Please check over my POPLA appeal

montyp23

Hi All,

Here is my POPLA appeal. There are no signs within this part of the carpark, I have pictures to prove this.

Thanks

--

POPLA appeal.

Dear Assessor

As a law abiding citizen who always pays his way, I was extremely upset to hear of a £100 ‘parking charge notice’ displayed on the vehicle of which I am registered keeper for.

I submit the points below to show that I am not liable for the parking charge:

1) The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 - No Keeper Liability
2) Ambiguous, unclear, and misleading signage.
3) No Landowner authority/contract - a managing agent is not the landowner.
4) No 'relevant obligation' nor 'relevant contract' under Schedule 4 of the POFA.
5) This case can be distinguished from Parking Eye v Beavis which does not apply.
6) I rely on the binding authority in Vine v Waltham Forest which was a Court of Appeal judgment, about a driver not seeing the terms and not deemed bound by them.



1) The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 - No Keeper Liability

The requirements of Schedule 4 POFA are quite clear in that there must be strict compliance with all of its requirements in order to take advantage of the rights granted under that Act to pursue the registered keeper in respect of a driver’s alleged debt. The BPA Ltd AOS Code of Practice (version 5, October 2015) supports the need for strict compliance (para 21.5 refers). All Parking Services UK Ltd has however failed to comply with the statutory requirements as followed.

a) In regards to paragraph 8(2)(a) of Schedule 4, POFA 2012, the 'period of parking' is not 'specified', only the time and date the parking charge was issued. It does not specify the period of parking as demanded under POFA 2012 paragraph 8(2)(a) and paragraph 7(2)(a). In fact the observation time is not specified. The Notice does not state the period of parking, merely the time of the alleged contravention.

b) The Notice to Keeper does not, as per Paragraph 8(2)(c), state that a notice to driver relating to the specified period of parking has been given and repeat the information in that notice as required by paragraph 7(2)(b), (c) and (f), with 7(2)(b) requiring that it “describe(s) those charges, the circumstances in which the requirement arose”. The “breach” was alleged to be for “parking for longer than the maximum period permitted”, however it does not make clear to the keeper what the maximum period permitted was, and how the driver had (allegedly) exceeded this.

b) Paragraph 8(2)(e) requires that the Notice to Keeper must “state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and invite the keeper—(i) to pay the unpaid parking charges; or (ii) if the keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to notify the creditor of the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to pass the notice on to the driver”. The Notice to Keeper clearly fails to comply with this requirement.

c) Paragraph 8 (2)(g) requires the operator to inform the keeper of any discount offered for prompt payment. The ‘Notice to Keeper’ fails to offer any discount and is therefore neither in compliance with the strict requirements of POFA nor with the BPA Ltd AOS Code of Practice (version 5, October 2015) paragraph 21.10.

All Parking Services UK Ltd have failed to comply and thus have not fulfilled all the requirements necessary under POFA to allow them to attempt recovery of any charge from the keeper.



2) Ambiguous, unclear, and misleading signage

Since receiving the notice to keeper informing me that the vehicle had been “parked in a permit area without displaying a valid permit”, I have been to review the signs available in the car park to establish if this condition was made clear before parking.

I noted that the signs are located sparsely in the car park, and the actual “terms and conditions” (T&C) are printed in font so small, that I, standing at a height of 5 foot 2 inches, found them impossible to read.



3) No Landowner authority/contract - a managing agent is not the landowner

As All Parking Services UK Ltd do not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner that authorises them to offer contracts for parking in their name, issue Parking Charge Notices and take legal action in their name for breach of contract.

A site agreement with another non-landowning agent (such as a managing agent) is not proof of authority from the landowner.



4) No 'relevant obligation' under Schedule 4

No promise was made by the driver to move the car because of the ambiguity of the sign.

