VCS Court Claim

Hi Coupon mad, thanks for the tip. Just checked and the tickets are on different calendar days and more than 12 hours apart. Can i still go with being unreasonable and not implementing a reasonable request?

Another go at my defence...any comments would be be gratefully received. The driver has received two court claims for two PCNs for the same alleged offence. The first court claim received was for the later PCN, and the second court claim received (2 days later) was for the earlier PCN.

VCS were requested as part of a SAR to bring all charge notices against the defendant under a single claim.

DEFENCE

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The Defendant is the registered keeper of the vehicle in question. The Claim relates to an alleged debt in damages arising from a driver's alleged breach of contract, when parking at XXXXX car park on XX/XX/XX.

2.1. It is denied that a 'charge notice' ('CN') was affixed to the car on the material date given in the Particulars. This Claimant is known to routinely affix misleading pieces of paper in a yellow/black envelope impersonating authority, bearing the legend 'this is NOT a Parking Charge Notice'. It is reasonable to conclude, from the date of the premature Notice to Keeper ('NTK') that was posted, that the hybrid note that the Claimant asserts was a 'CN' was no such thing, and therefore the driver was not served with a document that created any liability for any charge whatsoever. The Claimant is put to strict proof.

2.2. Accordingly, it is denied that any contravention or breach of clearly signed/lined terms occurred, and it is denied that the driver was properly informed about any parking charge, either by signage or by a CN.

3. The Particulars of Claim does not state whether they believe the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

4. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

5. Further and in the alternative, it is denied that the claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner which would be capable of binding any reasonable person reading them.

5.1. The terms on the Claimant's signage are also displayed in such a manner which is difficult to be read from a vehicle entering the area, and as it was acceptable to park on the site in the past, unexpected and was not seen. It is, therefore, denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding contract.

5.2. The Claimant’s signage is unlit and therefore illegible in poor natural light in any event.

5.3. The facts are whilst using the car park situated at XXXX the driver incurred a "Parking Charge", the alleged offence was "Parked without displaying a valid permit". It is denied that any contract was agreed or offered in prominent large lettering which resulted in the Defendant believing the Car Park was Free to use which was the case in the recent past.

5.4. At best, parking without authorisation could be a matter for the landowner to pursue, in the event that damages were caused by a trespass. A parking charge cannot be dressed up by a non-landowner parking firm, as a fee, or a sum in damages owed to that firm for positively inviting and allowing a car to trespass. Not only is this a nonsense, but the Supreme Court decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, confirmed that ParkingEye could not have pursued a sum in damages or for trespass.

5.5. County Court transcripts supporting the Defendant's position will be adduced, and in all respects, the Beavis case is distinguished.

6. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient propietary proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue pieces of paper that are not 'charge notices', and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

6.1. It is suggested that this novel twist (unsupported by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 - the 'POFA') of placing hybrid notes stating 'this is NOT a Parking Charge Notice' on cars, then ambushing the registered keeper with a premature postal NTK, well before the timeline set out in paragraph 8 of the POFA, is unlikely to have been in the contemplation of the Claimant's principal.

6.2. It is averred that the landowner contract, if there is one that was in existence at the material time, is likely to define and provide that the Claimant can issue 'parking charge notices' (or CNs) to cars - following the procedure set out in paragraph 8 of the POFA - or alternatively, postal PCNs where there was no opportunity to serve a CN (e.g. in non-manned ANPR camera car parks, and as set out in paragraph 9 of the POFA). The Claimant is put to strict proof of its authority to issue hybrid non-CNs, which are neither one thing nor the other, and create no certainty of contract or charge whatsoever.

7. The POFA, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £60, for which no calculation or explanation is given, and which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

8. The Claimant has acted unreasonably and has not acted upon a reasonable request by the Defendant to bring all 'charge notices' against them under a single claim. The fact they have chosen to restrict the claim to one PCN is reasonably taken by the Defendant to mean that the first PCN has been cancelled

9. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.


