UKPC Curzon Car park POPLA Appeal

Dannyhim5elf

Hi there,

I have drafted all points of dispute from the Newbies thread together to form the POPLA appeal for a "ticket not clearly displayed" windscreen ticket. I have a question however, when I initially appealed as keeper of the vehicle to UKPC I used a second address (address for my temporary university accommodation) and not the registered address of the vehicle. I've since received an NTK to no vehicle-registered address. Does this make the NTK invalid?

The POPLA is essentially all standard board posts however is posted below. Please let me know if there is anything that should be added or revoked. Non-standard wording/parts are in red.

Many thanks for all the hard work you guys put in on the forum.

Danny.



1. The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.!

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

*link*

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.!

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

*link*

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and!'agreement on the charge'!existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.!

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.!!

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.!!

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

*link*

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

*link*

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and!want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

*link*

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters.!Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.!

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''!

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':!

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.!
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact!'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106'!about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

*link*

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.


2. The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who may have been potentially liable for the charge

In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.!!

In this case, no other party apart from an evidenced driver can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made and regardless of whether a purported 'NTK' was served or not, because the fact remains I am only appealing as the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land!and!show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability
“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.!

There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.''

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator cannot transfer the liability for the charge using the POFA.!!

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:!
''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.''



3. No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.!!

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).!!

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement


4. A compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.

This operator has not fulfilled the 'second condition' for keeper liability as defined in Schedule 4 and as a result, they have no lawful authority to pursue any parking charge from myself, as a registered keeper appellant. There is no discretion on this matter. If Schedule 4 mandatory documents are not served at all, or in time (or if the document omits any prescribed wording) then keeper liability simply does not apply.

The wording in the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 is as follows:

''Right to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle:
4(1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. (2) The right under this paragraph applies only if

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6*, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met;

*Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4:
6(1) ''The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor)— (a)has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8. This is re-iterated further ‘If a notice to driver has been given, any subsequent notice to keeper MUST be given in accordance with paragraph 8.’

The NTK must have been delivered to the registered keeper’s address within the ‘relevant period’ which is highlighted as a total of 56 days beginning with the day after that on which any notice to driver was given. As this operator has evidently failed to serve a NTK, not only have they chosen to flout the strict requirements set out in PoFA 2012, but they have consequently failed to meet the second condition for keeper liability. Clearly I cannot be held liable to pay this charge as the mandatory series of parking charge documents were not properly given.



5. camera photos not valid or suspect

UKPC are requested to provide evidence that their supporting photos are accurate and valid. It has been known on past cases for UKPC to alter their photos to gratify their own purpose.!

Source: *link*

Furthermore, no neutral party was known to be present at the procurement of the photo's provided by UKPC. This leads the legitimacy of any provided photographic evidence into distrust until proven trustworthy.

Dannyhim5elf

6. ParkingEye v Beavis is not applicable to provide a rationale for a 'standard economic contract' like this one. This is a disproportionate and unconscionable penalty, not based upon the alleged quantifiable loss nor commercially justified.!!

The amount requested by UKPC is completely disproportionate to the overall cost of parking on site. The amount for 1 full day being £4 in comparison to the £100 charge reduced to £60. UKPC have made no attempt to justify the escalation from £4 to £100.

UKPC seem to be under the misapprehension that POPLA Assessors might believe the BPA line that the Supreme Court judgment was a green light legitimising all frivolous parking charges. Yet there is no comparison between this case and that one; the only similarity is both operators (UKPC and ParkingEye) described the sum as a 'parking charge'.!

There the similarities end. The Beavis case was entirely different and has no blanket application here, except in favour of my case as appellant to support the view that - in the absence of any other commercial justification similar to the Beavis case - this sort of consumer contract must still be proportionate to the tariff/loss. UKPC have shown no commercial justification nor 'legitimate interest' in charging £100 where the signs only refer to £90 and the tariff was just a few pounds.

The ParkingEye v Beavis decision related to those specific facts and unusual 'free parking licence' & 'complex' contractual arrangement flowing from specific landowner interests and reliant upon that 'prominent and clear' Riverside Retail Park signage only. The Supreme Court Judges tweeted on the day of the decision, to clarify that decision turned on those facts, that free car park in that case!only.!!

Each case must still turn on its own facts.

The Beavis decision is not a silver bullet and it cannot be twisted to strike out the majority of private parking ticket appeals and certainly not those which are regarding a Pay and Display site where the alleged loss (tariff) begins as a very easy to identify, tangible sum.!

In a standard economic dispute over a financial transaction between a consumer and a trader, like this one, the loss is easily calculable.