There can be no keeper liability without a 'relevant obligation' giving rise to a requirement for a driver to pay parking charges. This requirement is defined in Schedule 4 as follows:

“relevant obligation” means—
(a)an obligation arising under the terms of a relevant contract; or
(b)an obligation arising, in any circumstances where there is no relevant contract, as a result of a trespass or other tort committed by parking the vehicle on the relevant land;

An 'obligation arising from a relevant contract' would be one where the terms are transparent, prominent and clearly communicated to the driver before parking. The driver was a visitor and did not know about any 8 hour restriction on visitor parking, and could not have known even from reading the signs, due to the misleading nature of the signs. Neither was this explained in the Notice to Keeper, but in the Notice of Rejection, far too late to be imported into any contract or retrospectively create any obligation.

A contract is formed in a car park only if terms are clear and accepted/known before parking. This cannot be found to be the case in a car park where the signs are not clearly visable.
Schedule 4 is specifically dependent in paragraph 3 (below) upon 'adequate notice' of the parking charge being communicated to the driver in advance and this was not the case:

For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) “adequate notice” means notice given by—

(b) ...the display of one or more notices which— (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and

(ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land.

That would require clear and prominent signs throughout the site, carrying wording that is transparent and legible in low light, non-conflicting, and with the terms and 'charge' in large letters (in the Beavis case this was 96 point in bold font).



5) This case can be distinguished from Parking Eye v Beavis. There is no commercial justification possible and the signs fail to meet the bar set in the Beavis case.

All Parking Services UK Ltd are quoting Parking Eye v Beavis, I do not understand how the result of this court case could possibly be related to All Parking Services UK Ltd's charge here. The only similarity is that they are both called a 'parking charge' but here, All Parking Services UK Ltd's charge is penal, unfair and unsupported by any compelling 'legitimate interest' beyond that of the parking firm's own profits alone - which renders it unenforceable.

Parking Eye had control of the car park to enforce a time limit and were expected by the landowner to ensure a regular turnover of parking for customers of retailers. The area of parking in question regarding this All Parking Services UK Ltd charge has no such time limit, no customers needing spaces in a busy car park and there is no 'turnover of bays' requirement. Signage is sparse, unlike in the Beavis case.

The signage communicating the £85 charge was found to be very 'prominent' in ParkingEye's case at the Supreme Court, unlike the signage in question here. ParkingEye were also able to show that the complex contractual arrangement in that specific car park was not an unenforceable penalty, only in that case, despite the Judges saying that the penalty rule was plainly 'engaged' in private parking charge cases.

The Supreme Court decision in ParkingEye v Beavis states that the contract is accepted by performance in a driver parking, reading signage and being clearly informed of terms and given a 'valuable' licence to park. Mr Beavis was considered to have read the 'very prominent' terms first which showed the parking charge 'in large lettering' and by the action of parking and leaving his car, he was found to have made a promise which constituted consideration and acceptance of terms. This decision does NOT simply transfer seamlessly to all other types of parking charges and car parks where no licence to park is offered or where no similar commercial 'legitimate interest' exists, without twisting the facts.

Parking charges in less 'complex' cases can very easily be found to be unenforceable penalties, as was discussed at length in the Beavis case;

LORD NEUBERGER AND LORD SUMPTION: (with whom Lord Carnwath agrees):

14. …where a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform an act, and also provides that, if he does not perform it, he will pay the other party a specified sum of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a secondary obligation which is capable of being a penalty;’

31. The real question when a contractual provision is challenged as a penalty is whether it is penal, not whether it is a pre-estimate of loss. These are not natural opposites or mutually exclusive categories. …The question whether it is enforceable should depend on whether the means by which the contracting party’s conduct is to be influenced are “unconscionable” or (which will usually amount to the same thing) “extravagant” by reference to some norm.

32. The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation. The (operator) can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.

I ask the POPLA Assessor, please - in all fairness to myself as a consumer - to stop and read this point thoroughly before engaging the 'POPLA rationale standard template Beavis paragraph' which simply does not apply across the board. POPLA's template paragraph is already the subject of several complaints to ISPA, being blindly misapplied and unfair to consumers by not considering the facts that set a situation at odds with the Supreme Court findings. The Judges in Beavis made clear that the facts of each case/contract/interest/signs MUST be considered and the official Supreme Court tweeted, on the day of the decision, that their findings related to that car park/those signs/those interests in that case.

