Residential Parking ticket

Hi All,

I have had the chance to draft my defence as follows, I'd be much appreciated if you could give me some feedback and advice.

Is it too long to start with? I have the recent letter (I couldn't find the one back in 2015 but I am certain that the contents was exactly the same all these years) from the MC which was sent with the parking permit to the Lessee, and it states that the "parking permit is issued by the parking enforcement company and with effective from [date] ....", and never mentioned that a penalty will be applied if failed to do so. Should I add this to my defence?

Many Thanks in advance!

Preliminary

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all. Save where otherwise admitted, each and every allegation in the Particulars of Claim is denied.

2. It is admitted that, at all material times, the Defendant was the owner and registered keeper of the vehicle in question.

3. It is admitted that, at all material times, the Defendant was the owner of one of the flats of the private land in question.

4. The Defendant has held a share of freehold of the property. The Lessor has granted his Lessees rights to park based upon the demise, grant and/or easements within the lease for many years before this PCN was issued.

5. It is averred that the Lessee is entitled to rely upon the parking rights granted from the Lessor, and further up that chain of authority, the Lessor is entitled to rely upon his primacy of contract within the lease, in order to grant Lessees an unfettered right to park.

6. The Lessee has the right to park a vehicle granted by the Lease, which does not specify the requirement of the display of a permit or to pay penalties to third parties, such as the Claimant. The Claimant has no consideration to offer the Defendant that the Defendant does not already possess.

7. It is stated within the Lease agreement that the Lessees shall “peaceably hold and enjoy the Premises during the Term without any interruption by the Lessor or any person rightfully claiming under or in trust for the Lessor”. The only restrictions upon parking was to ensure that private motor cars “shall at all times be fully taxed and insured and in a roadworthy condition”. The relevant paragraphs of the Lease are:

“FOURTH SCHEDULE Clause 2”
The right to use in common with the Lessees and the occupiers of all other Flats and their visitors the gardens drives paths and forecourt to the Building and the separate garden forming part of the Reserved Property subject to the provisions of Part 2 of the Sixth Schedule hereto and to such further rules and regulations for the common enjoyment thereof as the Lessor may from time to time prescribe.

“SIXTH SCHEDULE PART 2”
Any such private motor car parked on the Reserved Property in conformity with the requirements hereof shall at all times be fully taxed and insured and in a roadworthy condition (with current MOT Certificate if one is required due to the age of such private motor car)

“SEVENTH SCHEDULE”
The Lessee paying the rent and performing and observing the covenants on the part of the Lessee contained in the Sixth Schedule hereto the Lessee shall peaceably hold and enjoy the Premises during the Term without any interruption by the Lessor or by any person rightfully claiming under or in trust for the Lessor.

8. Whilst the Lessor is entitled by clause 2 of the Fourth Schedule to introduce “regulations”, these must be reasonable and must relate to the “use of enjoyment” of the Property. The intention and meaning of the clause is not so that they can restrict Lessees’ use and enjoyment of the Property and impose unreasonable obligations upon Lessees. It has also by no means defines that the regulation includes the introduction of a parking permit system.

9. The Claimant is put to strict proof of their due diligence by inspecting the Lease in place and considering the rights of the residents, prior to commencing enforcement. This is a location where Lessees already enjoyed rights that cannot be varied, restricted or charged for, out with a lease variation (Landlord & Tenant Act 1987 applies). Where a majority of the leaseholders agree to any proposed variation, if there are less than 9 leases all or all but one of the parties must consent and if there are more than 8 leases, 75% of the parties must consent, and not more than 10% must not object to the proposed variation. This degree of consensus is notoriously hard to achieve and it is averred the Claimant has simply not bothered, and merely set up some signs and imposed permits upon residents, causing an ongoing private nuisance to those affected.

10. The Defendant, at all material times, kept a vehicle in accordance with the terms granted by the Lease. The erection of the Claimant’s signage, and the purported contractual terms conveyed therein, are incapable of binding the Defendant in any way, and their existence does not constitute a legally valid variation of the terms of the Lease. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

11. It is denied that any parking charges “loss and/or damage" (whatever they might be) as stated on the Particulars of claim are owed and any debt is denied in its entirety.

