SIP Parking

Thanks CM - it was at Manchester County Court. The judge was very thorough and very nice. I'm just trying to draft my defence and I'll post it as soon as it's done.

Fight, I don't want to out myself in case SIP are reading these boards (I've read that they do) but it was Manchester City Centre.

I am XX XX, Defendant in this matter and I assert that the Claimant has no cause for action for the following reasons:

1. It is admitted that I was the authorised registered keeper of the vehicle in question at the time of the alleged incident.

2. It is believed that it will be a matter of common ground that claim relates to a purported debt as the result of the issue of two Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) in relation to an alleged breach of the terms and conditions by the driver of the vehicle XXXXX when it was parked at XX. The PCNs stated the contravention as a) “Time Exceeded,” and b) "Invalid Ticket Displayed."

3. Further based upon the scant and deficient details contained in the Particulars of Claim and correspondence, it appears to be the Claimant's case that:
a. There was a contract formed between SIP Parking Ltd and me on XX/2016.
b. There was any agreement to pay a sum or parking charge
c. That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site
d. That in addition to the parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional and unspecified sums.
e. That SIP Parking Ltd fully complied with their obligations within the International Parking Community Code of Practice of which they were member at the time.

4. It is denied that:
a. A contract was formed, and it is further denied that any contravention of ''invalid ticket displayed'' occurred or can have occurred when using the PaybyPhone option, the failure of which was not communicated to me nor was it within my control. Even if a contract was potentially formed it was frustrated by the unexpected and uncommunicated failure of the Claimant's app, and it is trite law that no party can be held liable for breach to another under such circumstances of frustration of contract.
b. There was any agreement to pay a parking charge.
c. That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site. which communicated any additional punitive parking charge (effectively a private 'fine') in large lettering, in a clear and concise way, on a par with the tariff signs where the fees were advertised in the largest font. By contrast, the 'parking charge' is positively buried in small print, contrary to Lord Denning's 'Red Hand Rule' and contrary to the requirements of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

d. That in addition to the parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional and unspecified sums.
e. The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the International Parking Community Code of Practice of which they were member at the time.
f. The Pay by Phone app, being indisputably an offer of a 'distance contract', complied with The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, which says:

''Confirmation of distance contracts: 16.—(1) In the case of a distance contract the trader must give the consumer confirmation of the contract on a durable medium.
(2) The confirmation must include all the information referred to in Schedule 2 unless the trader has already provided that information to the consumer on a durable medium prior to the conclusion of the distance contract.
(3) If the contract is for the supply of digital content not on a tangible medium and the consumer has given the consent and acknowledgment referred to in regulation 37(1)(a) and (b), the confirmation must include confirmation of the consent and acknowledgement.''

5. I further deny that I am liable for the purported debt.

Rebuttal of Claim
6. I made all reasonable efforts to make payment for parking by using an approved payment channel.
a. Payment for parking was made for one hour using the ticket machine onsite, allowing me time to uninstall and reinstall the PayByPhone mobile app. 48 hours was then purchased offsite via the mobile phone app.
b. This is a distance contract which requires certain information to be supplied in advance.
c. The service makes no provision for the printing of a ticket to display.
d. I followed the PayByPhone instructions exactly as shown on the app and as I have done numerous times before and since.
d. This was a fully automated contract.
e. The payment channel did not indicate any failure to make payment and responded as if payment had been made. As such I believed the necessary payment had been made.
f. I do not believe that the failure of the payment service to accept payment is my responsibility. It is not reasonable in these circumstances for the driver to assume any more obligations for making the payment.
In Jolley v Carmel Ltd [2000] 2 –EGLR -154, it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach when unable to fully comply with the terms.

7. I did not enter into any 'agreement on the charge', no consideration flowed between the parties and no contract was established.

8. I deny that I would have agreed to pay the original demand of £100 to agree to the alleged contract had the terms and conditions of the contract been properly displayed and accessible.
a. The amount demanded is excessive and unconscionable and especially so when compared to the level of Penalty Charge Notice issued by the local Council which is set at £50 or £25 if paid within 14 days.

9. The signage on this site was inadequate to form a contract with the motorist (please see photos enclosed)
a. The signage on and around the site in question was unclear and not prominent and did not meet the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice or the International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice. The Claimant was a member of the IPC at the time and committed to follow its requirements. Therefore no contract has been formed with driver to pay the amount demanded by the Claimant, or any additional fee charged if unpaid in 28 days.
b. The size of font of the prices advised for parking is much larger than the font of the contract and the offer is not sufficiently brought to the attention of the motorist, nor are the onerous terms (the £100 parking charge) sufficiently prominent to satisfy Lord Dennings "red hand rule”.
c. In the absence of ‘adequate notice’ of the terms and the charge (which must be in large prominent letters such as the brief, clear and multiple signs in the Beavis case) this fails to meet the requirements of Schedule 4 of the POFA.


10. The Claimant has artificially inflated the value of the Claim from £100 in their first invoice to £160 in their final invoice for each PCN. I believe that the added costs have not actually been incurred by the Claimant; that these are figures plucked out of thin air and applied regardless of facts.
a. If the “parking charge” listed in the particulars of claim is to be considered a written agreement between Defendant and Claimant then under 7.3, the particulars fail to include “a copy of the contract or documents constituting the agreement”.
b. The Claimant has at no time provided an explanation how the sum has been calculated, the conduct that gave rise to it or how the amount has climbed from £100 to £160. Furthermore, SIP Parking Ltd's solicitor, Gladstones, has increased this further from £320 to £413.60 on the court claim form, to £441.27 on the (now set-aside) CCJ. This appears to be an added cost with no apparent qualification and an attempt at double recovery, which the POFA Schedule 4 specifically disallows.
c. The Protection of Freedom Act Para 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, to whit: the original £100 per PCN.