In the Supreme Court judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis, it was held that there was no loss to the parking operator, and therefore the doctrine of penalties was engaged. However, the charge in that 'complex' case was saved from being struck out as a penalty, by virtue of unusually clear signs and because it served a 'legitimate interest' relating to the landowner's aim for a turnover of spaces in a free retail park. By contrast, in the case of permit parking, the only legitimate interest lies in ensuring that parking spaces are occupied by genuine visitors, and not abused by random motorists with no connection to, or business within, the property.

The issuing of parking charges to visitors, as in this case, serves no legitimate interest, and therefore the Claimant cannot rely on the Beavis judgment, and it is submitted that the charge will fall foul of the penalty rule. The Beavis case supports that view.



6) I rely on the binding authority in Vine v Waltham Forest CA [2000] about a driver not seeing the terms and not deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

(image of tweet)

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established.

The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking. There was never any suggestion that the plaintiff was other than a truthful witness and the clamping fee extorted from her under no lawful excuse was an act of trespass and the charge had to be refunded.

That case supports and upholds my appeal and it is a Court of Appeal judgment, binding on lower courts, which is far more relevant than the Beavis case in this instance where All Parking Services UK Ltd's interest is nothing beyond the basic aim to punish/fine any alleged defaulter, without making the terms clearly legible from a driver's seat before parking.

Where a parking charge is penal with no legitimate interest extending beyond claiming restitutionary damages, it cannot be saved by the Beavis case and the penalty rule remains firmly engaged. This charge must be deemed unenforceable and the PCN not properly given.

I therefore respectfully request that my appeal is upheld and the charge dismissed.

Yours faithfully

Umkomaas

Without any context it's very difficult to comment. Have you another thread running? If so, PM Crabman (or Soolin), Forum Guide to merge threads please.

Coupon-mad

How did you get on with your April POPLA appeal?

Be a bit careful when writing in the first person; I know you've said 'on reviewing the signs' but I would suggest covering yourself by adding the wording shown:

I noted that the signs are located sparsely in the car park, and the actual “terms and conditions” (T&C) are printed in font so small, that I, standing at a height of 5 foot 2 inches, found them impossible to read when I went to look at the evidence for this appeal. The driver has not been identified but is of average height and would not have been able to read the terms because the area where the car was had no signs at all. Photo below proves this: (embed the photo here within the word document, makes it easier for POPLA to see the issue rather than random photos attached separately)

Be aware that as you have had other tickets the operator might argue that there was ample opportunity to read signs, especially of the appellant lives there.

I think your signage point needs more to it, like here:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/70918552#Comment_70918552

Landowner authority needs more to it, most POPLA appeals we help with, now cite 7.3 of the BPA CoP because that exposes sparse redacted contracts as still not proving the detail needed. The above example also shows that.

And I was wondering if this bit is true in your case or if it's the remnants of copy & paste:

An 'obligation arising from a relevant contract' would be one where the terms are transparent, prominent and clearly communicated to the driver before parking. The driver was a visitor and did not know about any 8 hour restriction on visitor parking, and could not have known even from reading the signs, due to the misleading nature of the signs.

montyp23

Hi both, thanks for your help.

Umkomaas wrote: »

Without any context it's very difficult to comment. Have you another thread running? If so, PM Crabman (or Soolin), Forum Guide to merge threads please.

I had a thread running previously for another appeal.

The car was parked in different part of the grounds where there isn't any signage.

Coupon-mad wrote: »

How did you get on with your April POPLA appeal?

Be a bit careful when writing in the first person; I know you've said 'on reviewing the signs' but I would suggest covering yourself by adding the wording shown:



Be aware that as you have had other tickets the operator might argue that there was ample opportunity to read signs, especially of the appellant lives there.

I think your signage point needs more to it, like here:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/70918552#Comment_70918552

Landowner authority needs more to it, most POPLA appeals we help with, now cite 7.3 of the BPA CoP because that exposes sparse redacted contracts as still not proving the detail needed. The above example also shows that.

And I was wondering if this bit is true in your case or if it's the remnants of copy & paste:

I won that appeal after a few weeks, but it was based on the fact that the company didn't respond to it.

