APCOA Parking Charge Notice - Swindon Train Station, PCN Received - What are the nex

billythefish1 · 10 April 2017 at 12:53PM

Quick question: In terms of appeal most of the arguments seem to relate to inadequate signage and T&Cs but can people advise what is deemed inadequate signage?

Umkomaas · 10 April 2017 at 1:04PM

billythefish1 wrote: »

Quick question: In terms of appeal most of the arguments seem to relate to inadequate signage and T&Cs but can people advise what is deemed inadequate signage?

You compare it with the requirements of the BPA's Code of Practice Paragraph 18 and Annex B. You then pull the signage apart.

StaffsSW · 10 April 2017 at 1:27PM

Fruitcake wrote: »

Not correct. In general, byelaws are not applicable to the driver or keeper, but to the owner. It is important therefore that they never find out who that is.

What defines "Owner"?

The V5 registration document is quite clear that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner, so if a vehicle is on finance, wouldn't that make the finance provider the owner?

Has this ever been tested or pushed?

Fruitcake · 10 April 2017 at 1:55PM

StaffsSW wrote: »

What defines "Owner"?

The V5 registration document is quite clear that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner, so if a vehicle is on finance, wouldn't that make the finance provider the owner?

Has this ever been tested or pushed?

Ownership can be difficult to establish. You only have to look at shell corporations to realise this. As for cars, yes it could be a finance company, or a charity, or a government scheme (Motobility) or a friend, or spouse, or parent, or child. I've bought cars for my kids where I have been the owner but they have been the registered keeper. They didn't become the owner until they paid me back.

I'm not sure if it has ever been tested, but the important thing is not to identify the owner, and ideally not to identify the driver either. In any case, it's up to the scammers to prove that byelaws don't apply, or can pursue someone where byelaws do apply, and if so, they can prove that they can pursue the keeper where byelaws apply.

billythefish1 · 10 May 2017 at 11:05PM

HI All,

So I've had the response from Apcoa Parking and I am hoping you can advise on the best approach of appealing this through Popla - things to point out, points to raise to get this thrown out.

How do I upload a response as picture here as it won't allow me to insert the link?

Umkomaas · 11 May 2017 at 4:43AM

billythefish1 wrote: »

HI All,

So I've had the response from Apcoa Parking and I am hoping you can advise on the best approach of appealing this through Popla - things to point out, points to raise to get this thrown out.

How do I upload a response as picture here as it won't allow me to insert the link?

All details regarding construction of a POPLA appeal are included in the NEWBIES FAQ sticky, post #4. Also do a forum search on 'APCOA POPLA' and pull up recent POPLA wins against them. Just, plagiarise, via copy and paste as necessary, and let us see your appeal draft. Don't miss the POPLA deadline.

If you've received a standard APCOA rejection letter, we don't need to see it, so no need to upload here. Or do you have some specific reason why you want it shown?

billythefish1 · 15 May 2017 at 11:17AM

Hi Umkomaas

The letter stated "This site is private land subject to the statutory control of the Railway Bye-Laws. Parking Charge Notices are therefore not issue under PoFA". Does this mean anything new?

waamo · 15 May 2017 at 11:29AM

That means they can't rely on keeper liability. They can only chase the driver and not transfer liability to the keeper as POFA allows them to do.

If you haven't named the driver and appealed as the keeper then APCOA have a problem.

The fact they are chasing the keeper and have not identified the driver should be included in a POFA appeal.

billythefish1 · 19 May 2017 at 7:35PM

HI there, here's my draft response (Part 1)- as usual I welcome your thoughts, comments and amends:

Dear POPLA,

Re: POPLA NO:
Re: PCN No. xxxx

I am the Registered Keeper (“My” or “I”) and this is my appeal, based on the points below.

1) APCOA not using POFA 2012
2) Railway Land Is Not ‘Relevant Land’
3) Amount demanded is a penalty
4) No keeper liability
5) Appellant not being the individual liable
6) Non-compliant signage, forming no contract with driver
7) Breach of DVLA’s KADOE contract with APCOA
8) Lack of standing / authority from landowner!

