POPLA appeal, ParkingEye - Tower Road Car Park, Newquay

spikypaddy

Hi all

I've received an NTK from Parking Eye with reference to the good old Tower Road car park in Newquay. Familiar story: week away with the family - then a brace of letters through the door from these charmers.

I'm obviously going to lodge an appeal online via ParkingEye's website. However, their NTK only came through the door today (10/11/16) - the date of incident is listed as 25/10/16 - by my maths making it 16 days between date of incident and receipt of 2x NTK. However, the date of issue is showing as 04/11/16 and the envelope from Croydon bears no post mark. Is there any way I can go about proving date of receipt and would this need to be used at the appeal to POPLA stage? I haven't had a chance to check the Parking Eye appeals process yet, because it requires log in with vehicle reg and their ref number.

Basically, parking WAS paid for in full and there was no over stay at all, but I suspect there may have been an issue with entering the vehicle registration at the pay machine.

Coupon-mad

I would bet that's not their 'POFA version' PCN then? The way to check the two types of PE PCN is shown in post #3 of the NEWBIES thread. Have a look, it is easy to spot.

No POFA = 'no keeper liability'; no need to prove dates of receipt if they haven't used the POFA wording which I suspect they have not dared to. If so then that's your golden ticket!

spikypaddy

Thanks for the swift response, Coupon-mad. Unfortunately this IS the POFA version - no blank space for me, so I have got the whole section about having 28 days to respond. However, obviously the date of arrival means someone has cocked up somewhere along the line - I just don't know how I can go about proving it without a post mark/franking mark on the envelopes.

spikypaddy

Bit of a wait before returning to this - the joys of working full time, having a toddler and studying part-time!

So, I've received my rejection from Parkingeye - as expected. Now I'm going to work on the appeal. Obviously I'm going to to base this on the templates in the newbies threads and run and a draft past you all, but I was wondering if it is worth making a point of mentioning that despite the POFA wording, the original NTK was NOT received within the 14 day limit specified under paragraph 9 (5) of POFA?

Additionally, even now there is no mention of the exact infringement I'm supposed to have committed, beyond the initial NTK stating that "By either not purchasing the appropriate parking time or by remaining at the car park longer than permitted..."

spikypaddy

OK, so I think I'm nearly ready to post a draft of the POPLA appeal, but still unsure if the lack of adherence to POFA 14 day receipt of NTK is relevant in this case, where I do have the POFA version of ParkingEye's letter? Can someone advise?

spikypaddy

I hope this is OK - I've well and truly gone for the kitchen sink approach, and slowly found myself getting madder and madder as I've realised just how much these thieving sods have broken all the rules! Have submitted a FOI request to find out when exactly they requested my details from DVLA - I think someone at PE may have been making some dates up along the way here! Copied and pasted from a number of different appeals on here, just hope they all make sense together.

POPLA APPEAL – code: XXXXXXXXXX
Name & address of Keeper

I am writing to you to lodge a formal appeal against a parking charge notice sent to myself as registered keeper of the vehicle in question. I was NOT the driver, although I was present when the vehicle was parked in the Tower Road car park in Newquay, Cornwall and so can confirm that a ticket for five hours parking was purchased by the driver and clearly displayed upon the driver’s side dashboard of the vehicle in question. The vehicle was parked in this car park for less than the five hours parking time purchased, and ParkingEye’s own ANPR photographs show the entrance and exit of the vehicle less than five hours apart.