Thanks for the heads up! I have updated the appeal. I will post it separately.

montyp23

Dear Assessor

As a law abiding citizen who always pays his way, I was extremely upset to hear of a £100 ‘parking charge notice’ displayed on the vehicle of which I am registered keeper for.

I submit the points below to show that I am not liable for the parking charge:

1) The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 - No Keeper Liability
2) Ambiguous, unclear, and misleading signage.
3) No standing or authority to pursue charges nor form contracts with drivers.
4) No 'relevant obligation' nor 'relevant contract' under Schedule 4 of the POFA.
5) This case can be distinguished from Parking Eye v Beavis which does not apply.
6) I rely on the binding authority in Vine v Waltham Forest which was a Court of Appeal judgment, about a driver not seeing the terms and not deemed bound by them.



1) The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 - No Keeper Liability

The requirements of Schedule 4 POFA are quite clear in that there must be strict compliance with all of its requirements in order to take advantage of the rights granted under that Act to pursue the registered keeper in respect of a driver’s alleged debt. The BPA Ltd AOS Code of Practice (version 5, October 2015) supports the need for strict compliance (para 21.5 refers). All Parking Services UK Ltd has however failed to comply with the statutory requirements as followed.

a) In regards to paragraph 8(2)(a) of Schedule 4, POFA 2012, the 'period of parking' is not 'specified', only the time and date the parking charge was issued. It does not specify the period of parking as demanded under POFA 2012 paragraph 8(2)(a) and paragraph 7(2)(a). In fact the observation time is not specified. The Notice does not state the period of parking, merely the time of the alleged contravention.

b) The Notice to Keeper does not, as per Paragraph 8(2)(c), state that a notice to driver relating to the specified period of parking has been given and repeat the information in that notice as required by paragraph 7(2)(b), (c) and (f), with 7(2)(b) requiring that it “describe(s) those charges, the circumstances in which the requirement arose”. The “breach” was alleged to be for “parking for longer than the maximum period permitted”, however it does not make clear to the keeper what the maximum period permitted was, and how the driver had (allegedly) exceeded this.

b) Paragraph 8(2)(e) requires that the Notice to Keeper must “state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and invite the keeper—(i) to pay the unpaid parking charges; or (ii) if the keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to notify the creditor of the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to pass the notice on to the driver”. The Notice to Keeper clearly fails to comply with this requirement.

c) Paragraph 8 (2)(g) requires the operator to inform the keeper of any discount offered for prompt payment. The ‘Notice to Keeper’ fails to offer any discount and is therefore neither in compliance with the strict requirements of POFA nor with the BPA Ltd AOS Code of Practice (version 5, October 2015) paragraph 21.10.

All Parking Services UK Ltd have failed to comply and thus have not fulfilled all the requirements necessary under POFA to allow them to attempt recovery of any charge from the keeper.



2) Ambiguous, unclear, and misleading signage

Since receiving the notice to keeper informing me that the vehicle had been “parked in a permit area without displaying a valid permit”, I have been to review the signs available in the car park to establish if this condition was made clear before parking.

I noted that the signs are located sparsely in the car park, and the actual “terms and conditions” (T&C) are printed in font so small, that I, standing at a height of 5 foot 2 inches, found them impossible to read when I went to look at the evidence for this appeal. The driver has not been identified but is of average height and would not have been able to read the terms because the area where the car was had no signs at all. Photo below proves this:

http://imgur.com/a/8qj09



3) No standing or authority to pursue charges nor form contracts with drivers.

I believe that this Operator has no proprietary interest in the land, so they have no standing to make contracts with drivers in their own right, nor to pursue charges for breach in their own name. In the absence of such title, All Parking Services UK Ltd must have assignment of rights from the landowner to pursue charges for breach in their own right, including at court level. A commercial site agent for the true landholder has no automatic standing nor authority in their own right, which would meet the strict requirements of section 7 of the BPA Code of Practice.

Section 7 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice requires parking operators to have the written authority from the landowner to operate on the land and to enforce charges in the courts in their own name.

In addition, Section 7.3 states:

“The written authorisation must also set out:

a. the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b. any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c. any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d. who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e. the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.''