12. It is denied that the Claimant has standing to bring any claim in the absence of a contract that expressly permits the Claimant to do so, in addition to merely undertaking 'parking management'. It is not admitted that the Claimant has contractual or other lawful authority to make contracts with Lessees at this location, and/or to bring proceedings against the Defendant. The Claimant is put to strict proof. Further, and in the alternative, the Defendant avers that the Claimant requires the permission of the owner of the relevant land - not merely another contractor or site agent not in possession - in order to commence proceedings.

13. There are no terms within the Lease requiring Lessees or their guests to display parking permits, or to pay penalties to third parties, such as the Claimant, for non-display of same. Primacy of contract cannot be amended by Private Parking Company signs unless the Lessees have agreed to a variation of the tenancy, which the Lessees have not.

13.1. There is a large body of case law, which establishes this. In Link Parking Ltd vs J. Parkinson [2016] C7GF50J7, the Judge, referring to a similar case in In Pace Recovery v Mr N [2016] C6GF14F0 [2016] ruled that:
“…the Judge in that case found that the parking company could not amend the terms of the lease agreement to bind a Lessee, but rather that it would have to be the other party to the contract.

14. In correspondence received by the Defendant, the Claimant relies on the case of ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 as a binding precedent on the lower court. However, that only assists the Claimant if the facts of the case are the same, or broadly the same. In Beavis, it was common ground between the parties that the terms of a contract had been breached, whereas it is the Defendant's position that no such breach occurred in this case, because there was no valid contract, and also because the 'legitimate interest' in enforcing parking rules for retailers and shoppers in Beavis does not apply to these circumstances. Therefore, this case can be distinguished from Beavis on the facts and circumstances. Furthermore, in the case of Jopson v Homeguard [2016] B9GF0A9E it was established that ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 does not apply to residential parking.

15. The Claimant’s notices attempt to make a forbidding offer, which isn’t an offer at all therefore no contract exists.

16. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the Lessor to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

17. The principle of primacy of contract of the terms of a Lease, overriding any purported terms conveyed by a parking operator's signage, is well rehearsed in numerous persuasive Judgments given at various County Court hearing centres. The Defendant will provide transcripts of a selection of Approved Judgments supporting this principle at the appropriate time, should this matter proceed to trial.

18. The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot override the existing rights enjoyed by Lessees. Accordingly, using the statutory wording from the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (the POFA) relating to parking charges on private land, it is denied that:

18.1. there was any 'relevant contract' between the Defendant and the Claimant.

18.2. there was any 'relevant obligation' (at all) to display a permit.

19. The Defendant avers that there can be no "legitimate interest" in penalising Lessees for using parking spaces, under the excuse of a scheme where ostensibly and as far as the Lessor is concerned, the parking firm is contracted for the benefit of the Lessees. It is contrary to the requirement of good faith and "out of all proportion to any legitimate interest" to fine Lessees or their visitors for using the parking spaces provided.

20. The presence of the Claimant on the land will have supposedly been to prevent parking by uninvited persons, for the benefit of the actual leaseholders. Instead, a predatory operation has been carried out on those very people whose interests the Claimant was purportedly there to uphold.

21. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

22. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself. The Claimant has added an additional sum of £60 to the original £100 parking charge, for which no justification has been provided. The Defendant believes that this is an attempt at double recovery by the Claimant, which the Court should not uphold, even in the event that Judgment for Claimant is awarded.

23. Apart from the free parking spaces in the “open space” granted by the Lessor, the property management company of the property at question offers Lessees to the have a spot in the “underground parking” with an annual fee of £200; this is equivalent to £0.75p per day. The £100 parking charge is out of proportion.

24. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

25. Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims.

26. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

27. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

28. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing, the transcript of which is quoted as:
'It is ordered that the claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

29. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.

30. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

31. For all or any of the reasons stated above, the Court is invited to dismiss the Claim in of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 3.4, and to award the Defendant such costs as are allowable on the small claims track, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim unrealistic costs which they are not entitled to recover. Given that the claim is based on an alleged contractual parking charge of £100 - already significantly inflated and mostly representing profit, as was found in Beavis - but the amount claimed on the claim form is inexplicably £160.00, the Defendant avers that this inflation of the considered amount is a gross abuse of process. It is admitted that interest may be applicable, subject to the discretion of the Court on any sum (if awarded), but it is denied that interest is applicable on the total sums claimed by the Claimant.