I contend that I am not liable for this parking charge on the basis of the following, explained in further detail below:

1) This Notice to Keeper (NTK) is not compliant with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA) due to the dates and the wording used
2) The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact liable for the charge.
3) ParkingEye has no standing or authority to form contracts with drivers in this particular car park, nor to pursue charges.
4) Breach of the BPA Code of Practice on ANPR
5) Breach of the BPA Code of Practice on appeals
6) The charge is a penalty, breaches the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and is prohibited/unfair under the CPUTRs. It is not saved by ParkingEye v Beavis.
7) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself
8) There must be a de minimis argument to be put forward in cases where an incorrect Vehicle Registration Number is entered


1) This Notice to Keeper (NTK) is not compliant with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA) due to the dates and the wording used
Under schedule 4, paragraph 4 of the POFA, an operator can only establish the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of a vehicle if certain conditions must be met as stated in paragraphs 5, 6, 11 & 12. ParkingEye have failed to fulfil the conditions which state that the keeper must be served with a compliant NTK in accordance with paragraph 9, which stipulates a mandatory timeline and wording:-

“The notice must be given by—
(a) handing it to the keeper, or leaving it at a current address for service for the keeper, within the relevant period; or
(b) sending it by post to a current address for service for the keeper so that it is delivered to that address within the relevant period.”

The applicable section here is (b) because the NTK was delivered by post. Furthermore, paragraph 9(5) states: “The relevant period... is the period of 14 days beginning with the day after that on which the specified period of parking ended”

As the date of the alleged parking event is 25th October 2016, I would need to have received the NTK by post no later than 8th November 2016 for it to be compliant with POFA. However, both copies of the NTK sent to myself as Registered Keeper arrived instead some 16 days after the alleged event, on 10th November 2016 - making it impossible for the notice to have been deemed ‘served’ or given, within the 'relevant period' as required under paragraph 9(4)(b).

The fact that ParkingEye issued an NTK claiming they have statutory rights, under POFA, to pursue the keeper, but then themselves not complying with the conditions required by POFA to be granted those rights, only leads me to believe that they issued the NTK in an attempt to fraudulently obtain money from me. This view is supported by the fact that ParkingEye has a template for their PCNs that excludes the usual POFA wording for cases where they have failed to comply with the POFA conditions, but chose not to use it for the PCN sent to me. I am also taking this matter up with David Dunford at DVLA.

The PCN also fails to identify the facts that caused a charge to arise and fails to describe the unpaid parking charges that they allege were unpaid at the machine. 7(2) states:

“The notice must - (b) inform the driver of the requirement to pay parking charges in respect of the specified period of parking and describe those charges, the circumstances in which the requirement arose...and the other facts that made those charges payable...”

This NTK stated that “either” there was not appropriate parking time purchased “or” the vehicle remained longer than permitted (neither of which is a ‘fact’). Even in their rejection email, the operator fails to establish any “fact” as basis for this charge. If this operator should change their story for POPLA and perhaps try to show that a ‘wrong or non-existent VRN’ gave rise to the charge, POPLA please note that that would prove my point that this NTK has no ‘facts’ and fails to describe those parking charges which they contend remain ‘unpaid’ by the driver.

So, this is a charge that could only be potentially enforced against a known driver and there is no evidence of who that individual was - and that person was not me.

2) The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact liable for the charge.
In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.

Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay, not by POPLA, nor the operator, nor even in court. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a POFA-compliant NTK.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator, because they cannot use the POFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot – they will fail to show I can be liable because the driver was not me.

The vital matter of full compliance with the POFA was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:-

Understanding keeper liability
“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.”

No lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from a keeper, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the POFA. This exact finding was made in a very similar case with the same style NTK in 6061796103 v ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:

“I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.”

3) ParkingEye has no standing or authority to form contracts with drivers in this particular car park, nor to pursue charges.
As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined
b) any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation
c) any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement
d) who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs
e) the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement

spikypaddy

4) Breach of the BPA Code of Practice on ANPR.
It is submitted that this charge was not properly given because it breaches the BPA Code of Practice regarding ANPR which requires checks to be made to ensure that a charge is ‘appropriate’ before issuing a PCN.

The payment made for 5 hours would in fact be very easy to identify if this operator had carried out the necessary checks required in the BPA CoP, so I suggest these checks were not made and that the operator has contravened the requirements of professional diligence; a duty of consumer-facing service providers.