Non-disclosure of reasonable grounds or particulars for bringing a claim:
11. SIP Parking Ltd are not the lawful occupier of the land. I have reasonable belief that they do not have the authority to issue charges on this land in their own name and that they have no rights to bring action regarding this claim.
a. The Claimant is not the landowner as per a recent Land Registry search, and furthermore I have an email from the landowner stating that they do not contract with SIP Parking Ltd (please see correspondence enclosed)
b. The Claimant is not the landowner and suffers no loss whatsoever as a result of a vehicle parking at the location in question
c. The Claimant is put to proof that it has sufficient interest in the land or that there are specific terms in its contract to bring an action on its own behalf. As a third party agent, the Claimant may not pursue any charge
d. The Particulars of Claim are deficient in establishing whether the claim is brought in trespass. If the driver on the date of the event was considered to be a trespasser if not allowed to park there, then only the landowner can pursue a case under the tort of trespass not this Claimant, and as the Supreme Court in the Beavis vs Parking Eye (2015) [2015] UKSC 67 case confirmed, such a matter would be limited to the landowner themselves claiming for a nominal sum.

12. The Particulars of Claim fail to fulfil CPR Part 16.4 because it does not include a statement of the facts on which the claimant relies, only referring to a Parking Charge Notice with no further description; it fails to establish a cause of action which would enable me to prepare a specific defence:
‘The driver of the vehicle registration XX incurred the parking charge(s) on XX/2016, XX/2016 for breaching the terms of parking on the land at XX Manchester. The Defendant was driving the Vehicle and/or is the Keeper of the Vehicle AND THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS £320.00 for Parking Charges / Damages and indemnity costs if applicable, together with interest of £8.60 pursuant to s69 of the County Courts Act 1984 at 8% pa, continuing to Judgment at £0.07 per day’

13. The claimant has not provided enough details in the particulars of claim to file a full defence. In particular, the full details of the contract which it is alleged was broken have not been provided.
a) The Claimant has disclosed no cause of action to give rise to any debt.
b) The Claimant has stated that a parking charge was incurred.
c) The Claimant has given no indication of the nature of the alleged charge in the Particulars of Claim. The Claimant has therefore disclosed no cause of action.
d) The Particulars of Claim contains no details and fails to establish a cause of action which would enable me to prepare a specific defence. It just states “parking charges” which does not give any indication of on what basis the claim is brought. There is no information regarding why the charge arose, what the original charge was, what the alleged contract was nor anything which could be considered a fair exchange of information. The Particulars of Claim are incompetent in disclosing no cause of action.

14. I respectfully invite the court to strike out or dismiss the claim under Rule 3.4(2)(a) of PRACTICE DIRECTION 3A as having not set out a concise statement of the nature of the claim or disclosed reasonable grounds or particulars for bringing a claim (Part 16.4(1)(a) and PRACTICE DIRECTION 16 paragraphs 3.1-3.8). In C3GF84Y (Mason, Plymouth County Court), the judge struck out the claim brought by KBT Cornwall Ltd as Gladstones Solicitors had not submitted proper Particulars of Claim, and similar reasons were cited by District Judge Cross of St Albans County Court on 20/09/16 where another relevant poorly pleaded private parking charge claim by Gladstones was struck out without a hearing due to their ‘roboclaim’ particulars being incoherent, failing to comply with CPR16.4, and ''providing no facts that could give rise to any apparent claim in law''. The Practice Direction also sets out the following example which is analogous to this claim: ‘those which set out no facts indicating what the claim is about, for example ‘Money owed £5000’.’

15. I researched the matter online, and discovered that the Claimant is a member of the Independent Parking Committee (IPC), an organisation operated by Gladstones Solicitors. They also operate the Independent Appeals Service (IAS), the allegedly independent body appointed by the Claimant’s trade body, the IPC. This research revealed that the IAS, far from being independent, is a subsidiary of the IPC, which in turn is owned and run by the same two Directors who also run Gladstones Solicitors. The individuals in question are John Davies, and William Hurley. These findings indicate a conflict of interest. Such an incestuous relationship is incapable of providing any fair means for motorists to challenge parking charges, as well as potentially breaching the Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct.

16. The Claimant’s solicitors are known to be a serial issuer of generic claims similar to this one, with no due diligence, no scrutiny of details nor even checking for a true cause of action.

17. I believe the terms for such conduct is ‘robo claims’ which is against the public interest, demonstrates a disregard for the dignity of the court and is unfair on unrepresented consumers. I have reason to believe that this is a claim that will proceed without any facts or evidence supplied until the last possible minute, to my significant detriment as an unrepresented Defendant.

18. I respectfully suggest that parking companies using the small claims track as a form of aggressive, automated debt collection is not something the Courts should be seen to support.

19. I deny the claim in its entirety voiding any liability to the claimant for all amounts due to the aforementioned reasons. It is submitted that the conduct of the Claimant is wholly unreasonable and vexatious.

20. I invite the court to dismiss this claim out as it is in breach of pre court protocols in relation to the particulars of claim under Practice Direction 16, set out by the Ministry of Justice and also Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) under 16.4 and to allow such Defendant’s costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14.

I believe the facts stated in this Defence Statement are true.