Taken to court by UK Parking Control Ltd

This was my defence:

Defence

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1. The Particulars of Claim fail to refer to the material terms of
any contract and neither comply with the CPR 16 in respect of
statements of case, nor the relevant practice direction in respect
of claims formed by contract or conduct.

2. It is admitted that at all material times the Defendant is the
registered keeper of vehicle registration mark VO60SYT which is
the subject of these proceedings. The vehicle is insured with
Direct Line with multiple named drivers permitted to use it.

3. It is disputed that on dates 18/05/2016, 24/05/2016, 25/05/2016
and 27/05/2016, the Defendant's vehicle was parked at “Curzon
Street Car Park Curzon Street Birmingham” as stated in the
particulars of claim. UKPC’s own photographic evidence shows the
vehicle parked outside of the car park’s fences and parameters.
Rather, the vehicle was parked on a private side-road leading to
Curzon Gateway student accommodation. It is unknown to the
Defendant as to whether the address photographed can be considered
within the boundaries of the address stated on these documents.

4. The Defendant is unable to identify the driver for the
18/05/2016, 24/05/2016, 25/05/2016 and 27/05/2016. The Claimant is
put to strict proof.
4.1. The Claimant has provided no evidence (in pre-action
correspondence or otherwise) that the Defendant was the driver.
The Defendant avers that the Claimant is therefore limited to
pursuing the Defendant in these proceedings under the provisions
set out by statute in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)
4.2. Before seeking to rely on the keeper liability provisions of
Schedule 4 POFA the Claimant must demonstrate that:
4.2.1. there was a relevant obligation either by way of a breach
of contract, trespass or other tort; and
4.2.2. that it has followed the required deadlines and wording as
described in the Act to transfer liability from the driver to the
registered keeper.
It is not admitted that the Claimant has complied with the
relevant statutory requirements.
4.3. To the extent that the Claimant may seek to allege that any
such presumption exist, the Defendant expressly denies that there
is any presumption in law (whether in statute or otherwise) that
the keeper is the driver. Further, the Defendant denies that the
vehicle keeper is obliged to name the driver to a private parking
firm. Had this been the intention of parliament, they would have
made such requirements part of POFA, which makes no such
provision. In the alternative, an amendment could have been made
to s.172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The 1988 Act continues to
oblige the identification of drivers only in strictly limited
circumstances, where a criminal offence has been committed. Those
provisions do not apply to this matter.

5. The Defendant relies upon ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015)
UKSC 67, in so far as the Court were willing to consider the
imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial
value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for
any breach of parking terms were clear throughout the site.
5.1. The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter
was inadequate to reasonably convey a contractual obligation.
5.1.1. Signs in the area are broken and covered by wiring and
broken lighting fixtures. Clear photographic evidence will be
provided to the court. Furthermore, the 'parking charge' and terms
on the sign are not legible, this is further evident from the
Claimant’s own photographic evidence that they have provided. If
the charge/sign/details can't be read in daylight or darkness in
UKPC's own photographs, it cannot be actcepted that the driver be
considered by the act of parking, to have agreed to a contract.
The Claimant’s own employee was unable to get a good view of the
signs. I will evidence the grainy, illegible tiny print photos
that were provided by UKPC, unlike Beavis’, whose were clear and
prominent.
5.1.2. The largest wording present on the signage states NO
UNAUTHORISED PARKING. This signage is forbidding, and does not
constitute an offer of a contract. The defendant will rely on the
judgements of DDJ Ellington in UKPC v Masterson B4GF26K6[2016].
5.1.2.1. If the driver/s on each occasion were considered to be
trespassers if not allowed to park there, then only the landowner
can pursue a case under the tort of trespass, not this Claimant,
and as the Supreme Court in the Beavis case confirmed, such a
matter would be limited to the landowner themselves claiming for a
nominal sum.
5.1.3. The Claimant has not produced any evidence to show they
have complied with the BPA Approved Operator Scheme Code of
Practice (18.2) by providing clear and prominent entrance signs.
The BPA state that ‘Entrance signs play an important part in
establishing a parking contract and deterring trespassers.
Therefore, as well as the signs have tell drivers about the terms
and conditions for parking, you must also have a standard form of
entrance sign at the entrance to the parking area.
5.2. The Defendant avers that the residential site (Curzon
Gateway) that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site
where there is a commercial value to be protected. The Claimant
has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty
charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context, with
ParkingEye distinguished.

6. It is denied that the Claimant has standing to bring any claim
in the absence of a contract that expressly permits the Claimant
to do so, in addition to merely undertaking parking management.
The Claimant has provided no proof of any such entitlement.

7. It is believed that this Claimant has not adhered to the BPA
Code of Practice and is put to strict proof of full compliance.
This Claimant has been exposed in the national press - and was
recently investigated by the BPA - for falsifying photo evidence,
which was admitted by the Claimant. It is submitted that this is
not a parking company which complies with the strict rules of
their Trade Body, which were held as a vital regulatory feature in
ParkingEye v Beavis.

8. It is denied that the Claimant has any entitlement to the sums
sought.

9. It is admitted that interest may be applicable, subject to the
discretion of the Court on any sum (if awarded), but it is denied
that interest is applicable on the total sums claimed by the
Claimant.