32. In the alternative, the Court is invited, under the Judge's own discretionary case management powers, to set a preliminary hearing to examine the question of this Claimant's substantial interference with easements, rights and 'primacy of contract' of residents at this site, to put an end to not only this litigation but to send a clear message to the Claimant to case wasting the court's time by bringing beleaguered residents to court under excuse of a contractual breach that cannot lawfully exist.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Thanks Coupon-Mad!

I have made some amendments and slight tweak to the ordering.

May I ask for any further advice please?

Many Thanks!

Preliminary

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all. Save where otherwise admitted, each and every allegation in the Particulars of Claim is denied.

2. It is admitted that, at all material times, the Defendant was the owner and registered keeper of the vehicle in question.

3. It is admitted that, at all material times, the Defendant was the owner of one of the flats of the private land in question.

4. The Defendant has held a share of freehold of the property. The Lessor has granted his Lessees rights to park based upon the demise, grant and/or easements within the lease for many years before this PCN was issued.

5. It is averred that the Lessee is entitled to rely upon the parking rights granted from the Lessor, and further up that chain of authority, the Lessor is entitled to rely upon his primacy of contract within the lease, in order to grant Lessees an unfettered right to park.

6. The Lessee has the right to park a vehicle granted by the Lease, which does not specify the requirement of the display of a permit or to pay penalties to third parties, such as the Claimant. The Claimant has no consideration to offer the Defendant that the Defendant does not already possess.

7. It is stated within the Lease agreement that the Lessees shall “peaceably hold and enjoy the Premises during the Term without any interruption by the Lessor or any person rightfully claiming under or in trust for the Lessor”. The only restrictions upon parking was to ensure that private motor cars “shall at all times be fully taxed and insured and in a roadworthy condition”. The relevant paragraphs of the Lease are:
“FOURTH SCHEDULE Clause 2”
The right to use in common with the Lessees and the occupiers of all other Flats and their visitors the gardens drives paths and forecourt to the Building and the separate garden forming part of the Reserved Property subject to the provisions of Part 2 of the Sixth Schedule hereto and to such further rules and regulations for the common enjoyment thereof as the Lessor may from time to time prescribe.

“SIXTH SCHEDULE PART 2”
Any such private motor car parked on the Reserved Property in conformity with the requirements hereof shall at all times be fully taxed and insured and in a roadworthy condition (with current MOT Certificate if one is required due to the age of such private motor car)
“SEVENTH SCHEDULE”
The Lessee paying the rent and performing and observing the covenants on the part of the Lessee contained in the Sixth Schedule hereto the Lessee shall peaceably hold and enjoy the Premises during the Term without any interruption by the Lessor or by any person rightfully claiming under or in trust for the Lessor.

8. Whilst the Lessor is entitled by clause 2 of the Fourth Schedule to introduce “regulations”, these must be reasonable and must relate to the “use of enjoyment” of the Property. The intention and meaning of the clause is not so that they can restrict Lessees’ use and enjoyment of the Property and impose unreasonable obligations upon Lessees. It has also by no means defines that the regulation includes the introduction of a parking permit system.

9. The Claimant is put to strict proof of their due diligence by inspecting the Lease in place and considering the rights of the residents, prior to commencing enforcement. This is a location where Lessees already enjoyed rights that cannot be varied, restricted or charged for, out with a lease variation (Landlord & Tenant Act 1987 applies). Where a majority of the leaseholders agree to any proposed variation, if there are less than 9 leases all or all but one of the parties must consent and if there are more than 8 leases, 75% of the parties must consent, and not more than 10% must not object to the proposed variation. This degree of consensus is notoriously hard to achieve and it is averred the Claimant has simply not bothered, and merely set up some signs and imposed permits upon residents, causing an ongoing private nuisance to those affected.

10. The Defendant, at all material times, kept a vehicle in accordance with the terms granted by the Lease. The erection of the Claimant’s signage, and the purported contractual terms conveyed therein, are incapable of binding the Defendant in any way, and their existence does not constitute a legally valid variation of the terms of the Lease. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

11. It is denied that the Claimant has standing to bring any claim in the absence of a contract or other lawful authority that expressly permits the Claimant to do so, in addition to merely undertaking 'parking management'. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the Lessor to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

12. It is denied that any parking charges “loss and/or damage" (whatever they might be) as stated on the Particulars of claim are owed and any debt is denied in its entirety.

