charge. In my case, i paid - the fact that i entered an incorrect registration number during the electronic payment is somewhat irrelevant (?)

3. No keeper liability. A couple of points under this: (a) No NTK received (a requirement of PoFA 2012) within 56 days of the original windscreen notice, so keeper liability does not apply. (b) Even if they had submitted NTK, it is the right of the keeper not to identify driver or owner. As Indigo are unable to identify owner, POPLA cannot lawefully assume keeper = owner, and it is the owner who is liable for the PCN.

Regarding point (a), Indigo have until 31/03 for the NTK to reach me. The rejection for the first appeal was received on 28/02, so I have until 28/03 to file an appeal. Even if I appeal on the last day, there are still 3 days for the NTK to arrive. Can I still leave this point in?

4. Indigo have not proven they are pursuing the driver, who otherwise might have been liable for the PCN (or owner, but point 3 argues they can't prove the owner)

This is the one i am unsure of. I think i have already implied I was the driver in my original appeal

5. Inadequate signage
6. Evidence of landowner authority

I think I understand the above now, although it's more than likely I've misinterpreted something!

I'll upload the (hopefully) final draft in the next post.

wkm86

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: RAILWAY BYELAW

Penalty notice: [xxxxxxx]
Vehicle registration: [xxxxxxxx]

The above demand was received from Indigo for failing to display a valid parking ticket at Leagrave Station car park on 03/02/2017.

Their request was immediately appealed proving to them that the parking ticket had actually been paid electronically but an incorrect vehicle registration was entered (photographic evidence of the receipt was submitted) but my appeal to Indigo was rejected and they gave me POPLA code [xxxxxxxxx].

I write to you as the registered keeper of the vehicle [xxxxxxxx], and I wish to appeal the £100 parking charge notice (PCN) issued by Indigo.

I submit the reasons below to show that I am not liable for the parking charge:

1. No person or body other than the Courts can impose a penalty for breach of Byelaws 14(1), 14(2) or 14(3) of the Railway Byelaws 2005
2. No Breach of Byelaw
3. The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 – No Keeper Liability
4. The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who may have been potentially liable for the charge
5. Signage
6. No Evidence of Landowner Authority

1. No person or body other than the Courts can impose a penalty for breach of Byelaws 14(1), 14(2) or 14(3) of the Railway Byelaws 2005.

Any definition of “authorised person” (if Indigo argue they are such) is not relevant in this context. There is nothing in the Railway Byelaws 2005 which states that such a person or private firm has any power to impose a ‘penalty’.

Only a Magistrates’ court can, upon laying of the case by the landowner, who are the Train Operating company (TOC).

Certainly a private firm cannot dress up a ‘charge’ and call it a ‘penalty’ just because they happen to be agents of a TOC at a Railway car park and they feel that calling their charge a penalty gives them a more imposing and intimidating status than issuing ‘parking charges’.

I put Indigo to strict proof to show the basis of their ‘penalty’ and state the type of court within which they believe they would be able to enforce this ‘PCN’ in their name, as required by the BPA CoP. If it is the Magistrates Court I put them to strict proof that they have the power and authority to do this and that they have done so, showing case files, claim numbers, and evidence from the TOC as well as a rebuttal of the publicly-available FOI information, if Indigo submit it is incorrect. Indigo will also have to prove with documentary evidence that the money from these alleged 'penalties' goes to the TOC (as a fine or penalty must) and not to Indigo (as a contractual charge dressed up to impersonate a penalty would).

2. No Breach of Byelaw

The Penalty Notice mentions 'This cark park is regulated by the terms and conditions of parking displayed at the car park in accordance with Railway Byelaw 14'.

There is no Railway byelaw known as: 'Breach code 1: Failing to display a valid ticket or voucher (including e-tickets)'. If Indigo attempt to hold me liable under byelaws, despite the fact it's not relevant land (no POFA keeper liability possible) then breach of byelaws, too, is denied. Railway Byelaw 14 (3) says specifically:

''No person in charge of any motor vehicle, bicycle or other conveyance shall park it on any part of the railway where charges are made for parking by an Operator or an authorised person without paying the appropriate charge at the appropriate time in accordance with instructions given by an Operator or an authorised person at that place''.

