Indigo Parking Ticket Help - Misread FAQ Section

I have taken a mixture of some of the responses on here and have tailored them to my exact case. Could anyone be kind enough to give it a quick look through and confirm it is suitable for when i receive my POPLA code? Thanks in advance



POPLA Ref ...................
APCOA Parking PCN no .......................

I am writing to you as the registered keeper and would be grateful if you would please consider my appeal for the following reasons.

1) INDIGO not using POFA 2012 and stating that Railway Byelaws apply
2) Railway Land Is Not ‘Relevant Land’
3) Amount demanded is a penalty and is punitive
4) No keeper liability
5) Appellant not being the individual liable
6) Non-compliant signage, forming no contract with driver
7) Breach of DVLA’s KADOE contract with INDIGO
8) Location of the vehicle


1) INDIGO not using POFA 2012

INDIGO’s rejection of my initial appeal, it appears that INDIGO are attempting to claim the charge is liable to them under railway byelaws. This is shown below in response to my appeal against their PCN. I reject this and put to them strictly to prove on which byelaw they claim is broken, and in any case, why this would result in an obligation to pay INDIGO.

I also refer to Freedom of Information Act Request – F0013227 whereby the Department for the Secretary of State for Transport has categorically stated that no confirmation or change in laws since the Railways Act 1993 came into force, which empower any person or body other than the courts to impose a penalty for breach of Byelaws 14(1), (2) or (3) made under Section 219 of the Transport Act 2000 (as amended) and made operational on 7 July 2005.

Therefore, any breach of byelaws is a criminal offence, not a breach of any contract INDIGO may say the driver entered in to. If the driver is found to have breached byelaws 14 (1-3), the resulting penalty is paid to the government, not to INDIGO or the railway. Further, byelaw offences are decided by the court, not by INDIGO – the parking company or railway can only allege the breach.


2) Railway Land Is Not ‘Relevant Land’

Under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012, section 1, it states that:

“(1) This schedule applies where –
(a) The driver of a vehicle is required by virtue of a relevant obligation to pay parking charges in respect of the parking of the vehicle on relevant land”. Following from this, in section 3, PoFA 2012 states that: “(1) In this schedule “relevant land” means any land (including land above or below ground level) other than - … (b) any land … on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control”. And that: “(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) (c) the parking of a vehicle on land is “subject to statutory control” if any statutory provision imposes a liability (whether criminal or civil, and whether in the form of a fee or charge or a penalty of any kind) in respect of the parking on that land of vehicles generally or of vehicles of a description that includes the vehicle in question”.

Since byelaws apply to railway land, the land is not relevant land within the meaning of PoFA and so is specifically excluded from 'keeper liability' under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. As I am the registered keeper I am not legally liable, as this Act does not apply on this land. I ask INDIGO for strict proof otherwise if they disagree with this point and would require them to show evidence including documentary proof from the rail authorities that this land is not already covered by byelaws. Railway land, being governed by Byelaws, is not relevant land and Keeper Liability under POFA does not apply, and therefore INDIGO are unable to pursue the registered keeper in lieu of the driver’s details – see point 1 above as well.

POPLA assessor Steve Macallan found in 6062356150 in September 2016 that land under statutory control cannot be considered ‘relevant land’ for the purposes of POFA 2012. ‘As the site is not located on ‘relevant land’, the operator is unable to rely on POFA 2012 in order to transfer liability to the keeper. Additionally, as I am not satisfied the appellant was the driver, I am unable to conclude that the operator issued the PCN correctly, and I must allow this appeal.’


3) Amount demanded is a penalty and is punitive,

This contravenes the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The authority on this is ParkingEye v Beavis. That case was characterised by clear and ample signage where the motorist had time to read, and then consider the signage and decide whether to accept or not. In this case the signage was neither clear not ample, and the motorist had not time to read the signage, let alone consider it, as the charge was applied without the vehicle even entering the car park. The signage cannot be read safely from a moving vehicle.

Please see the attached photograph - that INDIGO supplied themselves as evidence in this case - showing the small signage. The car had not even passed this sign considering it was parked outside of the car park.