13. There are no terms within the Lease requiring Lessees or their guests to display parking permits, or to pay penalties to third parties, such as the Claimant, for non-display of same. Primacy of contract cannot be amended by Private Parking Company signs unless the Lessees have agreed to a variation of the tenancy, which the Lessees have not.

14. The principle of primacy of contract of the terms of a Lease, overriding any purported terms conveyed by a parking operator's signage, is well rehearsed in numerous persuasive Judgments given at various County Court hearing centres.

14.1. There is a large body of case law, which establishes this. In Link Parking Ltd vs J. Parkinson [2016] C7GF50J7, the Judge, referring to a similar case in In Pace Recovery v Mr N [2016] C6GF14F0 [2016] ruled that:
“…the Judge in that case found that the parking company could not amend the terms of the lease agreement to bind a Lessee, but rather that it would have to be the other party to the contract.

15. In correspondence received by the Defendant, the Claimant relies on the case of ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 as a binding precedent on the lower court. However, that only assists the Claimant if the facts of the case are the same, or broadly the same. In Beavis, it was common ground between the parties that the terms of a contract had been breached, whereas it is the Defendant's position that no such breach occurred in this case, because there was no valid contract, and also because the 'legitimate interest' in enforcing parking rules for retailers and shoppers in Beavis does not apply to these circumstances. Therefore, this case can be distinguished from Beavis on the facts and circumstances. Furthermore, in the case of Jopson v Homeguard [2016] B9GF0A9E it was established that ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 does not apply to residential parking.

16. The Claimant’s notices attempt to make a forbidding offer, which isn’t an offer at all therefore no contract exists.

17. The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot override the existing rights enjoyed by Lessees. Accordingly, using the statutory wording from the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (the POFA) relating to parking charges on private land, it is denied that:

17.1. there was any 'relevant contract' between the Defendant and the Claimant.

17.2. there was any 'relevant obligation' (at all) to display a permit.

18. The Defendant avers that there can be no "legitimate interest" in penalising Lessees for using parking spaces, under the excuse of a scheme where ostensibly and as far as the Lessor is concerned, the parking firm is contracted for the benefit of the Lessees. It is contrary to the requirement of good faith and "out of all proportion to any legitimate interest" to fine Lessees or their visitors for using the parking spaces provided.

19. The presence of the Claimant on the land will have supposedly been to prevent parking by uninvited persons, for the benefit of the actual leaseholders. Instead, a predatory operation has been carried out on those very people whose interests the Claimant was purportedly there to uphold.

20. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

21. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself. The Claimant has added an additional sum of £60 to the original £100 parking charge, for which no justification has been provided. The Defendant believes that this is an attempt at double recovery by the Claimant, which the Court should not uphold, even in the event that Judgment for Claimant is awarded.

22. Apart from the free parking spaces in the “open space” granted by the Lessor, the property management company of the property at question offers Lessees to the have a parking spot in the “underground parking” with an annual fee of £200; this is equivalent to £0.75p per day. The £100 parking charge is out of proportion in comparison.

23. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

24. Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims.

25. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

26. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

27. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing, the transcript of which is quoted as:
'It is ordered that the claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

28. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.

29. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

30. For all or any of the reasons stated above, the Court is invited to dismiss the Claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 3.4, and to award the Defendant such costs as are allowable on the small claims track, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim unrealistic costs which they are not entitled to recover. Given that the claim is based on an alleged contractual parking charge of £100 - already significantly inflated and mostly representing profit, as was found in Beavis - but the amount claimed on the claim form is inexplicably £160.00, the Defendant avers that this inflation of the considered amount is a gross abuse of process. It is admitted that interest may be applicable, subject to the discretion of the Court on any sum (if awarded), but it is denied that interest is applicable on the total sums claimed by the Claimant.

31. In the alternative, the Court is invited, under the Judge's own discretionary case management powers, to set a preliminary hearing to examine the question of this Claimant's substantial interference with easements, rights and 'primacy of contract' of residents at this site, to put an end to not only this litigation but to send a clear message to the Claimant to case wasting the court's time by bringing beleaguered residents to court under excuse of a contractual breach that cannot lawfully exist.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.