(statement of truth and signature and date go here)

Thanks Coupon Mad. I wasnt sure about even including it, as it may implicate who was driving. I'll make amends and repost. Can i check ...i assume i use the exact same defence for the second claim? If I win (jumping the gun here) would i request at that point for the other claim to be dismissed given the circumstances are exactly the same and the defence the same?


DEFENCE

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The Defendant is the registered keeper of the vehicle in question. The Claim relates to an alleged debt in damages arising from a driver's alleged breach of contract, when parking at XXXXX car park on XX/XX/XX.

2.1. It is denied that a 'charge notice' ('CN') was affixed to the car on the material date given in the Particulars. This Claimant is known to routinely affix misleading pieces of paper in a yellow/black envelope impersonating authority, bearing the legend 'this is NOT a Parking Charge Notice'. It is reasonable to conclude, from the date of the premature Notice to Keeper ('NTK') that was posted, that the hybrid note that the Claimant asserts was a 'CN' was no such thing, and therefore the driver was not served with a document that created any liability for any charge whatsoever. The Claimant is put to strict proof.

2.2. Accordingly, it is denied that any contravention or breach of clearly signed/lined terms occurred, and it is denied that the driver was properly informed about any parking charge, either by signage or by a CN.

3. The Particulars of Claim does not state whether they believe the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

4. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

5. Further and in the alternative, it is denied that the claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner which would be capable of binding any reasonable person reading them.

5.1. The terms on the Claimant's signage are also displayed in such a manner which is difficult to be read from a vehicle entering the area, and as it was acceptable to park on the site in the past. It is, therefore, denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding contract.

5.2. The Claimant’s signage is unlit and therefore illegible in poor natural light in any event.

5.3. The facts are whilst using the car park situated at XXXX the driver incurred a "Parking Charge", the alleged offence was "Parked without displaying a valid permit". It is denied that any contract was agreed or offered in prominent large lettering which resulted in the Defendant believing the Car Park was Free to use which was the case in the recent past.

5.4. At best, parking without authorisation could be a matter for the landowner to pursue, in the event that damages were caused by a trespass. A parking charge cannot be dressed up by a non-landowner parking firm, as a fee, or a sum in damages owed to that firm for positively inviting and allowing a car to trespass. Not only is this a nonsense, but the Supreme Court decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, confirmed that ParkingEye could not have pursued a sum in damages or for trespass.

5.5. County Court transcripts supporting the Defendant's position will be adduced, and in all respects, the Beavis case is distinguished.

6. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient propietary proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue pieces of paper that are not 'charge notices', and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

6.1. It is suggested that this novel twist (unsupported by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 - the 'POFA') of placing hybrid notes stating 'this is NOT a Parking Charge Notice' on cars, then ambushing the registered keeper with a premature postal NTK, well before the timeline set out in paragraph 8 of the POFA, is unlikely to have been in the contemplation of the Claimant's principal.

6.2. It is averred that the landowner contract, if there is one that was in existence at the material time, is likely to define and provide that the Claimant can issue 'parking charge notices' (or CNs) to cars - following the procedure set out in paragraph 8 of the POFA - or alternatively, postal PCNs where there was no opportunity to serve a CN (e.g. in non-manned ANPR camera car parks, and as set out in paragraph 9 of the POFA). The Claimant is put to strict proof of its authority to issue hybrid non-CNs, which are neither one thing nor the other, and create no certainty of contract or charge whatsoever.

7. The POFA, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £60, for which no calculation or explanation is given, and which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

8. The Claimant has acted unreasonably and has not acted upon a reasonable request by the Defendant to bring all 'charge notices' against them under a single claim. The fact they have chosen to restrict the claim to one PCN is reasonably taken by the Defendant to mean that the first PCN has been cancelled

9. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.


(statement of truth and signature and date go here)