I put this operator to strict proof that these checks were made (showing full records from that day including the VRN list of payments around the time in question and any payments with no VRN recorded) and to explain why a charge was issued when they would indisputably have identified the matching 5 hour payment. The operator would have been in no doubt that the car parking was paid for, had they made the required checks. And the situation is fully within this operator’s control. As cameras are used to record number plates entering and leaving then they should be connected to the ticket machines. As a number-plate begins to be typed, a truly ‘connected’ system would find the ANPR image and simply require the driver to confirm that this is their vehicle, and the system would show the time of arrival (all details known to the system already).

Further, the signs fail to inform a driver what the ANPR data will be used for. When paying in good faith, the driver had no idea that secret camera data would later be used against them to bind them to a charge they knew nothing about and did not agree to. They thought the cameras were there for security, due to the lack of any other information (a black icon showing a camera communicates nothing).

Failure to tell a driver how the data will be used is an ICO breach AND a ‘misleading omission’ of a material fact – prohibited by consumer law.

5) Breach of the BPA Code of Practice on appeals
ParkingEye have failed to comply with the BPA’s Code of Practice relating to how PPCs must respond to appeals against PCNs:
(Link to code of practice)

Clause 22.8. of the states that BPA members:

“…must acknowledge or reply to the appeal within 14 days of receiving it.”

My initial appeal against this Parking Charge Notice was lodged via the Appeals form on ParkingEye’s website (Link to appeals page]) on 16th November 2016, and yet no response was forthcoming from ParkingEye until 2nd December 2016, when they rejected my initial appeal via email. This is a 16 day response time – 2 days over the 14 day limit prescribed in the above extract.

6) The charge is a penalty, breaches the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and is prohibited/unfair under the CPUTRs. It is not saved by ParkingEye v Beavis.
This situation is an 'ordinary' contract involving no overstay and no breach of the legitimate interests of the landowner. This was a simple consumer/trader transaction with a ticket for parking being purchased in good faith and produced by a machine and can be very easily distinguished from the case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis.

Indeed, the Judges' findings at the Court of Appeal stage - which were not disputed nor overturned at the Supreme Court, so the findings stand as part of that binding case law - fully support my view that the case of 'Kemble v Farren' remains the binding authority in support of this position. At 47 in the Court of Appeal Judgment, it was held:”When the court is considering an ordinary financial or commercial contract, then it is understandable that the law, which lays down its own rules as to the compensation due from a contract breaker to the innocent party, should prohibit terms which require the payment of compensation going far beyond that which the law allows in the absence of any contract provision governing this outcome. The classic and simple case is that referred to by Tindal CJ in Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing. 141 at 148: “ But that a very large sum should become immediately payable, in consequence of the non-payment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered a penalty, appears to be a contradiction in terms, the case being precisely that in which courts of equity have always relieved, and against which courts of law have, in modern times, endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess the real damages sustained by the breach of the agreement.”

“ And at the Supreme Court it was held at 14. “...where a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform an act, and also provides that, if he does not perform it, he will pay the other party a specified sum of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a secondary obligation which is capable of being a penalty...”

At 22, the Supreme Court explored Lord Dunedin’s speech in Dunlop and separated complex cases (Beavis) from ordinary/standard contracts with a transaction and tariff paid at a machine: “Lord Dunedin's...four tests are a useful tool for deciding whether these expressions can properly be applied to simple damages clauses in standard contracts. But they are not easily applied to more complex cases.”

This is NOT a 'more complex' case by any stretch of the imagination. At 32, it was held that a trader, in this case a parking company: “...can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.”

Clearly a charge ‘out of all proportion’ to the tariff - which was paid in any case - is an unfair penalty to the mind of any reasonable man. A huge charge arising under the excuse of an unexplained event such as a keypad or system error is unjustified and unfair, if the remedy is out of all proportion with the 'breach' and the (completely different) Beavis case does NOT apply to this argument.

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 supports my position that the failure in performance of the keypad and/or failure by the operator to diligently carry out the necessary checks to ensure charges are not issued inappropriately, is unfair and unenforceable:

Link to legislation

- Schedule 2:'Consumer contract terms which may be regarded as unfair':

”A term which has the object or effect of inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer in relation to the trader or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate performance by the trader of any of the contractual obligations...”