1) APCOA not using POFA 2012

APCOA’s rejection of my initial appeal, it appears that APCOA are attempting to claim the charge is liable to them under railway byelaws. I reject this and put to them strictly to prove on which byelaw they claim is broken, and in any case, why this would result in an obligation to pay APCOA.

I also refer to Freedom of Information Act Request – F0013227 whereby the Department for the Secretary of State for Transport has categorically stated that no confirmation or change in laws since the Railways Act 1993 came into force, which empower any person or body other than the courts to impose a penalty for breach of Byelaws 14(1), (2) or (3) made under Section 219 of the Transport Act 2000 (as amended) and made operational on 7 July 2005.

Therefore, any breach of byelaws is a criminal offence, not a breach of any contract APCOA may say the driver entered in to. If the driver is found to have breached byelaws 14 (1-3), the resulting penalty is paid to the government, not to APCOA or the railway. Further, byelaw offences are decided by the court, not by APCOA – the parking company or railway can only allege the breach.

2) Railway Land Is Not ‘Relevant Land’

Under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012, section 1, it states that:

“(1) This schedule applies where –
(a) The driver of a vehicle is required by virtue of a relevant obligation to pay parking charges in respect of the parking of the vehicle on relevant land”. Following from this, in section 3, PoFA 2012 states that: “(1) In this schedule “relevant land” means any land (including land above or below ground level) other than - … (b) any land … on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control”. And that: “(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) (c) the parking of a vehicle on land is “subject to statutory control” if any statutory provision imposes a liability (whether criminal or civil, and whether in the form of a fee or charge or a penalty of any kind) in respect of the parking on that land of vehicles generally or of vehicles of a description that includes the vehicle in question”.

Since byelaws apply to railway land, the land is not relevant land within the meaning of PoFA and so is specifically excluded from 'keeper liability' under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. As I am the registered keeper I am not legally liable, as this Act does not apply on this land. I ask APCOA for strict proof otherwise if they disagree with this point and would require them to show evidence including documentary proof from the rail authorities that this land is not already covered by byelaws. Railway land, being governed by Byelaws, is not relevant land and Keeper Liability under POFA does not apply, and therefore APCOA are unable to pursue the registered keeper in lieu of the driver’s details – see point 1 above as well.

POPLA assessor Steve Macallan found in 6062356150 in September 2016 that land under statutory control cannot be considered ‘relevant land’ for the purposes of POFA 2012. ‘As the site is not located on ‘relevant land’, the operator is unable to rely on POFA 2012 in order to transfer liability to the hirer. Additionally, as I am not satisfied the appellant was the driver, I am unable to conclude that the operator issued the PCN correctly, and I must allow this appeal.’

3) Amount demanded is a penalty and is punitive

Amount demanded is a penalty and is punitive, contravening the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

APCOA’s letter of rejection against My appeal, and their signage, both confirm that this charge represents liquidated damages for breach and the predominant purpose of the charge at this extravagantly high level is as a deterrent.

A parking charge must be a pre-estimate of likely losses flowing from an alleged breach in order to be potentially enforceable. APCOA cannot demonstrate any initial loss caused by the parking event. They would have been in the same position had the parking charge notice not been issued, and would have many of the same business and staff/salary overheads even if no vehicles breached any terms at all.

Nor is the charge 'commercially justified'. If APCOA cites 'ParkingEye v Beavis & Wardley' it's irrelevant. Mr Beavis is taking that flawed small claim decision to the Court of Appeal, just as HHJ Moloney fully expected at the time he made his decision, which was full of caveats and full of holes and a distinct lack of case law. In addition, POPLA Assessor Chris Adamson has stated in June 2014: ''In each case that I have seen from the higher courts...it is made clear that a charge cannot be commercially justified where the dominant purpose of the charge is to deter the other party from breach...It also seems that courts have been unwilling to allow clauses designed to deter breach as this undermines the binding nature of the initial promise made. Whilst the courts have reasonably moved away from a strict interpretation of what constitutes a genuine pre-estimate of loss, recognising that in complex commercial situations an accurate pre-estimate will not always be possible, nevertheless it remains that a charge for damages must be compensatory in nature rather than punitive.''

