Fine after 30seconds

In paragraph 2 you stated:-
"The Claimant failed to respond to the Defendant's letter dated 6th December 2018, asking for more evidence, and merely proceeded to issue a claim."

Yes... unless you know what is going to happen on 6 December 2018.

was it this one for DPA?

Heck no, the actual counter-claim in both his cases was MUCH longer, luckily I kept a copy of my suggested counter claim for Henry Hippo (re his byelaws case) in my sent items on the pepipoo pm system.

You will of course need to change dates/details/location/contravention to suit (yours is not Council owned) and it's only possible to counterclaim under the DPA, if the PPC got your data from the DVLA, not if YOU gave it to them in an early appeal (yes or no?).

I have added in HH's own case by editing it in (it's the Slough case from March):




PARTICULARS OF COUNTER-CLAIM


1. The Defendant raising this counter-claim against the Claimant, is the registered keeper of the vehicle with the registration number xxxxxxx.

2. (i) The Claimant in this original claim is a private parking company who are required to adhere to the International Parking Community's Code of Practice, which holds all members out for the purposes of the Data Protection Act 1998, as a 'data controller' in Section B (5): Data Processing: ''You are required to be registered with the Information Commissioner as a data controller.''

(ii) This status as a data controller is reiterated by the DVLA in the KADOE contract, under which an Approved Operator parking firm (the party known to the DVLA as 'the Customer') obtain data, which states: ''The Customer, separately from the DVLA, shall be the Data Controller of each item of Data received from the DVLA from the point of receipt of that Data by the Customer or its Link Provider and shall be responsible for complying with the principles of the DPA in relation to its further Processing of that Data.''

(iii) It follows that there is no question that this Claimant bears the responsibility of being a data controller in this matter.


3. The Defendant in this original claim, being the registered keeper of the car in question, is the 'data subject' in this matter. The registration number of the vehicle, together with the Defendant's name and address details, all constitute personal data. this has been confirmed by the Information Commissioner in paragraph 6 of this specific report about private parking operators (to be filed with the Court in support of this Counter-Claim):

https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/cons...onsultation.pdf


4. It is common ground that the Defendant's vehicle was stopped at the side of the road at xxxxx xxxxx, a location owned by the City of London Corporation. At this location, as adduced in the Defence, local Byelaws apply, which include clauses relating to the parking of vehicles. This location falls under statutory control and it follows that is cannot be deemed 'relevant land' as defined in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (the POFA).


5.(i) The Claimant's operative photographed the vehicle, capturing and storing the VRN and an image of the vehicle, following which they obtained the Defendant's personal data, including name and address, from the DVLA. It is averred that, since the location is not 'relevant land', the Claimant had no grounds to pursue me as registered keeper. The purpose of such data being supplied to a parking firm in cases of 'non-relevant land', is only authorised by the DVLA for the basic reason of enquiring who was driving (no more and no less).

(ii) A registered keeper has no obligation nor responsibility whatsoever, to supply the name and address of the driver (whether they know or not) and if they exercise their right not to name the driver then the matter ends there. A registered keeper cannot be pursued regarding a case relating to non-relevant land, because such land falls outwith the 'keeper liability' provision in the POFA.

(iii) It follows that the data relating to the Defendant should not have been stored, nor further processed, after enquiring who was driving, even if the Court believes there was a lawful reason for the Claimant to obtain the data in the first place (which is denied, given the status of this land).


6.(i) Due to the location being subject to Byelaws, the land in question cannot be operated or enforced as if it were private land.

(ii) If the landowner wished to pursue the driver/owner under the local Byelaws,the correct route would have been for the City Of London to have issued a Penalty Charge, or Excess Charge under the applicable law, and the matter would have had to have been laid before Magistrates (in the case of a Byelaws breach).

(iii) As such, due to the status of this location, this Claimant had no reasonable cause to obtain, nor to process, the Defendant's personal data for any reason, not even to enquire who was driving. There was no lawful excuse to issue a notice purporting to be a private 'Parking Charge Notice' at this specific 'non-private land' location, and this was a false instrument.


7. It follows that this Claimant had no reasonable cause to use that VRN to obtain the Defendant's name and address. Significant distress has been caused as a direct result of this data processing, as well as loss of time and costs for defending this matter.

7.1. Each demand that arrived in the post caused serious distress for the household, despite the honest belief that a registered keeper's data could not be used in this way by this Claimant, regarding this location. In forcing the Defendant to answer to the matter in court, serious distress has been caused which will be fully outlined in a Witness Statement and at the hearing. Indeed, being required to attend a hearing and working on a Defence and Counter-Claim in the Defendant's own time, has caused loss of leave.


8. Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (the DPA) indicates that Data may only be lawfully processed if one of the conditions set out in the Schedule applies to that processing. Those conditions are:

(1) The individual whom the personal data is about has consented to the processing. and (5) The processing is necessary:
(a) in relation to a contract which the individual has entered into; or because the individual has asked for something to be done so they can enter into a contract, or
(b) The processing is necessary because of a legal obligation that applies to you (except an obligation imposed by a contract)
(c) The processing is necessary to protect the individual's 'vital interests'. This condition only applies in cases of life or death, such as where an individual's medical history is disclosed to a hospital's A&E department treating them after a serious road accident.
(d) The processing is necessary for administering justice, or for exercising statutory, governmental, or other public functions
(e) The processing is in accordance with the 'legitimate interests' condition.

None of the above apply.


9. By reason of the obtaining and/or storing and processing the data, the Claimant acted in breach of its statutory duty under Section 4(4) of the DPA, in that it processed the personal data unfairly and/or unlawfully in contravention of the Defendant's rights under the First Data Protection Principle.