By stark contrast, the contract offered to Mr Beavis in the Chelmsford car park in the Beavis case was described by the Judges as a 'complex' contract which Moore-Bick LJ at the Court of Appeal remarked was 'entirely different' from this sort of financial contract flowing from alleged non-payment of a quantifiable sum to UKPC.!

As regards the Beavis case, it was made plain that the 'penalty rule' is certainly 'engaged' in parking ticket cases and the facts of each case will determine if the penalty rule has been disengaged. The penalty rule could have been abolished in the Beavis case but abolition of that 'useful tool' was very deliberately NOT the case.

In complex contracts (in that case, a free car park with a licence to park but no monetary sum paid per hour) the trader must demonstrate a 'legitimate interest' in enforcing a disproportionately high charge, to avoid such a charge in each individual case from being an unenforceable penalty. UKPC have failed to demonstrate any other wider commercial or socio-economic justification for this exorbitant escalation clause and POPLA cannot make their case for them, therefore the charge remains unenforceable under the penalty rule.

But this case can easily be distinguished from Parking Eye v Beavis because this case is not a 'complex' contractual arrangement at all. So the same leap cannot be made to disengage the penalty rule by arguing 'legitimate interest'. If that was the case, then every alleged underpayment of a quantifiable sum between any trader and consumer could be escalated x 100. If you underpay your paper bill by £1 - the amount due remains at £1, same as in this case - it cannot escalate to £100 and this is because the Beavis case rationale does not apply to 'standard' financial contracts. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court Judges made that very clear.

In Beavis, a major difference which made it more complex than standard contracts, was that there was!no!small sum owed and so, to reach their decision, the Judges had to consider other interests. None of the reasons that gave Parking Eye a legitimate interest which disengaged the 'penalty rule' in their case against Mr Beavis are present in this material case, in which the penalty rule remains firmly engaged and where there is a quantified tariff in play.!

The appellant respectfully submits that the assessor carefully reads the Supreme Court judgment and the preceding Court of Appeal judgment from the same case.!

The Judges set apart the Beavis contract from this type of 'simple financial contract'. This is one the Judges had!seen many times before, where there is a quantified small sum at stake in the first instance as a result of a primary obligation.!

This sort of contract was not under discussion in the Beavis case.!!

The penalty rule is clearly engaged in this case of a standard contract with a quantified tariff, but unlike in Parking Eye v Beavis it is not disengaged by UKPC merely pointing to the Beavis case as if it has blanket relevance (otherwise your local paper shop could point to the Beavis case regarding that £1 underpaid paper bill, as could any trader over any small sum owed). Clearly the 'tweet' from the Supreme Court on the day that their decision was handed down, made it clear that was not the intention of the judgment which turned on its own facts regarding a complex set of circumstances, relevant to a complex contract of its kind only.

At the Court of Appeal stage, when addressing the issue of pre-estimate of loss versus commercial justification, Lord Justice Moore-Bick agreed with HHJ Moloney QC’s findings, and opined at paragraph 27 that: “The application in a case of this kind!of a rule based on a simple comparison between the amount of the payment and the direct loss [...] is inappropriate.”

In agreement with Moore-Bick LJ, and!distinguishing the contract formed between ParkingEye and the motorist from a commercial contract, Sir Timothy Lloyd stated at paragraph 47 that, “[...] the principles underlying the doctrine of penalty ought not to strike down a!provision of this kind, in relation to a contract such as we are concerned with,...”.

The Judges were only discussing!''a contract such as we are concerned with''!which was a far more complex one than!''all the previous cases shown to us {which} have concerned contracts of a financial or at least an economic nature.''

Here, this is one of those cases Courts have seen many times before, a simple contract of a!'financial/economic nature'!and the only interest UKPC has in enforcing their £100 charge instead of any 'outstanding tariff' for 13 minutes - which falls within any reasonable grace period anyway - is profit alone.!

This position is reinforced in the earlier findings in the Beavis case from the Court of Appeal, where the judgment states:

"44.!All the previous cases shown to us have concerned contracts of a financial or at least an economic nature, where the transaction between the contracting parties can be assessed in monetary terms, as can the effects of a breach of the contract...

45. The!contract in the present case is entirely different.!There is!no economic transaction between the car park operator and the driver who uses the car park, if he or she stays no longer than two hours; there is no more than (for that time) a gratuitous licence to use the land...''

47. ...When the court is considering an ordinary financial or commercial contract, then it is understandable that the law, which lays down its own rules as to the compensation due from a contract breaker...should prohibit terms which require the payment of compensation going far beyond that which the law allows!in the absence of any contract provision governing this outcome.

