Tower road, Newquay, Again..

Coupon-mad wrote: »

It is not pointless appealing to POPLA and in fact we have found PE often cancel at POPLA stage re Tower Road, when they see a forum appeal, going into detail. Not sure why, it might be because of the contract, but we've seen them give up.

Worth the fight, so do a search and find a few appeals to crib from. Then show us your version before submitting them (same for both PCNs as long as the details are similar).

Did both PCNs have the 'POFA keeper liability after 29 days' wording on the front page near the bottom? Or instead of that, do either of them have a blank space near the bottom and no mention of the POFA and the registered keeper being liable?

Hi,
I am the registered keeper and was a passenger in the car so I can give an honest account of this unfair charge; however I was not the driver at the time in question – the driver will not be named according to POFA 2012.
On the occasion in question, my family I and visited Newquay for the day.
We entered a pay and display car park as close to the beach as we could without getting lost.
Some weeks later – and not the 8 days quoted by the Parking Eye charge notice we received a parking ticket notice for £100
We purchased a ticket to what we thought was sufficient time according to the signage.
I have yet to receive any evidence that our car was present without a valid ticket, such as a photo.
I have spent many hours researching Parking Eye and this car park in particular – and it appears to be a reoccurring issue caused in a misleading trap set by Parking Eye – for the sole purpose of making money in this fashion.
These issues are widely reported as are the complaints sent to Cornwall council.
I feel the fine is not only unwarranted, but completely unfair and out of proportion.
The points I would like to submit to show I am not liable for this charge are as follows
1) The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 - no keeper liability
As this was a Pay/Display car park, the Notice to Keeper (NTK) has to set out the position clearly in terms of 'describing the parking charges due' which remained unpaid as at the day before the date of issue of the PCN.
Due to this timeline stated in Schedule 4, these 'parking charges due' can only be a tariff the driver should have paid, because no higher sum was 'due' before the PCN was even printed!

From the pcn I can only see that, that the car stayed for a certain amount of time and that the contravention was 'either/or' an overstay or failure to pay. This does not give any clarity of terms, it leaves a keeper to wonder what the hourly rate tariff even was and whether the driver paid nothing, or paid too little, or paid only for half an hour or an hour, or paid in full but put in the wrong car registration, or some other event. This Operator has the technology to record car registrations, to collect/record payments and to take photos of cars arriving and leaving, so it would be reasonable to assume that they are able - and indeed are required under the POFA - to state on the NTK the basic requirements to show a keeper how the 'parking charges' arose and the amount of outstanding parking charges (tariff) as at the day before the PCN was issued.

These are the omissions:
''9(2)The notice must—
(b)inform the keeper that the driver is required to pay parking charges in respect of the specified period of parking and that the parking charges have not been paid in full;
(c)describe the parking charges due from the driver as at the end of that period, the circumstances in which the requirement to pay them arose (including the means by which the requirement was brought to the attention of drivers) and the other facts that made them payable;
(d)specify the total amount of those parking charges that are unpaid...'
NTK is not compliant, for example re this requirement:

The NTK specifically fails on all counts.
2) The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who was liable for the charge
In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.

Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made because the fact remains I am only the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator, because they cannot use the POFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA 2012 was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability
“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.''

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:
''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.''


3) No landowner authority

Section 7 of the BPA CoP states that an operator must have the written authorisation of the Landowner, if the parking company does not own the land, which Parking Eye do not.

Paragraphs 7.1 & 7.2 dictate some of the required contract wording. I request Parking Eye provide proof of the contract terms with the actual landowner (not another agent, shop, etc) and I would also point out these mandatory requirements, which a vague ‘witness statement’ will not prove:

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined
b) any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation
c) any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement
d) who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs
e) the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement
I do not believe that Smart Parking have a contract with the site landowner which meets all the requirements above and even if they do, the contract breaches the EA 2010 if indirect discrimination arises as a result of any inflexible point of policy.

4) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.