I fully expect APCOA will send POPLA a generic statement showing duplicated layers of staff time, including unnecessary checks and balances. It will no doubt follow the now rather well-trodden path of trotting out the unsubstantiated and incredible assertion that a full three hours of management time 'double checking' the work of others, goes into each and every PCN (whether appealed or not!). Where a large percentage of the 'GPEOL calculation' comprises staff costs, they must be able to justify those heads as relating to every typical PCN. And yet, only 2% of PCNs get to POPLA stage, so clearly even if a manager did double check those rare cases which go to POPLA, only 2% of those man hours could be included in a genuine pre-estimate of loss when calculated in advance. If the driver had paid this PCN between day 15 and day 29 and had never appealed it, APCOA would need to be able to justify the full charge as a GPEOL and their calculation could not include the entire count of man-hours allegedly spent on the odd rare case appealed to POPLA.

Like other operators, it is in the public domain that APCOA have recently jumped on the bandwagon and manufactured a newly re-written ‘loss’ statement. This is surprisingly similar to that used by PPS (after PPS had won a couple of anomalous POPLA decisions). This allegedly plagiarised calculation is now common to several operators and POPLA has seen it and dismissed it before. A generic 'model loss statement' cannot possibly show any regard to calculating before the event, a genuine pre-estimate of the likely loss, which might typically flow from a parking event. I contend APCOA's calculation is merely a conveniently totalled sum of actual loss suffered, made afterwards, rather than a genuine pre-estimate of loss.

As such, POPLA should I hope, see through it just as Ricky Powell did in 6861754004 (re PPS, the originators of the generic calculation APCOA now use):

''I am not satisfied that the pre-estimate of loss supplied by the Operator reflects the charge issued. I find that the ‘appeal writing’ loss asserted is duplicated in two heads of loss. The ‘Appeals staff’ appeals writing costs are included in the sum for £9.51. However, there are further appeal writing costs included in the ‘Management’ costs, which total £71.65. It has not been explained how the individual heads of loss included under the heading ‘Management’ are calculated. It is also impossible to determine what contribution the appeal writing costs contribute to the total of £71.65. Therefore, I cannot find that the total costs for ‘Management’ are substantiated and so must disregard them from the total genuine pre-estimate of loss. The total pre-estimate after subtracting the above £71.65 is £31.18. I find that this does not substantially amount to the issued £100 charge and that it does not constitute a genuine pre-estimate of the Operator’s loss caused by the Appellant’s breach. Therefore, I find that the parking charge is not enforceable in this case. '' (Ricky Powell, Assessor, August 2014).

I contend that APCOA's calculation (even if it is a more credible effort than those recently presented) must fail as it has been re-written recently and is not a genuine PRE-estimate. In fact it would be a 'post-estimate' after the event, of figures designed to match the charge. As such, any re-write by APCOA would be disingenuous and not acceptable, according to the words of Mr Greenslade: “However, genuine pre-estimate of loss means just that. It is an estimate of the loss which might reasonably be suffered, made before the breach occurred, rather than a calculation of the actual loss suffered made afterwards."

I put APCOA to strict proof of the date when the GPEOL was decided for this contravention in this car park. This must include documentary evidence of a meeting with their client or contemporaneous notes or emails or other evidence, which shows how/when this PCN sum, was decided in advance, specifically for this client in this car park and showing the likely losses caused by this alleged contravention. The authority on this is ParkingEye v Beavis. That case was characterised by clear and ample signage where the motorist had time to read, and then consider the signage and decide whether to accept or not. In this case the signage was neither clear not ample, and the motorist had not time to read the signage, let alone consider it, as the charge was applied instantly the vehicle stopped. The signage cannot be read safely from a moving vehicle.

4) No keeper liability

Having re-checked the date on the Notice to Keeper issued by APCOA, the driver is not known in this case. POFA 2012 Schedule 4, Paragraph 9, requires that, in order to make use of the provision to pursue the registered keeper, APCOA must send a Notice to Keeper within 14 days of the alleged contravention. The alleged contravention happened at Swindon Main Car Park railway station on 14th March 2017. The Notice to Keeper was issued on 4th April 2017 and therefore presumed to have arrived on 6th April 2017, which is 24 days after the alleged contravention. APCOA Parking (UK) Ltd has therefore failed to issue a Notice to Keeper in the required timeframe, and therefore I cannot be held liable in this instance for the alleged debt of the driver.