10. Due to the nature of this location, which is neither 'relevant land' nor 'privately-owned' (despite the misleading sign), the Claimant's misappropriation, obtaining and processing of personal data about the Defendant was unlawful and/or in contravention of any or indeed all of the Data Protection Principles. Certainly, it is averred that the Claimant was in breach of the Second Data Principle, pursuant to Schedule 1 of the DPA, which states: !!!8220;Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.!!!8221;


11. Further or alternatively, by pursuing the Defendant for monies which it was not entitled to recover, the Claimant has unlawfully infringed the Defendant's right to privacy and has misused the Defendant's private information.


12. The Claimant is a member of the Trade Body known as the International Parking Community (IPC). In accordance with the Code of Practice as laid down by the IPC (such rules being held by the Supreme Court Judges in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 as 'effectively regulatory') a parking operator ''shall comply'' with the statutory provisions of the DPA 1998. In this case, the Claimant has failed to comply with that statute, and is therefore operating in breach of the IPC Code of Practice.


13. In consequence of the processing the Claimant has suffered damage and distress. Pursuant to s13 of the DPA, 'Compensation for failure to comply with certain requirements', the Act states at 13(1) that 'An individual who suffers damage by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that damage'.


14. The Claimant relies on two binding authorities in support of the Claim, which are Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA 311, and Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 333. In Vidal-Hall, it was held by the Court of Appeal that compensation was payable upon the fact of breach, and that it was not necessary to quantify a direct pecuniary loss. In Halliday, the Court of Appeal held that a compensatory sum of up to £750 was deemed 'appropriate and sufficient'.


15. Both of the above cases arose as a result of material breaches of the DPA by the respective defendants, and can be considered to provide binding precedents for my own situation. My claim is for £500, at the lower end of the scale and not a sum that appears excessive, given the circumstances of harassment and DPA breach by a Claimant pursuing a wholly vexatious claim and unreasonable three-figure sum.


16. (i) A similar ruling was made by a District Judge at Liverpool County Court on 7 December 2016, in case no. C9DP2D6C, VCS v Mr. M. Also in Claim No D6GM2199 at the County Court at Bury Court: Civil Enforcement Ltd v Mr B, where District Judge Osborne accepted the argument about the DPA breach by a Parking Company who could not hold a registered keeper liable, yet still pursued that party. He accepted the tort of damages. He agreed £500 not unreasonable, given the distress of demands and a court claim. He said he was disappointed in the claimant bringing an unfounded case. The Court's attention is respectfully drawn to the fact that exemplary costs of £405 (as requested) was granted. This is understood to have arisen due to the claim being found to be false and/or vexatious, or where a party is found to be guilty of misrepresentation or suppression of facts.

(ii) This industry's threatening pre-action letters were specifically criticised on 16th March 2018 at Slough in case D8HW7G7P, UK Parking Control v Mr S, where a £500 counter-claim was granted to the successful Defendant due to similar data protection breaches, at the same time as the original meritless parking charge claim was dismissed (transcript will be provided as evidence).

(iii) The assertion that this land is 'privately owned' was misrepresented in the subsequent demands, which were issued unlawfully, unsupported by the Byelaws, purely calculated to make a profit for the Claimant as if contract law applied, when it did not and could not, at this location.

iv) Ignorance of the law and status of the land being no excuse, given that the IPC Code of Practice states in Part B (9):

Byelaws: 9.1 ''It is your responsibility to establish whether any land upon which you operate is subject to any Byelaws. Where land is subject to Byelaws you must ensure that your practices are in accordance with them or, alternatively, that you operate a scheme that is not prohibited by them''.



PARTICULARS OF DAMAGE AND DISTRESS:

17. As a result of the issuing of a private 'Parking Charge' by the Claimant, the Defendant, a Litigant in Person with no previous civil litigation experience, has suffered the quantifiable cost of postage and those travel and other costs for attending a hearing in due course, plus the loss of his own time, something which is not adequately covered by the limited costs awarded in the small claims court hearing. In addition there are non-pecuniary losses, not least being severely worried by the unwarranted demands, which to any untrained eye: impersonated authority, were written to cause alarm and to force payment from consumers, and which unreasonably escalated the sum and misled the Defendant about how a CCJ can be obtained. This series of threatening letters and the court claim have caused untold worry and distress to the Defendant and have caused a loss of family time and peace of mind that will never be reclaimed.


THE COUNTER-CLAIM:

18. (i) Damages in the sum of £500 for breach of statutory duty pursuant to Section 13(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 and/or misuse of private information.

(ii) An order pursuant to Section 14(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998 for the blocking and/or erasure and/or destruction of the data held by the Claimant, whether stored as digital data or otherwise and any photographs or other relevant material.

(iii) It is averred that this Claimant's claim falls within the scope of exemplary/punitive costs. A sum of double the amount claimed is suggested as not unreasonable under the circumstances, however, the Judge is invited to use discretion to grant such costs in this case as are deemed warranted, pursuant to the ruling in Rookes v Barnard 1964 in that the conduct of this Claimant was unwarranted, wholly unreasonable, vexatious and indeed misleading, insofar as the law/byelaws issue is concerned and insofar as the status of the land is concerned. This operation being one which the Claimant knew or should have known, is prohibited under the Byelaws.



STATEMENT OF TRUTH

The Counter-Claimant believes that the facts stated are true.


Signature ......................................


Date .........

Yes i would take out the DPA part as you mentioned.

No, the entire counter claim only works well if they got your data from the DVLA, Did they not? If not, if you gave them your data in an appeal, you cannot claim under the DPA.

That is a counter claim under the DPA.

Maybe you can't, then?