There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

“imgur.com/a/AkMCN”

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

"2.bp.blogspot.com/-eYdphoIIDgE/VpbCpfSTaiI/AAAAAAAAE10/5uFjL528DgU/s640/Parking%2Bsign_001.jpg"

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

"archive.mozilla.org/newlayout/testcases/css/sec526pt2.htm"

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

"signazon.com/help-center/sign-letter-height-visibility-chart.aspx"

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

"ebay.co.uk/gds/Outdoor-Dimensional-Sign-Letter-Best-Viewing-Distance-/10000000175068392/g.htm"

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

"bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html"

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.
5) The charge is a penalty, breaches the CRA and is not saved by the decision in ParkingEye vs Beavis

It appears that a partial registration number may have been recorded, either by inadvertent error of the disabled/elderly driver, or by failure of the operator's own keypad, or failure of the signage to make the full VRN a clear 'obligation' with risk of a penalty. No evidence has been produced either way by this operator as to the cause of the issue and it is not disputed by any party that there was certainly no attempt to avoid payment, which according to the complex signage was paid in full.

This situation is an 'ordinary' contract involving no overstay and no breach of the legitimate interests of the landowner. This was a simple consumer/trader transaction with a ticket for parking being purchased in good faith and produced by a machine and can be very easily distinguished from the case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis.

Indeed, the Judges' findings at the Court of Appeal stage - which were not disputed nor overturned at the Supreme Court, so the findings stand as part of that binding case law - fully support my view that the case of 'Kemble v Farren' remains the binding authority in support of this position.

At 47 in the Court of Appeal Judgment in 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' it was held:

''When the court is considering an ordinary financial or commercial contract, then it is understandable that the law, which lays down its own rules as to the compensation due from a contract breaker to the innocent party, should prohibit terms which require the payment of compensation going far beyond that which the law allows in the absence of any contract provision governing this outcome. The classic and simple case is that referred to by Tindal CJ in Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing. 141 at 148: “But that a very large sum should become immediately payable, in consequence of the non-payment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered a penalty, appears to be a contradiction in terms, the case being precisely that in which courts of equity have always relieved, and against which courts of law have, in modern times, endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess the real damages sustained by the breach of the agreement.” ''

And at the Supreme Court it was held at 14. ''…where a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform an act, and also provides that, if he does not perform it, he will pay the other party a specified sum of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a secondary obligation which is capable of being a penalty;’ ''

At 22, the Supreme Court explored Lord Dunedin’s speech in Dunlop and separated complex cases (Beavis) from ordinary/standard contracts with a transaction and tariff paid at a machine:
''Lord Dunedin's...four tests are a useful tool for deciding whether these expressions can properly be applied to simple damages clauses in standard contracts. But they are not easily applied to more complex cases.''

This is NOT a 'more complex' case by any stretch of the imagination.

At 32, it was held that a trader, in this case a parking company:
''...can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.''

Clearly a charge out of all proportion to the tariff - which was paid in any case - is an unfair penalty to the mind of any reasonable man, regardless of whether in the small print, the sign may have said somewhere 'enter the full registration'. A huge charge arising under the excuse of such a minor term is unjustified and unfair, if the remedy is out of all proportion with the 'breach' and the (completely different) Beavis case does NOT apply to this argument.

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (the CRA, enacted after the Beavis parking event) supports a consumer's position in at least two ways:

- the signage failed to make any obligation and/or risk of penalty prominent, to enter the FULL VRN. The CRA states: ''A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract or a written consumer notice is transparent. To be transparent it must be expressed in plain and intelligible language and be legible...any subject matter terms must not be hidden in any small print otherwise the price and the subject matter terms will be assessed for "fairness". ''

- Under Schedule 2 'Consumer contract terms which may be regarded as unfair' it includes: ''A term which has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation.''

As this charge is clearly punitive and is not saved from breaching the 'penalty rule' (i.e. Lord Dunedin's four tests for a penalty) by the Beavis case, which turned on completely different facts and related only to that car park with its own unique complexity of commercial justification.

6)It was also apparent on this day that the were issues with one or more of the parking machines.
Numerous people were complaining about incorrect tickets being printed, or simply that no tickets were being produced – this seemed to be intermittent and with the lack of onsite staff, this was causing allot of doubt and lack of confidence in the machines to accurately record and print information.
If the phone logs to Parking eyes are checked from the day in question – the volume of calls to the help line from this site will be apparent – and also add reason to doubt the integrity of the information supplied by Parking Eye.

This concludes my POPLA Appeal