“A term which has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation.”

This charge is clearly punitive and is not saved from breaching the 'penalty rule' (i.e. Lord Dunedin's four tests for a penalty) by the Beavis case, which does NOT supersede other defences. It turned on completely different facts and related only to that car park with its own unique complexity of commercial justification.This case is not comparable.

The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 also supports my position that this commercial practice of charging for their own system failure is unfair:

Link to legislation

”Prohibition of unfair commercial practices”:3.—

(1) Unfair commercial practices are prohibited.
(2) Paragraphs (3) and (4) set out the circumstances when a commercial practice is unfair.
(3) A commercial practice is unfair if—
(a) it contravenes the requirements of professional diligence;and
(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer...
(4) A commercial practice is unfair if—
(a) it is a misleading action under the provisions of regulation 5;
(b) it is a misleading omission under the provisions of regulation 6; “

ParkingEye have failed all of the above tests, which makes a charge under these circumstances prohibited and unenforceable. The Beavis case established that the penalty rule was certainly deemed ‘engaged’ in parking charge cases. Even if POPLA cannot consider consumer law (whyever not?) then the evidence shows that this charge is the very essence of ‘unconscionable’ which was the Beavis case definition of an unrecoverable penalty.

7) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself
There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

Link to decision

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

Link to signage

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

Link to guide

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

Link

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

Link

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

Link

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

8) There must be a de minimis argument to be put forward in cases where an incorrect Vehicle Registration Number is entered
As previously mentioned, although not the driver at the time of the alleged incident at Tower Road, I was present at the time of the event. I am aware that suitable parking was purchased, particularly as I contributed towards the cost of the parking for five hours – a period of time deemed sufficient for our needs on the day. This was clearly displayed upon the vehicle’s dashboard and the vehicle was at the car park no longer than the five hour period – as evidenced by ParkingEye’s own ANPR photo capture. The pay and display ticket machines at Tower Road are not at all user friendly and - since ParkingEye have yet to provide any details of the ticket purchased - one can perhaps assume that it is because the details of registration number keyed in at the time might be incorrect.

Some PPCs have pursued charges when an O is input instead of a 0 & vice versa. What about a typo that is a simple transposition of two characters? It would be simple enough to have the automated systems test for this when no match is found on ANPR records – as per point 4 in relation to breaches of the BPA Code of Practice in relation to ANPR usage. There has been no loss of revenue, and although the automated system may not be able to account for all instances where an incorrect VRN is entered, some trivial mistakes could be caught e.g. the machine should not allow a ticket to be issued when an incomplete VRN is entered. From my own research, it would even appear that this type of machine can dispense a ticket when no VRN is entered.

spikypaddy

Hi all. I've received a reply from POPLA stating that I should receive evidence from ParkingEye, yet have not yet received it and only have 3 days remaining to comment on their "evidence". How should I best contact ParkingEye to request their evidence - there is no email address for them, so in this case will I have to call them?

Guys_Dad

Inform POPLA if it hasn't been received.

spikypaddy

Thanks - I've emailed POPLA and copied in aos@britishparking.co.uk, but now need to make sure I get the evidence pack from PE. They've been rubbish so far on all counts: NTK arrived late (16 days after event), they took 16 days to respond to my appeal and now they've not sent through the evidence. I made sure I highlighted all of that in my email to POPLA, too - but I guess I'm stuck with having to call PE.

Coupon-mad

No, email them:

info@parkingeye.co.uk

And BTW they haven't 'made a mistake' or cocked up the deadlines...they know full well that the bulk posting system they use delays posting until a batch is ready to go, some 3 or 4 days later, and means their PCNs don't arrive in time in many cases.

But hey, they don't care because the envelopes are not franked and POPLA can't tell when it arrived because victims can't prove it.

This is not incompetence, it IS the business model.