The classic and simple case is that referred to by Tindal CJ in Kemble v Farren (1829)6 Bing. 141 at 148:!“But that a very large sum should become immediately payable, in consequence of the non-payment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered a penalty, appears to be a contradiction in terms, the case being precisely that in which courts of equity have always relieved, and against which courts of law have, in modern times, endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess the real damages sustained by the breach of the agreement.”!

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 shows this case law still holds because it includes the fact that a consumer cannot lawfully be expected to pay a disproportionate sum in compensation for a!small sum owed.!This is the fundamental legislation relating to standard contracts between traders and consumers and it is undoubtedly applicable to this case.

The ParkingEye v Beavis judgment makes clear that the Court of Appeal would have considered the disproportionate charge in!this!case (but not the!more complex!Beavis case or cases!'of its kind') a clear penalty. They found the contract in Beavis 'entirely different' from simple, commercial 'monetary transaction' cases such as they had seen before.!

'ENTIRELY DIFFERENT'. So without displaying intellectual dishonesty or copy/pasting skewed 'guidance' from the BPA or another parking industry interested party, I suggest that it would be impossible to apply ParkingEye v Beavis to this standard economic contract. As UKPC have shown no other compelling reason or rationale for escalating a small sum parking tariff to £100, they fall foul of the penalty rule...just as ParkingEye would have, if they had taken a 'standard contract' case to Supreme Court level. Furthermore, photographic evidence of a valid parking ticket has be provided, Therefore I maintain that no costs have been incurred to UKPC other than their own costs in pursing this claim.

Fruitcake

I don't understand your comment about an NTK to no vehicle address.

Do you mean they replied to the address you gave them on your initial appeal? It would make sense for them to reply to that address, but nothing invalidates the NTK.

What is more important whether the NTK arrived in time to meet the strict requirements of the POFA 2012.

The fact they sent you a NTK means your point about not receiving a NTK is not true. You did get one at the service address you supplied to the scammers. The dates of the alleged event and date received therefore are much more important.

Your point about the validity of their photos won't wash unless you can show that there is actually something wrong with them. I don't understand your comment about a neutral party either.

Dannyhim5elf

Hi Fruitcake,

Yes, the NTK was provided in time and to the address supplied to them so I'll remove this from the final appeal. Same with the point about photograph validity, I'll discard this for the final appeal.

Is there anything else I should be including or just go ahead with the remains 4 points of dispute?

Many thanks.

Umkomaas

While you have not said as much, but please confirm that you have received the 10-digit POPLA code from UKPC.

Dannyhim5elf

I have indeed received the POPLA code from UKPC and it is still within its month lifespan.

Fruitcake

UKPC's NTKs are usually not too bad as far as meeting the POFA requirements, so if it is in date there is probably no mileage in using it, unless there is something fatal they have missed. The only way to tell is to compare it line by line with the POFA requirements.

Inadequate signage is always one of the strongest appeal points, so you need your own photos of the actual signs in place with general and close up views to show where they fail to meet the BPA CoP.
Embed all the images you want to use instead of using links. That way the assessor has to look at them.

You also need to tidy up formatting errors, as well as checking spelling and grammar.

I can't think of anything else unless grace periods apply.

Dannyhim5elf

I do not think grace periods apply in my case. There's a 15-min timing difference in a couple of photographs provided by UKPC to counter this point.

The photographs of signage provided by UKPC are appalling their own right, showing the ineligibility of the sign even on close up and also showing the car is a good distance away from the sign.

So I should I be removing the final paragraph of the poor signage point (copied it below) and replacing this with images as to how the signs do not meet the standards spoken about before it?

"So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this. "


EDIT: I have previously gone over the NTK against POFA requirements and it seems that they've all been met.

many thanks

Coupon-mad

The photographs of signage provided by UKPC are appalling their own right, showing the ineligibility of the sign even on close up and also showing the car is a good distance away from the sign.

So I should I be removing the final paragraph of the poor signage point (copied it below) and replacing this with images as to how the signs do not meet the standards spoken about before it?

Yes I would.

In POPLA appeals I've done v UKPC (all won over the years) I always copy and crop, then embed UKPC's own diabolically unclear photos of their own wishy-washy signs into the 'unclear signs' point, to directly illustrate your appeal. Use them against them and add some wording of your own remarking on how £100/the terms simply can't be read.

Don't upload UKPC's pics separately; make it much easier for the bored 'Assessor' to understand the issues. Do one long storybook-style, several pages, illustrated 'killer' POPLA appeal document as a PDF uploaded under 'other'.

Dannyhim5elf

Thanks coupon-mad, I'll do exactly this and report back with the outcome.

Dannyhim5elf

Won on POPLA appeal with UKPC not contesting the appeal. Thank you everyone. Will post in the POPLA appeal wins thread.