As far as 'appropriate charge at the appropriate time is concerned', I submit that a parking ticket valid on the date mentioned in the penalty notice had been purchased and photographic evidence of the receipt was provided to Indigo when I first appealed. This bylaw is about NOT PAYING and it is not disputed that the driver had paid and had no further fee to pay – hence no contravention of the byelaw has taken place.

3. The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 – No Keeper Liability

This operator has not fulfilled the 'second condition' for keeper liability as defined in Schedule 4 and as a result, they have no lawful authority to pursue any parking charge from myself, as a registered keeper appellant. There is no discretion on this matter. If Schedule 4 mandatory documents are not served at all, or in time (or if the document omits any prescribed wording) then keeper liability simply does not apply.

The wording in the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 is as follows:

''Right to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle:
4(1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. (2) The right under this paragraph applies only if

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6*, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met;

*Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4:
6(1) ''The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor)— (a)has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8. This is re-iterated further ‘If a notice to driver has been given, any subsequent notice to keeper MUST be given in accordance with paragraph 8.”

The NTK must have been delivered to the registered keeper’s address within the ‘relevant period’ which is highlighted as a total of 56 days beginning with the day after that on which any notice to driver was given. The alleged infringement occurred on 03/02/2017 and from my understanding the NTK was required to reach me by 31/03/2017. As this operator has evidently failed to serve a NTK, not only have they chosen to flout the strict requirements set out in PoFA 2012, but they have consequently failed to meet the second condition for keeper liability. Clearly I cannot be held liable to pay this charge as the mandatory series of parking charge documents were not properly given.

Furthermore, Indigo’s declared position via their correspondence is based on railway byelaws.

The Railway Byelaws state, under 14 (4), that: “In England and Wales (i) The owner of any motor vehicle, bicycle or other conveyance used, left or placed in breach of Byelaw 14(1) to 14(3) may be liable to pay a penalty as displayed in that area.” Accordingly, under the Byelaws the owner of a vehicle is liable to pay any outstanding penalty for contravention of the Byelaws.

From the evidence provided to POPLA by the operator, I believe POPLA will be unable to determine that it has identified the appellant in this case, as the owner of the vehicle. It is a fact that the owner has not been identified. The POFA positively enshrines the right of a keeper not to name the driver nor be 'assumed' to be that individual and nor can it be reasonably assumed in the absence of any evidence, that a keeper or driver is necessarily the owner.

Therefore, in this case, the operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing for the charge is in fact liable:

- POPLA cannot lawfully 'presume' that a keeper may be held as the owner, and
- Henry Greenslade has confirmed that POPLA cannot lawfully 'presume' that a keeper may be held as if they 'might' be the driver.

As the burden of proof rests with the operator in both showing that the appellant has not complied with terms in place on the land, AND showing that the appellant is liable for the parking charge issued, POPLA will be unable to reach any lawful and factual conclusion regarding a keeper appellant like myself being liable, without the POFA having been followed.

wkm86

4. The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who may have been potentially liable for the charge

In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.

In this case, no other party apart from an evidenced driver can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made and regardless of whether a purported 'NTK' was served or not, because the fact remains I am only appealing as the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability:

“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.''

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator cannot transfer the liability for the charge using the POFA.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:

''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.''

5. Signage:

The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

(Link removed)

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

(Link removed)

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

(Link removed)

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

(Link removed)

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

(Link removed)

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

(Link removed)

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

The signage was not compliant with the BPA Code of Practice and was not seen before parking - so there was no valid contract formed between Indigo and the driver. There was no offer, consideration or acceptance flowing between this Operator and the driver which could have created any contract for the driver to pay this extortionate sum over and above the correct tariff (in this case £6.80) already paid.

