Pesky Parking Eye - Should I or Shouldnt I pay?

Coupon-mad wrote: »

That's a good POPLA appeal to base yours on.

Just change details such as the dates of the Notice posted to you (that example says July and August) and remove the pic of the sign at midnight and any mention of darkness, if it was actually daylight.

Replace any sentence which describes what the driver did that doesn't suit your case, with the facts like 'the driver may have been waiting for someone who missed the ferry; there were no prominent signs to inform the driver that they were being recorded'.

It's probably obvious to you what needs changing. The proof reading is down to you; it's a very good example and should win.

I have now changed bits and pieces and changed the statuory thing to bylaws.

Can you please have a look when you have time and advise me WHERE I should put the alleged waiting for someone and them missing the ferry thing please. I am not a lawyer and whichever way I write it, it sounds terrible .thanks in advance

Here is the new link to the revised appeal -including all the information everyone has advised on this thread. Such as the bylaws and the winning case showing the non relevant land thingy.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/i2wlp7v9qnd1itd/Parking%20Charge%20Notice%20revised.docx?dl=0

Thanks Coupon Mad & Everyone that is helping me.

[FONT=&quot] POFA Para 9(2)(f) states that the Notice to Keeper must

‘warn the keeper that if after the period of 28 days […]
(i) the amount of the unpaid parking charges […] has not been paid in full, and
(ii) the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver,
the creditor will have the right to recover from the keeper so much of that amount as remains unpaid’.

As the Parking Charge Notice received in this instance does not include this warning, the operator is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. This is a clear and strict requirement under the relevant legislation that ParkingEye have not complied with and as such cannot rely upon to hold me liable as keeper.


This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:
''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.''





3 ParkingEye has no standing or authority to form contracts with drivers in this particular car park, nor to pursue charges.

I do not believe that ParkingEye has any proprietary interest in the land such that it has no standing to make contracts with drivers in its own right, or to pursue charges for breach in its own name. In the absence of such title, ParkingEye must have assignment of rights from the landowner to pursue charges for breach in their own right, including at Court level.

I contend that ParkingEye merely holds a basic licence to supply and maintain signs and to post out 'tickets' as a deterrent to car park users. I therefore require ParkingEye to provide POPLA and me with an unredacted, contemporaneous copy of the contract that it holds with the landowner. This is required so that I may be satisfied that this contract permits ParkingEye to make contracts with drivers in its own right and provides it with full authority to pursue charges, including a right to pursue them in Court in its own name.

For the avoidance of doubt, a witness statement to the effect that a contract is or was in place will not be sufficient to provide the necessary detail of the contract terms (such as revenue sharing, genuine intentions of these restrictions and charges, set amounts to charge for each stated contravention, etc.). A witness statement would not comply with section 7 of the BPA Code of Practice as the definition of the services provided would not be stated in such a vague template document.

4 The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

[FONT=&quot]In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-eYdphoIIDgE/VpbCpfSTaiI/AAAAAAAAE10/5uFjL528DgU/s640/Parking%2Bsign_001.jpg

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car [/FONT]

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park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.
Here is the Town Quay sign:

Please note, this sign was NOT at the entrance to the car park but some way in, quite high up above a pay machine in the Red zone (permit parking) area. The wording on this sign is crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background, with far too much information for a motorist to take in while driving past, and the wording of the terms and conditions at the bottom of the sign is so small it is virtually illegible. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.


There are neither full terms nor the sum of the parking charge displayed at the entrance to the site, or in one half of the main car park, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one. It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, most signs do not clearly mention the parking charge.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

The terms, where displayed at all, are displayed inadequately, in letters approximately a quarter inch high, with the charge in letters just one inch high:

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

http://www.signazon.com/help-center/sign-letter-height-visibility-chart.aspx

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:
http://www.ebay.co.uk/gds/Outdoor-Dimensional-Sign-Letter-Best-Viewing-Distance-/10000000175068392/g.html
''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just a quarter inch showing the terms and one inch showing the 'charge', placed high on a wall or pole and buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when on a pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it with perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass to be able to read the terms. To read the terms and conditions at all one would need to be at most 10 feet from the sign, but a driver driving past any signs in this car park would be more than 20 feet away.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established.


5. The car park signage failed notify the driver that ParkingEye Ltd intended to exercise its rights under POFA
[FONT=&quot]In circumstances where the terms of a notice are not negotiable (as is the case with the car park signage) and where there is any ambiguity or contradiction in those terms, the rule of contra proferentem shall apply against the party responsible for writing those terms. This is confirmed within the Consumer Rights Act 2015 including;

Paragraph 68 (1): a trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.

Paragraph 68 (2): a consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

Paragraph 69 (1): if a term in a consumer contract, or a consumer notice, could have different meanings, the meaning that is most favourable to the consumer is to prevail.

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