(4) No keeper liability

Having re-checked the date on the Notice to registered keeper issued by INDIGO, the driver is not known in this case. POFA 2012 Schedule 4, Paragraph 9, requires that, in order to make use of the provision to pursue the registered keeper, INDIGO must send a Notice to Keeper within 14 days of the alleged contravention. The alleged contravention happened outside Cowden Railway station Car Park on 8th May 2017. The Notice to registered keeper arrived on 16th June.
The Operator failed to deliver a Notice to Registered keeper that was fully compliant with the requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“POFA”)

The creditor may not exercise the right under paragraph 4 to recover from the keeper any unpaid parking charges specified in the notice to keeper if, within the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which that notice was given, the creditor is given—

Paragraph 14(2) and (3) of POFA 2012:

(2) The conditions are that —
(a) The creditor has within the relevant period given the registered keeper a notice in accordance with sub-paragraph (5) (a “notice to registered keeper”), together with a copy of the documents mentioned in paragraph 13(2) and the notice to keeper;
(b) A period of 21 days beginning with the day on which the notice to registered keeper was given has elapsed; and
(c) The vehicle was not a stolen vehicle at the beginning of the period of parking to which the unpaid parking charges relate.
(3) In sub-paragraph (2)(a) “the relevant period” is the period of 21 days beginning with the day after that on which the documents required by paragraph 13(2) are given to the creditor.[/I]

- INDIGO was required to send this information to me (as Registered Keeper) within 21 days after receiving them from the lease/hire company .
- I was informed of the PCN 38 days later.
- As this has not happened, you cannot use POFA to assume keeper liability. There is more than one driver of the vehicle which you placed a PCN on.

In Summary...
- I wish to confirm to you I was NOT the driver of the vehicle.
- I am not obliged to disclose the identity of the driver and this does not affect my liability in this matter.
- As INDIGO has not complied with paragraphs 13 (2) and 14 (2) of POFA 2012, you cannot rely on the provisions of the Act and hold me liable as keeper.
- You will need to pursue this claim with the driver once you identify them.
Should the Operator try to suggest that there is any other method whereby a vehicle’s keeper (or registered keeper) can be held liable for a charge where a driver is not identified, I draw POPLA’s attention to the guidance given to operators in POPLA's 2015 Annual Report by Henry Greenslade, Chief Adjudicator in which he reminded them of a keeper's right not to name the driver whilst still not being held liable for an unpaid parking charge under Schedule 4 of POFA. Although I trust that POPLA's assessors are already very familiar with the contents of this report, for ease of reference I set out a link as follows:

popla.co.uk/docs/default-source/default-document-library/popla_annualreport_2015.pdf?sfvrsn=2

I draw POPLA’s particular attention to the section entitled “Keeper Liability” in which Mr. Greenslade explains that:

“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.......
.......... However keeper information is obtained, there is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver”.

Through its failure to deliver a compliant Notice to Registered keeper, the Operator has forfeited its right to claim unpaid parking charges from the vehicle’s registered keeper. For this reason alone, POPLA may determine that the Operator’s claim against me is invalid.



(5) Appellant not being the individual liable

INDIGO has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who was liable for the charge. (ref POPLA case Carly Law 6061796103). In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. Any person(s), with the consent of the registered keeper, may drive a vehicle as long as the driver is insured.

Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be and as the registered keeper/lessee of the vehicle in question), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

Not being the owner of the vehicle, under the Railway byelaws the registered keeper of the vehicle cannot assumed to be the owner anymore than they can assumed to be the driver.

As the registered keeper/lessee of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if INDIGO is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made because the fact remains I am only the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with INDIGO, because they cannot use the POFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA 2012 was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability

“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. If POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass."

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:

"I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal."

The same conclusion was reached by POPLA Assessor Steve Macallan, quoted in appeal point above.



6) Non-compliant signage, forming no contract with driver

The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from the main road where the car was parked and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself. Entrance signs which are mandatory under the code are not visible from where the car was parked and do not follow paragraph 18.2 of the code from where the car was parked on the main road.

There was neither contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case. For a contract to be formed, one of the many considerations is that there must be adequate signage on entering the car park, and furthermore a Notice is not imported into the contract unless brought home “so prominently that the party ‘must’ have known of it” and agreed terms. I contend that this is not the case, and question the fact that the driver saw any sign specifying the amount of the ‘fine’ that would be due, and so there was no consideration or acceptance and no contract agreed between the parties

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:


In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case (Cowden picture used from INDIGO evidence provided):



This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge, which is hidden in small print. Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put INDIGO to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:


''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:


''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports My argument, not the operator's case:

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put INDIGO to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective from the main road having not even entered the car park. Equally, I require INDIGO to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat having parked a car before even reaching the car park, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking (and not even entering the car park) and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

Quick question, still haven't received a POPLA code from Indigo and it's now been a month since I sent the original correspondence. Nothing in the post either. Is this normal? Thanks