I therefore put All Parking Services UK Ltd to strict proof to provide POPLA and myself with an unredacted, contemporaneous copy of the contract between All Parking Services UK Ltd and the landowner, not another agent or retailer or other non-landholder, because it will still not be clear that the landowner has authorised the necessary rights to All Parking Services UK Ltd.



4) No 'relevant obligation' under Schedule 4

No promise was made by the driver to move the car because of the ambiguity of the sign.

There can be no keeper liability without a 'relevant obligation' giving rise to a requirement for a driver to pay parking charges. This requirement is defined in Schedule 4 as follows:

“relevant obligation” means—
(a)an obligation arising under the terms of a relevant contract; or
(b)an obligation arising, in any circumstances where there is no relevant contract, as a result of a trespass or other tort committed by parking the vehicle on the relevant land;

An 'obligation arising from a relevant contract' would be one where the terms are transparent, prominent and clearly communicated to the driver before parking. Neither was this explained in the Notice to Keeper, but in the Notice of Rejection, far too late to be imported into any contract or retrospectively create any obligation.

A contract is formed in a car park only if terms are clear and accepted/known before parking. This cannot be found to be the case in a car park where the signs are not clearly visable.
Schedule 4 is specifically dependent in paragraph 3 (below) upon 'adequate notice' of the parking charge being communicated to the driver in advance and this was not the case:

For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) “adequate notice” means notice given by—

(b) ...the display of one or more notices which— (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and

(ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land.

That would require clear and prominent signs throughout the site, carrying wording that is transparent and legible in low light, non-conflicting, and with the terms and 'charge' in large letters (in the Beavis case this was 96 point in bold font).



5) This case can be distinguished from Parking Eye v Beavis. There is no commercial justification possible and the signs fail to meet the bar set in the Beavis case.

All Parking Services UK Ltd are quoting Parking Eye v Beavis, I do not understand how the result of this court case could possibly be related to All Parking Services UK Ltd's charge here. The only similarity is that they are both called a 'parking charge' but here, All Parking Services UK Ltd's charge is penal, unfair and unsupported by any compelling 'legitimate interest' beyond that of the parking firm's own profits alone - which renders it unenforceable.

Parking Eye had control of the car park to enforce a time limit and were expected by the landowner to ensure a regular turnover of parking for customers of retailers. The area of parking in question regarding this All Parking Services UK Ltd charge has no such time limit, no customers needing spaces in a busy car park and there is no 'turnover of bays' requirement. Signage is sparse, unlike in the Beavis case.

The signage communicating the £85 charge was found to be very 'prominent' in ParkingEye's case at the Supreme Court, unlike the signage in question here. ParkingEye were also able to show that the complex contractual arrangement in that specific car park was not an unenforceable penalty, only in that case, despite the Judges saying that the penalty rule was plainly 'engaged' in private parking charge cases.

The Supreme Court decision in ParkingEye v Beavis states that the contract is accepted by performance in a driver parking, reading signage and being clearly informed of terms and given a 'valuable' licence to park. Mr Beavis was considered to have read the 'very prominent' terms first which showed the parking charge 'in large lettering' and by the action of parking and leaving his car, he was found to have made a promise which constituted consideration and acceptance of terms. This decision does NOT simply transfer seamlessly to all other types of parking charges and car parks where no licence to park is offered or where no similar commercial 'legitimate interest' exists, without twisting the facts.

Parking charges in less 'complex' cases can very easily be found to be unenforceable penalties, as was discussed at length in the Beavis case;

LORD NEUBERGER AND LORD SUMPTION: (with whom Lord Carnwath agrees):

14. …where a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform an act, and also provides that, if he does not perform it, he will pay the other party a specified sum of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a secondary obligation which is capable of being a penalty;’

31. The real question when a contractual provision is challenged as a penalty is whether it is penal, not whether it is a pre-estimate of loss. These are not natural opposites or mutually exclusive categories. …The question whether it is enforceable should depend on whether the means by which the contracting party’s conduct is to be influenced are “unconscionable” or (which will usually amount to the same thing) “extravagant” by reference to some norm.

32. The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation. The (operator) can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.