(5) Appellant not being the individual liable

APCOA has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who was liable for the charge. (ref POPLA case Carly Law 6061796103). In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. Any person(s), with the consent of the registered keeper, may drive a vehicle as long as the driver is insured.

Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be and as the Registered Keeper), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

Not being the owner of the vehicle, under the Railway byelaws the registered keeper of the vehicle cannot assumed to be the owner anymore than they can assumed to be the driver.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if APCOA is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made because the fact remains I am only the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with APCOA, because they cannot use the POFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA 2012 was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability

“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. If POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass."

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:

"I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal."

The same conclusion was reached by POPLA Assessor Steve Macallan, quoted in appeal point above.

billythefish1 · 19 May 2017 at 7:44PM

And Part 2:

6) Non-compliant signage, forming no contract with driver

The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself. Entrance signs which are mandatory under the code are not visible and do not follow paragraph 18.2 of the code.

There was neither contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case. For a contract to be formed, one of the many considerations is that there must be adequate signage on entering the car park, and furthermore a Notice is not imported into the contract unless brought home “so prominently that the party ‘must’ have known of it” and agreed terms. I contend that this is not the case, and question the fact that the driver saw any sign specifying the amount of the ‘fine’ that would be due, and so there was no consideration or acceptance and no contract agreed between the parties

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge, which is hidden in small print. Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put APCOA to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports My argument, not the operator's case:

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put APCOA to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require APCOA to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

7) Breach of DVLA’s KADOE contract

The DVLAs KADOE contract is the enabling mechanism for the DVLA to release data to APCOA. It states that they can only use the data released to seek recovery from the driver, or the keeper if the procedure in Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act is used. Since PoFA cannot be used under byelaws, for contract-based parking tickets, only the driver could be held liable. In such a situation the parking company might still write to the keeper to ask them to nominate the driver, but they cannot infer they have any liability.

This illegal obtainment of the keepers’ details and implication of liability is a serious breach of the Data Protection Act and as such I shall be notifying both the DVLA and ICO accordingly. I shall also be seeking damages from APCOA for £750.00

8) Lack of standing / authority from landowner!

Section 7 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice requires parking operators to have the written authority from the landowner to operate on the land. Section 7.1 states:

“If you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you the authority to carry out all the aspects of car park management for the site that you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges”.

Section 7.3 states: “The written authorisation must also set out:

a. the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined!

b. any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c. any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement!

d. who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs!

e. the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.''

I do not believe that APCOA’s mere site agreement as a contractor issuing PCNs and letters 'on behalf of' a TOC gives the parking firm any rights to sue in their own name. This is insufficient to comply with the BPA Code of Practice and not enough to hold me liable in law to pay APCOA (not that a keeper can be liable anyway on non-relevant land and APCOA cannot enforce byelaws themselves, only the Train Operating Company (TOC) or site landowners can, by requiring the driver ONLY, to answer to a real fine at a Magistrates Court). APCOA have no title in this land and therefore have no standing to enforce 'parking charges' or penalties of any description in any court. No evidence has been supplied lawfully showing that APCOA are entitled to pursue these charges in their own right.

I require APCOA to provide a full copy of the contemporaneous, signed & dated (unredacted) contract with the landowner. I say that any contract is not compliant with the requirements set out in the BPA Code of Practice and does not allow them to charge and issue proceedings for this sum for this alleged contravention in this car park. In order to refute this it will not be sufficient for APCOA merely to supply a site agreement or witness statement, as these do not show sufficient detail (such as the restrictions, charges and revenue sharing arrangements agreed with a landowner) and may well be signed by a non-landholder such as another agent. In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, a non-landowner private parking company must have a specifically-worded contract with the landowner - not merely an 'agreement' with a non-landholder managing agent - otherwise there is no authority. I put APCOA to strict proof of compliance with all of the above requirements.

I therefore respectfully request that my appeal is upheld and the charge is dismissed.

Yours sincerely,

APCOA Parking Charge Notice - Swindon Train Station, PCN Received - What are the nex

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