In breach of Appendix B (Mandatory Entrance Signs) Indigo have no signage with full terms which could be readable at eye level, for a driver in moving traffic on arrival.

The signs do not meet the minimum requirements in part 18 of the BPA code of practice. They were not clear and intelligible as required. The BPA Code of Practice states under appendix B, entrance signage:

“The sign must be readable from far enough away so that drivers can take in all the essential text without needing to look more than 10 degrees away from the road ahead.”

For a contract to be formed, one of the many considerations is that there must be adequate signage on entering the car park and throughout the car park. I contend that there is not.

The sign at the entrance to the premises is rendered illegible by being placed back from the road in such a way that a driver could only see it at the very last moment and containing small lettering so as to not being readable/legible to a driver moving in a car when entering the premises. Any alleged contract is not formed after the vehicle has already been parked, such as when the driver walks away and past a sign (on the opposite side of the car park) when walking towards the station platform area, as this is too late.

The sign containing the Terms and Conditions in the car park area where the vehicle was parked is also not visible and rendered illegible due it’s positioning and containing small lettering so as to not be seen when approaching in a car when entering the premises. The car park is busy and having to take eyes off the direction of travel to actually read the sign breaches the BPA code of practice.

There were no signs or road markings to indicate that the area was private property or in any way restricted, and no signage indicating the area was private before entering the road. The requirement to pay £100 is not clear and prominent as the Supreme Court commented on in Beavis. Such an onerous obligation should be the most prominent part of the sign, as is stated in Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule.

5. No Evidence of Landowner Authority

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an un-redacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).

Paragraph 7 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

Section 7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.
Section 7.3 states “The written authorisation must also set out:

a. the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined
b. any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation
c. any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement
d. who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs
e. the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement “

Indigo are required to provide a full copy of the contemporaneous, signed & dated (unredacted) contract with the landowner. Any contract is not compliant with the requirements set out in the BPA Code of Practice and does not allow them to charge and issue proceedings for this sum for this alleged contravention in this car park. In order to refute this it will not be sufficient for the Operator merely to supply a site agreement or witness statement, as these do not show sufficient detail (such as the restrictions, charges and revenue sharing arrangements agreed with any landholder). In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, a non-landowner private parking company must have a specifically-worded contract with the landowner otherwise there is no authority.


Conclusion

That completes my case for appeal. I respectfully request that this parking charge notice appeal be allowed and the appeal should be upheld on every point.

I would also like to formally request to see all evidence presented by Indigo regarding this appeal and the opportunity to refute any evidence submitted by Indigo regarding this appeal.

To quote Henry Greenslade; a highly respected, longstanding lead adjudicator of parking ticket appeals across the board (Council statutory tribunals as well as private parking issues via POPLA); with a reputation for fairness and high integrity:

From the Final Report:

''At POPLA, Assessors consider the evidence produced by each party, all of which evidence the other party has the opportunity to see and comment upon.''

and from page 15 of the POPLA Annual Report 2015:

“…it is certainly a basic principle of a fair appeals service that each party is given the opportunity to see the other party’s case and to comment upon it. This is the position at POPLA. Appellants should obviously receive the operator’s evidence in its entirety.''


Yours Faithfully,


XXXXX

Coupon-mad

Regarding point (a), Indigo have until 31/03 for the NTK to reach me. The rejection for the first appeal was received on 28/02, so I have until 28/03 to file an appeal. Even if I appeal on the last day, there are still 3 days for the NTK to arrive. Can I still leave this point in?

POPLA codes will work for 30 days at least, so add a couple of days to your calculations.

Indigo will not see your POPLA appeal immediately, especially if you do this online in the evening. POPLA will only pick it up electronically the next day, then Indigo will be sent it from POPLA...finally some goon at Indigo looks at it...by which time it would be far too late for them to scrabble to serve a NTK (never mind the date they put on it) to actually be received at your house in time!

Your POPLA appeal looks great, so diarise to submit it online in just under 4 weeks.