I ask the POPLA Assessor, please - in all fairness to myself as a consumer - to stop and read this point thoroughly before engaging the 'POPLA rationale standard template Beavis paragraph' which simply does not apply across the board. POPLA's template paragraph is already the subject of several complaints to ISPA, being blindly misapplied and unfair to consumers by not considering the facts that set a situation at odds with the Supreme Court findings. The Judges in Beavis made clear that the facts of each case/contract/interest/signs MUST be considered and the official Supreme Court tweeted, on the day of the decision, that their findings related to that car park/those signs/those interests in that case.

In the Supreme Court judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis, it was held that there was no loss to the parking operator, and therefore the doctrine of penalties was engaged. However, the charge in that 'complex' case was saved from being struck out as a penalty, by virtue of unusually clear signs and because it served a 'legitimate interest' relating to the landowner's aim for a turnover of spaces in a free retail park. By contrast, in the case of permit parking, the only legitimate interest lies in ensuring that parking spaces are occupied by genuine visitors, and not abused by random motorists with no connection to, or business within, the property.

The issuing of parking charges to visitors, as in this case, serves no legitimate interest, and therefore the Claimant cannot rely on the Beavis judgment, and it is submitted that the charge will fall foul of the penalty rule. The Beavis case supports that view.



6) I rely on the binding authority in Vine v Waltham Forest CA [2000] about a driver not seeing the terms and not deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

http://imgur.com/a/AkMCN

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established.

The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking. There was never any suggestion that the plaintiff was other than a truthful witness and the clamping fee extorted from her under no lawful excuse was an act of trespass and the charge had to be refunded.

That case supports and upholds my appeal and it is a Court of Appeal judgment, binding on lower courts, which is far more relevant than the Beavis case in this instance where All Parking Services UK Ltd's interest is nothing beyond the basic aim to punish/fine any alleged defaulter, without making the terms clearly legible from a driver's seat before parking.

Where a parking charge is penal with no legitimate interest extending beyond claiming restitutionary damages, it cannot be saved by the Beavis case and the penalty rule remains firmly engaged. This charge must be deemed unenforceable and the PCN not properly given.

I therefore respectfully request that my appeal is upheld and the charge dismissed.

Yours faithfully

Coupon-mad

I reckon that will do and the PPC will bail out again!

montyp23

Awesome, thank you for your help!

I will go ahead and submit it.

Umkomaas

6) I rely on the binding authority in Vine v Waltham Forest CA [2000] about a driver not seeing the terms and not deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

http://imgur.com/a/AkMCN

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established.

The image you've linked here in appeal point 6) is relevant to the Beavis case (not Vine -v- Waltham) and maybe should be positioned as part of your appeal point 5).

Coupon-mad

Ah yes, at that point the OP should be linking to a summary of Vine v Waltham Forest. This link would do within point #6:

http://swarb.co.uk/vine-v-london-borough-of-waltham-forest-ca-5-apr-2000/

HTH

montyp23

Umkomaas wrote: »

The image you've linked here in appeal point 6) is relevant to the Beavis case (not Vine -v- Waltham) and maybe should be positioned as part of your appeal point 5).

Thank you for the info. Where should I place the image link? Just at the bottom of point 5 or below this paragraph "The Supreme Court decision in ParkingEye v Beavis states that the contract..."?

Coupon-mad wrote: »

Ah yes, at that point the OP should be linking to a summary of Vine v Waltham Forest. This link would do within point #6:

http://swarb.co.uk/vine-v-london-borough-of-waltham-forest-ca-5-apr-2000/

HTH

Thanks, I've added that link in.

Umkomaas

montyp23 wrote: »

Thank you for the info. Where should I place the image link? Just at the bottom of point 5 or below this paragraph "The Supreme Court decision in ParkingEye v Beavis states that the contract..."?

I'd put it directly under this part of your appeal point 5). And maybe emphasise that the Supreme Court official tweet confirmed the ruling as relating to this particular car park (Riverside, Chelmsford - the scene of the Beavis parking event).

This decision does NOT simply transfer seamlessly to all other types of parking charges and car parks where no licence to park is offered or where no similar commercial 'legitimate interest' exists, without twisting the facts.