McDonald's & MET - almost a month later

Coupon-mad wrote: »

I don't think that is worth arguing, stick with more obvious NTK wording breaches & omissions. Yes, show us all your draft please.

Non-compliance with the PoFA 2012 - a compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.

In Schedule 4, Paragraph 9, the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) gives several legal requirements for the issue of a valid Notice to Keeper (NtK). I have yet to receive a NtK that meets these requirements and therefore, due to the lack of a compliant NtK being issued, the operator cannot hold me liable for this charge.

According to Paragraph 9(2)(e), The notice must:

state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and invite the keeper—!
(i)to pay the unpaid parking charges; or!
(ii)if the keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to notify the creditor of the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to pass the notice on to the driver;!

Nowhere on any correspondence I have received does the operator “invite the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charges”.

Paragraph 9(2)(h) states that a valid notice must:

identify the creditor and specify how and to whom payment or notification to the creditor may be made;

I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance by demonstration where within the PCN the creditor is explicitly identified.

Paragraph 9(2)(a) states that a notice must:

specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates;

Here, the drafters have been very careful with their wording. It is explicit that a valid NtK must specify the period of!parking. This is manifestly different from the period of time between the first and second photographs on the PCN as they only provide times between entry to and departure from the car park; it gives no information about how long the vehicle was stationary and parked for. Reference to previous adjudications that recognise that it takes time for a driver to read and understand signage as well as park and pay for tickets where appropriate will elucidate this vital distinction.

This operator has not fulfilled the 'second condition' for keeper liability as defined in Schedule 4 and as a result, they have no lawful authority to pursue any parking charge from myself, as a registered keeper appellant. There is no discretion on this matter. If Schedule 4 mandatory documents are not served at all, or in time (or if the document omits any prescribed wording) then keeper liability simply does not apply.

The wording in the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012 is as follows:

''Right to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle:
4(1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. (2) The right under this paragraph applies only if

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6*, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met;

*Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4:
6(1) ''The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor)— (a)has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8. This is re-iterated further ‘If a notice to driver has been given, any subsequent notice to keeper MUST be given in accordance with paragraph 8.’

The terms are very clear and this is emphasised in the BPA CoP. As this operator has evidently failed to serve a NTK, not only have they chosen to flout the strict requirements set out in PoFA 2012, but they have consequently failed to meet the second condition for keeper liability. Clearly the keeper cannot be held liable to pay this charge as the mandatory series of parking charge documents were not properly given.

!

The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who was liable for the charge

In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no PoFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.!

Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made because the fact remains I am only the keeper and only Schedule 4 of the PoFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator, because they cannot use the PoFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land!and!show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the PoFA 2012 was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability, “There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.!

There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.”

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.!

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:!


“I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.'”

!

No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice

Since this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land, I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, merely because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.!

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).!

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b) any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c) any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d) who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e) the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement

!

The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.!

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only explicitly saying the decision was only applicable to that instance as it took into account “the use of this particular car park & clear wording of the notices”.

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest sized typeface with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were signs in 'large lettering' at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.!

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

!

In contrast, this case manifestly fails to an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and!'agreement on the charge'!existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with multiple colours, a tiny typeface and many confusing and irrelevant paragraphs. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read prior to parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print. Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

It is particularly noteworthy that signage does not give the sum of the parking charge (or indeed any charge at all) in large lettering so at no point was the driver correctly informed about any contractual arrangement to pay £100.. A driver cannot be liable to pay a charge not prominently communicated and £100 is certainly onerous, in a free car park. The signage is demonstrably inadequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers.

Schedule 4.2 clear states the following:

(2)The reference in the definition of “parking charge” to a sum in the nature of damages is to a sum of which adequate notice was given to drivers of vehicles (when the vehicle was parked on the relevant land).

(3)For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) “adequate notice” means notice given by—

(a)the display of one or more notices in accordance with any applicable requirements prescribed in regulations under paragraph!12!for, or for purposes including, the purposes of sub-paragraph (2); or

(b)where no such requirements apply, the display of one or more notices which—

(i)specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and

(ii)are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

“the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators’ signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.”

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than a couple of centimetres high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.!I also put the operator to strict proof of the height of the signs and the proximity of the nearest sign to where the driver was parked.

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

http://www.signazon.com/help-center/sign-letter-height-visibility-chart.aspx

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and!want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

http://www.ebay.co.uk/gds/Outdoor-Dimensional-Sign-Letter-Best-Viewing-Distance-/10000000175068392/g.html

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters.!Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.!

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''!

So, a letter height far smaller than 3”, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a magnifying glass) to be able to clearly read the terms. There are further guidelines published by the BPA on lettering size.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':!

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.!
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact!Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106!about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the full terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

Umkomaas wrote: »

Complain to the BPA.